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so as to achieve happiness, prosperity 
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This thesis—its conceptualisation, its research, its writing—has been a long, arduous, 
sometimes pleasing, often painful, and ultimately rewarding process. I began thinking about its 
problem as an LLM student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where 
I was introduced to the idea of rights inflation in Dr Kai Möller’s Theory of Human Rights 
Law class. The idea is essentially that all autonomy interests are prima facie protected as rights, 
and whether or not a right has been violated is to be decided at the balancing stage. I was struck 
by the sharply divergent situation in Singapore, where as little interests as possible are protected 
as constitutional rights, and where constitutional rights claims have never been vindicated. I 
wanted to find out why—and one under-explored reason is Singapore’s communitarian 
approach to rights. I then wanted to know what communitarian means, and why this appeared 
to be the accepted reason—or at least attribution—in the scholarship for Singapore’s prima 
facie weak protection of rights. My digging deeper into the issue has led me on an journey that, 
I think, is the point of academia: discovering new ideas (I had never heard of communitarianism 
before this), revising old ones (I had once claimed—in private, thankfully—that liberal 
democracy is the most superior form of governance), and putting it all together to form a 
coherent argument that reflects parts of the author that are both intellectual and personal. Just 
as this thesis has shown me that orthodoxies are not static, I hope to persuade the reader that a 
communitarian approach to rights, one that takes rights seriously, is not just plausible, but 
normatively attractive as well.  
 I had the occasion to present the ideas in the thesis at various workshops and 
conferences, and I would like to thank the convenors for giving me the opportunity to do so. 
An amalgamation of Chapters One, Two, Three and Four was presented at the 4th Legal 
Scholarship Workshop, University of Hong Kong. Chapter Three was presented, and 
rigorously challenged, by the participants in the Cambridge Legal Theory Discussion Group 
and the 7th Annual Yale Law School Doctoral Scholarship Conference. The argument in 
Chapter Four was presented at the Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy during 
my session on Chapter Three of David Miller’s On Nationality. The core argument of the thesis 
was presented at the 5th International Society of Public Law Conference at the University of 
Hong Kong. The comments that I have received from the presenters, participants and audience 
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members at these workshops and conferences have helped me sharpen and refine my 
arguments, for which I am grateful.  
 This thesis would not have been possible without the support of a handful of important 
people. My utmost and unquantifiable thanks goes to Mom and Dad. Not only has their 
generous financial support allowed me to do this PhD at all, but their unwavering and 
unconditional love gave me the freedom to break from the mould of Singaporean 
conventionality so that I could explore and define the contours of my authentic self. I owe 
special thanks to my supervisors, Dr Kirsty Hughes, Dr Haris Psarras and Dr Antara Haldar, 
who challenged my assumptions and arguments, and often believed in the feasibility of my 
project, and my ability to see it through, more than I did. Thanks also to my advisor/first year 
examiner, Professor David Feldman, and my other first year examiner, Dr Stephanie Palmer, 
whose challenge to my original, nebulously conceived thesis led to the thesis as it stands today. 
Thanks is also due to Professor Matthew Kramer for giving me the opportunity to test a key 
idea at his Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy.  
 My Cambridge experience has been made immeasurably more colourful and rewarding 
by the life-changing friendships that I have made. John Adenitire and Raffael Fasel have been 
my anchor in the sea of confusion that Cambridge has often been. It is through their support, 
both intellectual and personal, that I discovered the true meaning of community. I am also 
grateful to Chung Wei-Yun, Ivan Lee, Kaara Martinez, Joshua Neoh and Barry Solaiman for 
the hours of conversation and laughter over a glass (or many glasses) of wine, at Magdalene 
College’s candle-lit formal dinner, on a walk to Grantchester, and/or while walking several 
times around Magdalene’s magnificent garden on study breaks. I would also like to thank my 
friends back home, Chang Rui Shan and Magdelene Seraphiel Sim, the repositories of the parts 
of myself that I sometimes lost to the whirlwind of the Cambridge PhD experience. Finally, I 
would like to thank my partner, Etienne De Braekeleer, for being the calm amidst the storm, 
the voice of clarity amidst the cacophony of self-doubt, and for his endless patience and love.   
 The Chinese, Japanese and Korean names in this thesis follow their naming convention: 
surname (Chang), then given name (Ya Lan). Christian names, however, will precede 
surnames. 
 






In 2010, two men in their forties1 were arrested for having oral sex with each other in a public 
toilet in Singapore. They were charged under section 377A of the Penal Code 2  which 
criminalises acts of ‘gross indecency’ between men.3 No similar provision for women exists, 
and the old section 377 which criminalised acts ‘against the order of nature’ regardless of 
gender was repealed in 2007.4 Although the 377A charge was eventually amended to public 
indecency,5 the original charge set off a series of challenges to 377A’s constitutionality, finally 
culminating in Singapore’s highest court, the Court of Appeal (CA), ruling in 2015 that 377A 
violated neither the right to liberty nor the right to equality.6 
 What is striking about the decision is that it flows against the tide of LGBT rights 
liberalisation in many liberal democratic societies, including constitutional courts’ striking 
down of similar legislations on grounds of privacy and equality, among others.7  Without 
suggesting that these societies set the standard for rights protection, the contrast between the 
CA’s ruling and the successive legalisation of gay marriage in countries such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Taiwan suggests that Singapore’s approach to rights 
diverges sharply with the approach generally taken by liberal democratic countries. A survey 
of the outcome of all the constitutional rights cases in Singapore reinforces this impression. In 
Singapore’s 54 years as an independent nation, including 24 years after the right of appeal to 
 
1 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2012] 4 SLR 476 [4]. 
2 Cap 224, 2008 rev ed.  
3 Section 377A reads: ‘Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission of, or 
procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency with another 
male person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years.’ (377A) 
4 The current section 377 criminalises sexual penetration of a corpse.   
5 i.e. under section 294(1), which criminalises ‘any obscene act in any public place’. 
6 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26. 
7 See e.g. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice [1998] ZACC 15, Lawrence v 
Texas 539 US 558 (2003), Dudgeon v United Kingdom Application no. 7525/76 (ECtHR, 22 October 1981) and 
the recent Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (Writ Petition No 76 of 2016). 
The Indian Supreme Court struck down section 377 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as it criminalised ‘carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature’ between consenting adults.  
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the Privy Council was abolished, and save for one case8 that was later overturned on appeal,9 
there has never been a single successful constitutional rights challenge to legislation and 
executive orders.  
Something, then, seems to be different about Singapore’s approach to rights. A 
ubiquitous diagnosis of the situation piggybacks on Singapore’s unfavourable reputation as an 
authoritarian and/or illiberal state, and charges that Singapore’s human rights practice is 
similarly authoritarian and/or illiberal. 10  While these criticisms accurately describe the 
impression produced by the unsuccessful outcomes of the constitutional rights cases and some 
draconian laws,11 they merely scratch the surface. The criticisms miss a possible alternative, 
more nuanced understanding of the ‘something’ that is different about Singapore’s approach 
to rights which better reflects the values that inform the courts’ constitutional rights 
adjudication. Scholars have described this ‘something’ as a communitarian12  approach to 
rights, which has as its reference point Singapore’s state-sponsored communitarianism that 
prioritises the collective interest over individual rights and interests. Chua Beng Huat states 
that ‘central to the communitarian ideology in Singapore’ is the ‘tension between abstract 
“collective” good and the costs it extracts from or imposes on the individual’.13 Eugene KB 
Tan describes the state’s communitarianism as ‘the belief that collective security and well-
being must take precedence over the individual’.14 Thio Li-ann argues that the courts’ rights 
 
8 Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78. 
9 Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 489. 
10 E.g. Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore (Cambridge 
University Press 2012); Daniel A Bell, ‘A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism’ (1995) 32 Society 38; 
and Daniel A Bell, ‘A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism: The Case of Singapore’ (1997) 25 Political 
Theory 6. This is also the dominant narrative in the media; e.g. William Gibson, ‘Disneyland with the Death 
Penalty’ (Wired, 1 April 1993) <www.wired.com/1993/04/gibson-2> accessed 3 September 2019  
11 For example, the Internal Security Act (Cap 143, 1985 rev ed) which allows for preventive detention; various 
restrictions on Article 14 freedom of expression, association and assembly; and the death penalty for drug 
trafficking, discussed in more detail in Chapter One, Part IV, 53–66.  
12  For present purposes, communitarianism can be crudely understood to mean an ideology or philosophy 
committed to the good of the community, broadly understood. I will explore a more nuanced conception of 
communitarianism in the thesis. 
13 Chua Beng Huat, ‘Communitarianism without Competitive Politics in Singapore’ in Chua Beng Huat (ed), 
Communitarian Politics in Asia (Routledge 2009) 88. 
14 Eugene KB Tan, ‘“We” v “I”: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore’ (2002) 4 Australian Journal of Asian 
Law 1, 13. 
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reasoning ‘frequently reveals a bias towards communitarian concerns’, evident from its 
‘prioritisation of collective welfare over individual concerns and of basic needs over civil-
political rights’.15 It is an approach that ‘rejects the idea of rights as trumps or determinative 
interests’16  in prioritising the collective interest over individual rights. Instead of viewing 
Singapore’s approach to rights as illiberal, draconian, etc., it can be understood as 
communitarian.  
Accepting this view at face value, however, means that Singapore’s communitarian 
approach to rights has caused constitutional rights challenges to fail. Not only does the outcome 
of the approach suggest a weak protection of rights, but by a priori placing the collective 
interest over individual rights, it is incongruous with Singapore’s constitutional supremacy. 
Since Article 4 of the Constitution declares that the Constitution is the ‘supreme law’ of the 
nation, the rights contained therein have some elevated status—but Singapore’s current 
communitarian approach is inherently incapable of recognising this status due to its a priori 
normative commitment to ‘collective over individual’.17 While it may be said that there is no 
disjunction if the Constitution itself does not recognise full-blown ‘liberal’ rights anyway, the 
crucial point is that the vague wording of the rights does not demonstrate any a priori normative 
commitment. Hence, the extent to which the rights are vindicated is a matter of constitutional 
interpretation—and Singapore’s commitment to the priority of the collective interest over 
individual rights creates a disjunction between the elevated status of constitutional rights, and 
Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ approach to them. To bridge this disjunction, either 
Singapore’s constitutional supremacy must yield—or its approach to rights must change.  
One obvious solution is for Singapore to adopt a liberal approach. However, it would 
mis-prescribe the problem, for Singapore is not a liberal society and the government has 
expressed its disdain towards liberalism. Foisting a liberal approach on Singapore would thus 
 
15 Thio Li-ann, ‘Protecting Rights’ in Thio Li-ann and Kevin YL Tan (eds), The Evolution of a Revolution: 40 
Years of the Singapore Constitution (Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 195. 
16 Thio Li-ann, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (Academy Publishing, 2012) 111. 
17 It is worth noting that Article 5(2A) of the Constitution, which required a two-third majority in a national 
referendum before any Part IV fundamental liberties can be amended, has been repealed in 2016. Fundamental 
liberties are thus not entrenched in the Constitution and can be easily amended by a two-third majority in a 
Parliament dominated by a single party. Nonetheless, the rights’ formal status as constitutional rights give them 




be forcing a square peg into a round hole. More importantly, it would be a missed opportunity 
to scrutinise Singapore’s communitarian approach in light of communitarianism. My proposed 
critique, then, will speak the same language as its target, and hopefully be more resounding 
and forceful as a result. Simultaneously, this is an opportunity to theorise about how rights can 
be protected within a communitarian framework, a question which has implications for 
Singapore specifically, and for the literature on rights more generally—and scant attention has 
been paid to these tasks. 
Liberalism is the dominant political philosophy with which rights are usually 
associated. Hence, while a copious amount of work has been put into different liberal 
approaches to rights,18 little has been done from a communitarian perspective, at least in the 
English language. Some contributions include: Michael Sandel’s brief communitarian 
arguments for the rights to religious liberty and free speech; 19  a Harvard Law Review 
communitarian defence of anti-hate speech legislation;20 Michael Freeden’s communitarian 
view on human rights and welfare;21 Amitai Etzioni’s sociological accounts of how to balance 
rights and the common good with regard to specific issues;22 and a communitarian approach to 
assisted suicide, reconstructed from cases that the author characterises as communitarian.23 
 
18 Just to name a few: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd 1996); James 
Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2008); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford 
University Press 1979); and Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge University 
Press 1993). 
19 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge University Press 2010) xii–xvi. 
20 ‘A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws’ (1987) 101 Harvard Law Review 682. 
21 Michael Freeden, ‘Human Rights and Welfare: A Communitarian View’ (1990) 100 Ethics 489. 
22 Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda (Fontana 
Press 1995); Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (Basic 
Books 1998); and Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Common Good and Right: A Neo-Communitarian Approach’ (2009) 10 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 113. 
23 Donald L Beschile, ‘The Role of Courts in the Debate on Assisted Suicide: A Communitarian Approach 
Symposim on the Right to Die’ (1995) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 367. Beschile argues, 
at 398, that a communitarian approach to the right to die would neither grant unlimited power to the government 
to act, nor begin by asserting a right to assisted suicide. Rather, ‘it would acknowledge the legitimacy … of social 
choice in these matters, and encourage public deliberation … [and] courts would retain a role in the process, 
insisting that legislatures justify their actions with rational argument’.  
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What the existing literature lacks is a theoretical account, from first principles, of a 
communitarian approach to rights.  
In Singapore’s case, the alternative understanding of Singapore’s approach as 
communitarian is not the dominant narrative when ‘Singapore’ and ‘rights’ are mentioned in 
the same breath. Major international human rights organisations paint a draconian picture of 
Singapore’s human rights standards and practices.24 In the Singaporean legal scholarship, Thio 
is the leading scholar who first introduced the idea of Singapore’s communitarian approach to 
rights. While it has been picked up by some scholars—Yvonne Lee, for instance, argued for a 
communitarian case to preserve 377A;25 Eugene Tan examined Singapore’s communitarian 
legalism; 26  and David Tan analysed political communication within Singapore’s neo-
Confucian and communitarian framework27—it remains a somewhat esoteric way to think 
about Singapore’s constitutional rights, though the communitarian language has been used in 
other disciplines, such as sociology,28 education29 and crime control.30  
The disproportionate focus on the authoritarian and/or illiberal narrative has resulted in 
two important gaps in the literature which I aim to fill. First, by insisting that Singapore’s 
approach is authoritarian and/or illiberal, critics miss the possibility that there is more going on 
in the case law than judicial deference to the state. While this deference certainly appears to 
exist in some cases, other cases strongly suggest that values other than statist ones are at play 
in the courts’ rights adjudication. Focusing too much on the state’s authoritarian restrictions on 
 
24 For example, in one of their reports, Human Rights Watch described Singapore’s restrictions on speech and 
assembly as ‘draconian’: Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2018: Rights Trends in Singapore’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 20 December 2017) <www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/singapore> accessed 2 
September 2019.  
25 Yvonne CL Lee, ‘“Don’t Ever Take a Fence down Until You Know the Reason It Was Put up”: Singapore 
Communitarianism and the Case for Conserving 377A’ (2008) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 347. 
26 Tan, ‘Communitarian Legalism in Singapore’ (n 14). 
27  David Tan, ‘The Reynolds Privilege in a Neo-Confucianist Communitarian Democracy: Reinvigorating 
Freedom of Political Communication in Singapore’ (2011) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 456. 
28  Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (Routledge 1997); and Chua, 
‘Communitarianism without Competitive Politics in Singapore’ (n 13). 
29 Charlene Tan, ‘“Our Shared Values” in Singapore: A Confucian Perspective’ (2012) 62 Educational Theory 
449. 
30 Victor Toom, ‘Trumping Communitarianism: Crime Control and Forensic DNA Typing and Databasing in 
Singapore’ (2014) 8 East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal 273. 
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rights and the courts’ seeming deference to it risks losing sight of what these values are, and 
how they may shape a plausible communitarian approach to rights for Singapore that does not 
result in the disjunction pointed out above.  
The second gap is almost the opposite of the first: whereas the authoritarian and/or 
illiberal critique does not acknowledge the communitarian counter-narrative, those who accept 
the counter-narrative do not interrogate it. Specifically, scholars have not questioned whether 
a communitarian approach to rights would look like Singapore’s. They have taken for granted, 
somewhat tautologically, that Singapore’s approach to rights is communitarian because it 
places the group over the individual, which is apparently what communitarianism requires. The 
problem with not questioning whether Singapore’s communitarian approach is communitarian, 
or the best communitarian approach, is that it risks legitimising Singapore’s prima facie flawed 
approach simply because it has been slapped with the communitarian label. In other words, a 
defender would say that criticisms of Singapore’s approach are wide of the mark because the 
approach is tailored to, and appropriate for, Singapore’s unique cultural circumstances. This 
forecloses the plausibility that a different communitarian approach could remove the 
disjunction between the elevated status of rights and their practical application. Accepting 
Singapore’s current communitarian approach at face value, then, also accepts, fatalistically, 
that Singaporeans’ constitutional rights cannot be better protected within a communitarian 
framework.  
I accept that Singapore’s approach is communitarian insofar as some of the cases evince 
a palpable concern for the community’s interests. But I dispute that it is the only communitarian 
approach that could conceivably be adopted, let alone the best one. This thesis, then, constructs 
an alternative communitarian approach to rights, one that Singapore can adopt. I call this the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach, and it consists of two elements: a pluralistic conception 
of community as constitutive communities (i.e. the communal attachments that partly constitute 
our identity); and a basic duty to include owed between members of the national community, 
which is one of many constitutive communities. Under the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach, rights protect our constitutive communities, and our interest in them, from 
unjustified encroachment by the state and/or the majority, thus enabling us to have access to, 
and participate in, our constitutive communities. Because constitutive communities mark out 
fundamental features of our identity, such as gender, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity and 
nationality, enabling us to live as members of our constitutive communities is to, first, promote 
living our lives in accordance with our deepest self-understanding; and second, protect us from 
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the social harms, such as discrimination, that come with membership in constitutive 
communities.  
These social harms are, unfortunately, unavoidable in plural modern societies. Hence, 
the duty to include steps in to mollify these harms, and it is defeated if a constitutive 
community’s beliefs and/or practices violate the duty itself. The duty to include provides an 
important reason for the majority in a national community to recognise fellow members’ 
unpopular constitutive communities: due to the special concern that members of a national 
community usually show for each other, when clashes arise between constitutive communities, 
members are obliged to continue to display this special concern. This is done by including their 
fellow members; that is, recognising and respecting their fellow members’ equality of 
membership in the national community, which entails taking their interest in their constitutive 
communities seriously.  
The Inclusive Communitarian Approach proposes that, when reasoning about whether 
a rights claim should be vindicated, the inquiry should focus on the constitutive community 
and its importance to its members’ lives. Unless the constitutive community’s beliefs and/or 
practices violate the duty to include, members of the national community ought to discharge 
their duty to include by recognising the constitutive community’s members’ equality of 
membership in the national community. This entails that the constitutive community is prima 
facie protected by constitutional rights. When assessing whether the right(s) being claimed can 
be justifiably limited, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach has in mind three communitarian 
values: the members’ interest in the constitutive community; the constitutive community itself; 
and unity in the national community. The Approach would thus determine the limits to the right 
in a manner that best protects these values.  
Although inspired by Singapore’s constitutional rights problem, the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach is generally applicable and can be adopted by societies looking for 
a more community-centric justification for rights. The generality of the Approach is reflected 
in the theoretical Chapters Two, Three, and Four. My inspiration, however, is Singapore. The 
thesis is thus bookended by Chapters One and Five, dedicated to analysing relevant 
constitutional rights cases to illustrate Singapore’s current approach, and applying the 




Singapore’s Communitarianism: 1991 White Paper on Shared Values  
Before outlining the thesis, I will first contextualise the problem. My claim that Singapore’s 
approach to rights is communitarian may raise a few eyebrows: Singapore, as is well known, 
has an open, capitalistic free market economy. A country undergirded by a capitalist free 
market is hardly one that one would associate with communitarianism because of capitalism’s 
individualistic drive towards private profits. In this regard, Daniel A Bell, who spent three years 
in Singapore and whose communitarian theory I will rely on, described life there as ‘a more 
individualistic form of life than [he] had encountered in any Western country’.31 In the same 
vein, one of the government’s twin principles of governance is meritocracy,32 which is also an 
individualistic principle that rewards individual achievements. It seems, then, that there is an 
incongruity between scholars’ claim that Singapore and its approach to rights are 
communitarian, and Singapore’s individualistic reality.  
 It is thus important to clarify that the government first made the communitarianism 
claim in response to Singapore society’s perceived individualism, and it applies only to social 
and cultural matters. In the late 1980s, the government noted with concern the corrosive effects 
of Singapore’s open economy on Singaporeans’ social values. There was a ‘worrying trend’, 
then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said, of a shift in values from communitarianism to 
individualism due to Singaporeans’ ‘[exposure] to “Western values”, primarily 
individualism’.33 Singapore’s leaders noted with alarm the social malaise that had beset an 
excessively individualistic American society, including ‘guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, 
unbecoming behaviour in public’. 34  To them, these were the consequences of a rampant 
individualism that entailed the ‘expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave 
as he pleases’, which stemmed from the idea of the ‘inviolability of the individual’, i.e. the 
notion that ‘human beings had arrived at this perfect state where everybody would be better off 
 
31 Daniel A Bell and Avner de-Shalit, The Spirit of Cities: Why the Identity of a City Matters in a Global Age 
(Princeton University Press 2011) 80. 
32 The other is multiracialism. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter Five, Part I(c)(i), 212–214. 
33  National Library Board, ‘Shared Values’ (Singapore Infopedia) 
<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_542_2004-12-18.html> accessed 3 September 2019. 




if they were allowed to do their own thing and flourish’.35 This has led to ‘the erosion of the 
moral underpinnings of a society and the diminution of personal responsibility’.36 
 To prevent these social vagaries from taking root in Singapore, and to stem the tide of 
‘Westernisation’, the government sought to anchor Singapore society in a set of supposedly 
anti-Western, ‘Asian’-inspired communitarian values. On 15 January 1991, these values were 
promulgated in a policy paper that Parliament adopted, the White Paper on Shared Values,37 
which enshrines the government’s conception of communitarianism. The White Paper states 
that the shared values that hold Singaporeans together and shape the Singaporean identity are: 
(1) nation before community and society above self; (2) family as the basic unit of society; (3) 
regard and community support for the individual; (4) consensus instead of contention; and (5) 
racial and religious harmony. 
While the White Paper has no constitutional force, it is frequently cited as an 
authoritative source of Singapore’s communitarianism and a significant policy document. 
Chua, for instance, argues that the White Paper, ‘[as] a publicly promoted and politically 
sanctioned document … is now available to the government and its supporters as rational 
grounds for action’.38 This means that, even if officials do not explicitly refer to it, the White 
Paper provides a publicly-promulgated ideological basis on which state policies can be justified 
and understood. It has also been argued that the White Paper has putative constitutional 
significance. Benedict Sheehy asserts that the White Paper is a ‘quasi-Constitution’ that ‘sets 
out fundamental principles suitable for organising many aspects of a society such as those 
found usually in the preamble of a constitution’,39 and Thio refers to the White Paper as ‘soft 
constitutional law’, i.e. ‘deliberately created, constitutionally significant norms that are not 
legally binding but have some legal effect in ordering constitutional relationships’. 40 




37 Parliament of Singapore, White Paper on Shared Values (Cmd 1, 1991). 
38 Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (n 28) 33. 
39 Benedict Sheehy, ‘Singapore, “Shared Values” and Law: Non East Versus West Constitutional Hermeneutic’ 
(2004) 34 Hong Kong Law Journal 67, 73. 
40 Thio Li-ann, ‘Soft Constitutional Law in Nonliberal Asian Constitutional Democracies’ (2010) 8 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 766, 768. 
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provides evidence of Singapore’s specific understanding of communitarianism, according to 
which the judiciary’s constitutional rights adjudication can be characterised as communitarian. 
 What does the White Paper reveal about Singapore’s communitarianism? As the first 
value reflects, it is based on the idea that the group’s interest takes priority over the individual’s; 
I will call this ‘collective over individual’. That ‘nation before community and society above 
self’—which essentially exhorts Singaporeans to place the nation/society’s interests above 
their own41—occupies the apex spot in the hierarchy of values demonstrates its importance. 
This is justifiable, the White Paper claims, because Singapore, as an ‘Asian’ society, ‘has 
always weighted group interests more heavily than individual ones’, a ‘balance [which] has 
strengthened social cohesion’.42 Even though the balance is skewed towards the group, it is 
nevertheless the right balance because, the White Paper asserts, ‘Asian societies emphasise the 
interests of the community, while Western societies stress the rights of the individual’.43 The 
White Paper attempts to provide empirical evidence for this claim, stating that a ‘major factor’ 
of Singapore’s success was Singaporeans’ willingness to ‘[put] the interests of society as a 
whole ahead of individual interest’ which ‘enabled the country to overcome difficult 
challenges, such as the withdrawal of British forces in the early 1970s and the severe economic 
recession in 1985’.44 During these trying times, Singaporeans demonstrated that they were 
‘willing to make temporary individual sacrifices for the sake of the group’ which led to ‘greater 
success for all’ in the long term.45 These sacrifices included workers ‘accepting a “pay-cut” 
which enabled Singapore to fully recover from the recession’46 in two years. The White Paper 
refers to this prioritisation of interests as ‘communitarianism’.47 
 How does this ‘collective over individual’ conception of communitarianism interact 
with the third value, ‘regard and community support for the individual’? This third value is the 
White Paper’s attempt to ‘remember that in Singapore society, the individual also has rights 
 
41 ‘Community’ specifically refers to the Singaporean’s official racial group. More will be said about this in 
Chapter Five, Part I(a), 204–207. 
42 White Paper (n 37) [26].  
43 ibid [24].  
44 ibid [11].  
45 ibid. However, the White Paper does not provide details of these events, though some Members of Parliament 
described the sacrifices that Singaporeans made during the recession. See text to n (46). 
46 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 15 January 1991, vol 56, col 923. 
47 White Paper (n 37) [30].  
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which should be respected, and not lightly encroached upon’. 48  Curiously, however, the 
explanation of what this means makes no reference to actual constitutional rights, but a specific 
individual interest that is not enshrined in the Constitution: assistance for the poor. Expressing 
concern for ‘a small number who have not kept up’49 with the opportunities generated by 
Singapore’s ‘efficient free-market economy’,50  the White Paper implores Singaporeans to 
support the individual and ‘do all we can to assist the needy [by] helping to meet some of their 
most pressing needs … so that poor families can make good in the next generation’.51 The 
White Paper does not comment further on the individual’s rights that must be respected and 
not lightly encroached upon.  
The discussion so far shows that Singapore’s communitarianism is essentially premised 
on the normative commitment to the priority of the collective interest viz. individual ones. This 
prioritisation is also evident in the judiciary’s adjudication of constitutional rights cases, thus 
rendering the courts’ approach communitarian; I will demonstrate this point in greater detail in 
Chapter One. The point for now is that the Singapore judiciary’s approach to rights can be 
characterised as communitarian per the White Paper because the case law contains a discernible 
trend of the judiciary prioritising the collective interest over individual rights. ‘Collective 
interest’ refers broadly to any objective pursued in the name of the collective, be it the public 
interest, the public good, public safety, the common good, national security and so on. This 
communitarian approach is adopted by a conservative judiciary that adheres to a strict 
interpretation of separation of powers, a judiciary that declines to venture outside the confines 
of law-as-formally-enacted and to engage with the amorphous principles that arguably 
underpin constitutional rights. It does, however, endorse wide restrictions placed on rights that 
favour the collective interest, resulting in the collective interest trumping constitutional rights.   
 
The Constitution  
Two things are noteworthy about the Constitution for our purpose. First, Part IV contains an 
exhaustive list of rights, called ‘fundamental liberties’, but which I will call constitutional rights 
 
48 ibid.  
49 ibid [33].  
50 ibid [32]. 
51 ibid [33]. 
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to reflect that they are rights contained in the Constitution. These rights are: life and liberty of 
the person (Article 9); prohibition against slavery and forced labour (Article 10); protection 
against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials (Article 11); equal protection of the law 
(Article 12); prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement (Article 13); freedom of 
speech, assembly and association (Article 14); freedom of religion (Article 15); and rights in 
respect of education (Article 16). Only Articles 9, 12, 14 and 15 have been substantively 
litigated; as such, the analysis in Chapter One will focus on these four Articles.  
Second, Article 4 declares that the Constitution is the ‘supreme law’ of Singapore. This 
Article has been interpreted by the courts as empowering them to strike down unconstitutional 
legislation. In Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Khong, the Court of Appeal declared, ‘The 
courts, in upholding the rule of law in Singapore, will no doubt readily invalidate laws that 
derogate from the Constitution’.52 In Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General, the Court of Appeal 
stated that Article 4  
provides for one of the most important features of the Constitution, viz, that it is the supreme 
law of Singapore. The supremacy of the Constitution is necessary for the purposes of the 
Constitution to be protected as it ensures that the institutions created by the Constitution are 
governed by the rule of law, and that the fundamental liberties under the Constitution are 
guaranteed.53 
Article 4 thus empowers the courts to void ‘any law [that] does not conform to and 
cannot be reconciled with the Constitution through a process of construction’,54 including laws 
that pre-date the Constitution. Yet, the courts display a peculiar tension by affirming, on the 
one hand, constitutional supremacy; but on the other hand, failing to recognise any of the 
constitutional rights claims that have come before them. This tension has produced the 
ineluctable impression that Singaporeans have rights on paper only. I hypothesise that this 
tension is caused by the courts’ communitarian approach to rights: by prioritising the collective 
interest over individual rights, rights face an uphill battle for vindication, and are easily 
trumped, as it were, by the competing collective interest. This approach is problematic because 
it is inherently at odds with Singapore’s constitutional supremacy, and thus, the elevated status 
of constitutional rights. This is the problem that the thesis addresses.  
 
52 Taw Cheng Kong (n 9) [89]. 
53 Tan Eng Hong (n 1) [60]. 




Definitions, Assumptions and Caveats 
Before setting out the thesis’ structure, some clarifications on definitions, methodology and 
assumptions are in order.  
 First, I presuppose an interest theory of rights. Instead of protecting all autonomy 
interests,55 I assume that rights protect only especially important interests from unjustified state 
and/or majority encroachment. I have in mind John Tasioulas’ reformulation of Joseph Raz’s 
interest theory.56 This theory says that rights57 are grounded in universal basic human interests, 
such as health and autonomy, that are sufficiently important to justify imposing duties on others 
to respect, protect or advance these interests by securing to the individual a right to her 
interest.58 These duties have to be ‘feasible claims’59 on others given constraints in resources 
and facts about human nature. Hence, if X, the object of a putative right, is a human interest of 
such import, then there is a right to X.  
An important advantage of Tasioulas’s interest theory is that it is a pluralist account. 
The interests that ground rights, Tasioulas argues, are pluralistic because they are irreducible 
to one overarching value. Hence, it could well be the case that more than one interest, or a 
combination of interests, ground a right. This can be distinguished from monist interest 
theories, such as Griffin’s,60 that ground rights in an overarching value, such as personhood. 
The advantage of Tasioulas’s pluralist account is that it can accommodate the communitarian 
interests, i.e. constitutive communities, that I will argue should be protected by rights. As 
Tasioulas says, his is a ‘flexible, many-faceted approach to the grounding of human rights, 
 
55 See Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2012). 
56 Raz (n 18). 
57 Although Tasioulas refers to moral rights, I will not distinguish between moral and constitutional rights since 
the constitutional rights that I am concerned with (e.g. freedom of religion, the right to equality) are also moral 
rights.  
58 John Tasioulas, ‘On the Foundations of Human Rights’ in Rowan Cruft, S Matthew Liao and Massimo Renzo 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2015) 50. 
59 ibid 51. 
60  Griffin (n 18). Though Griffin considers his theory a ‘trinitarian’ one as it appeals to three criteria for 
personhood; autonomy, liberty and minimum provision.  
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whereby more than one interest…grounds the existence of any given right’. 61  Tasioulas’ 
account is particularly advantageous because the Inclusive Communitarian Approach departs 
from conventional understandings of rights that focus primarily on the individual’s agency or 
autonomy, her ability to form and pursue her conception of the good independently of others, 
as if she were an island.  
While one could certainly extrapolate from a monist value like agency to the 
constitutive communities that I will argue for, Tasioulas’s pluralist account does away with the 
convoluted reasoning and simply accommodates interests other than agency or autonomy as 
grounds for rights. For an interest to qualify, it has to be universal; that is, every human being, 
simply in virtue of being human, and within a specified historical context, has an interest in it. 
A universal human interest falls under his theory if it is ‘objective, standardized, pluralistic, 
open-ended, and holistic in character’.62 In other words, rights are grounded in a range of 
human interests that are human interests for ‘the standard case of an ordinary human being 
living in a modern society’,63 regardless of whether it is believed that they are human interests, 
or whether their fulfilment is desired; and these interests ‘bear important non-instrumental 
relations to each other, so that an interest’s nature and significance is partly determined by its 
location within a broader web of prudential values’.64 Chapter Three will show that our interest 
in our constitutive communities are just these universal human interests.  
The one important limitation placed on interests that can ground a right is that the 
interest has to be sufficiently important to generate a duty on others to respect or protect a right 
to it. Duties, Tasioulas says, are ‘moral reasons of a special kind: categorical, exclusionary, and 
subject to an array of moral responses—such as blame, guilt, etc—in light of their violation’.65 
A classic example is the right against torture: our interest in bodily integrity and freedom from 
pain is sufficiently important such that it gives rise to a duty—on the state, for instance—not 
to torture an individual; and when this duty is violated we feel, and are, justified in holding the 
violators morally blameworthy. The other advantage of Tasioulas’s theory, then, is that it 
protects the normative force of rights by resisting rights inflation—and so it corresponds with 
 
61 Tasioulas (n 58) 51. 
62 ibid (emphasis removed).  
63 ibid. 
64 ibid 52. 
65 ibid 57. 
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the elevated status of Singapore’s constitutional rights, which protect interests that are 
important enough to impose a duty on the state and the national community to respect them. 
Finally, the two-part formulation of the theory—(1) sufficiently important interest that (2) 
generates a duty to respect—also corresponds to the two elements of the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach, explained below.  
Second, a clarification on what I am not claiming. I am not claiming that 
communitarianism is superior to liberalism, or that the Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
protects rights better than liberal ones. My approach is developed, first and foremost, for 
Singapore’s context, and seeks to improve Singapore’s existing practice. That said, liberal and 
communitarian approaches to rights are not necessarily opposed to each other. There is no 
immediate reason why communitarian reasoning, like the sort I am proposing, cannot be 
utilised in a liberal context, particularly because communitarianism is not liberalism’s 
opposite.66 Indeed, the difference between communitarianism and liberalism is one of degree, 
not of kind, for both are interested in individuals and communities; they merely locate the 
emphasis in different places.  
Relatedly, I could be accused of trying to sneak liberalism through the backdoor of 
communitarianism, such that what I claim is the most favourable interpretation of 
communitarianism is really liberalism reconceived. The boundaries between 
communitarianism and liberalism are, of course, porous; but what distinguishes my approach 
from some liberal ones, and what makes it communitarian, is that it stresses the importance of 
community to the individual’s self-understanding. On my account, rights protect the 
individual’s interest in her constitutive communities, and the communities themselves. My 
approach does not focus on autonomy or agency as justifications for rights, e.g. we need the 
right to liberty so that we can form and pursue our own conception of the good. Rather, my 
approach stresses our dependence on our constitutive communities in developing our identity 
and self-understanding, and the importance of these communities to our ability to live 
meaningful lives.   
Finally, definitions. ‘Singapore’ refers to the state, including the government, 
Parliament, and the judiciary, and does not refer to Singapore society unless explicitly stated. 
 
66 See Chapter Two, Part II(c), 96–97. 
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I use ‘rights’ in a general sense that includes moral, human and constitutional rights, and I 
specify when I am referring to constitutional rights by using precisely this phrase.  
 
The Thesis 
Given the problem with Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights that I have identified, 
my question is: How can we construct an alternative communitarian approach to rights that is 
consonant with the elevated status of constitutional rights? My answer to this question fills the 
two important gaps in the literature outlined above. First, it provides a theoretical account of a 
communitarian approach to rights. Second, it questions whether Singapore’s communitarian 
approach is the best communitarian approach which has not been addressed by scholars. It is 
important that this latter gap is filled because, as mentioned previously, accepting Singapore’s 
communitarian approach at face value is also to accept that the outcome of this approach, of 
no successful constitutional rights challenges in Singapore’s history, is inevitable. It thus also 
accepts that a communitarian approach to rights would not vindicate constitutional rights 
claims because only this particular communitarian approach can be adopted.   
 I reject these tacit acceptances in the thesis. I begin, in Chapter One, by demonstrating 
how this ‘collective over individual’ communitarian approach has resulted in the competing 
collective interest overriding constitutional rights in the case law by focusing on specific cases. 
Although it is arguable that this approach is evident in all the cases, in the interest of space and 
cogency, I will focus on cases where the courts have explicitly upheld a collective interest over 
the competing individual right(s), and where it is not so apparent that the courts were 
constrained by the wide restrictions of the constitutional text itself, as is the case with Article 
14.67 The cases that I will not discuss, then, include Article 14 cases relating to political 
defamation,68 contempt of court and scandalising the judiciary; Article 9 cases relating to 
 
67 For this reason, I am excluding most of the Article 14 cases. I do, however, discuss one Article 14 case where 
the High Court’s reasoning is particularly communitarian; see Chapter One, Part III(b), 48–53. 
68 See Tan, ‘Communitarian Legalism in Singapore’ (n 14) for an analysis of the courts’ communitarian approach 
to these cases. 
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criminal procedure, and Article 12 cases on the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial discretion 
enshrined in Article 35(8) of the Constitution.69 
My discussion of the most pertinent cases will proceed thematically as follows: freedom 
of religion, national security and national unity; sexual orientation and public morality; 
multiracialism, political protest and freedom of expression; and the death penalty and drug 
trafficking. I will show that the judiciary’s communitarian approach is manifest in the courts’ 
overwhelming emphasis on various collective interests, including the national interest, and 
comparatively little emphasis on the importance of rights. This approach is facilitated by its 
conservative view of its role in the system of separation of powers, and its reluctance to take 
an expansive, moral interpretation of the vague wording of most rights. In contrast, the courts 
endorse broad restrictions on rights that favour the collective interest. The analysis will show 
that the problem with Singapore’s communitarian approach is its basic principle, collective 
over individual, which causes it to be incongruous with the elevated status of rights. Due to the 
open-ended wording of most rights, however, the courts are not bound to adjudicate the cases 
in this specific communitarian way.  
Given that the problem with Singapore’s communitarian approach is ‘collective over 
individual’, Chapter Two interrogates whether communitarianism necessarily requires the 
collective to be prioritised over the individual. It answers the question negatively by subjecting 
‘collective over individual’ to a normative critique in light of ‘Western’ and Confucian 
communitarianism. The critique shows that ‘collective over individual’ does not necessarily 
follow from either the communitarian conception of the self as a social, situated and relational 
self, or from the communitarian politics of the common good. I make two conceptual claims 
about the most favourable interpretation of communitarianism: first, it values both the 
individual and community; and second, it advances only a thin theory of the good, that of 
inclusiveness. Since Singapore’s conception of communitarianism falls short of the most 
favourable interpretation of communitarianism, its communitarian approach to rights is not the 
best communitarian approach. As such, we have good reasons to abandon it and theorise about 
an alternative approach. 
 
69 This issue has arisen where there are two or more offenders jointly involved in the same criminal enterprise, 
but one is charged with a more serious offence than other. See Sim Min Teck v Public Prosecutor [1987] SLR(R) 
65; Thiruselvam s/o Nagaratnam v Public Prosecutor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 362; and Ramalingam v Attorney-General 
[2012] 2 SLR 49. 
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 Chapter Three picks up from the first conceptual claim about communitarianism, that 
it values both individual and community, and develops the first element of the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach: a pluralistic conception of community as constitutive communities. 
After explaining the constitutive communities theory with reference to Sandel and Bell, I argue 
that this conception should be adopted, and not a monist conception of community. The 
constitutive conception comports with the first conceptual claim about communitarianism: 
being pluralistic, it values both individual and community by appreciating our interest in our 
various constitutive communities, and these constitutive communities themselves. I then 
respond to a formidable objection to the theory, that from autonomy, and argue that the theory 
should be premised on what I term the Constituted Autonomous Self, i.e. a self who exercises 
content-neutral autonomy within the framework provided by its constitutive communities. I 
conclude Chapter Three by identifying two features that elevate communal attachments to 
constitutionally protected constitutive communities: the Fundamental Feature, which points to 
the fundamental importance of our constitutive communities to our self-understanding; and the 
Social Harm Feature, which points to the inexorably social nature of our constitutive 
communities, and the social harms to which they expose us. When these two features are 
present, our interest in our constitutive communities has the requisite degree of importance to 
be protected by rights.  
 Chapter Four expounds on the second element of the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach, which also follows from the second conceptual claim about communitarianism. This 
is the duty to include, which essentially exhorts members of the national community to 
recognise and respect each other’s equality of membership. My starting point is David Miller’s 
conception of the nation as an ethical community where members owe each other special 
obligations in addition to what we owe to humans as such. Membership in the national 
community has ethical significance. If an individual possesses the morally relevant criterion 
for membership—i.e. national identity—then she is a member of the national community, and 
so fellow members have a duty to include her in the national community. The duty’s 
implication is that, given the importance of her constitutive communities to her self-
understanding, and the social harms that she faces because of them, the national community 
cannot impede her access to and participation in her constitutive communities unless the 
communities’ beliefs and/or practices violate the duty to include. I then suggest a few ways in 
which the communitarian state can promote the good of inclusiveness.  
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Chapter Five applies the Inclusive Communitarian Approach to Singapore. I begin by 
showing that the Approach is relevant to Singapore because Singapore’s communitarianism 
already contains the two elements of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach: a constitutive 
understanding of community, and an emphasis on the nation. More importantly, I argue that 
the normative core of the duty to include, equality of membership, is arguably the essence of 
Singapore’s multiracialism. After demonstrating how the latter is underpinned by the notion of 
equality, I argue that it should be extended to equality simpliciter. I follow this with the 
reinterpretation of the cases discussed in Chapter One. The cases are divided into two clusters: 
first, when the impugned legislation or executive action encroaches into a constitutive 
community; and second, when it does not. It will be shown that, under the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach, the cases discussed in Chapter One will have a successful outcome. 
The thesis ends by reiterating that Singapore should abandon its current communitarian 
approach and adopt the Inclusive Communitarian Approach because the latter is better able to 
recognise the elevated status of rights within a communitarian framework. I also make some 
concluding remarks on the likelihood of the Singapore judiciary adopting this approach and 




Singapore’s Communitarian Approach to Constitutional Rights 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter illustrates how Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ approach to rights has 
operated in practice by analysing constitutional rights cases where the courts have upheld a 
collective interest over the competing individual right(s). It will be shown that, by prioritising 
the collective interest over individual rights, Singapore’s communitarian approach is 
incongruous with the elevated status of the rights contained in the Constitution. The courts’ 
communitarian reasoning combines a narrow, plain interpretation of the constitutional text with 
a broad interpretation of the permissible restrictions that can be placed on rights. Hence, 
although the courts generally assume that the rights claimed in the cases are applicable, they 
tend to adopt justifications for restrictions that favour the collective interest. However, as my 
analysis of the relevant cases will show, this particular communitarian approach is not 
inevitable because of the open-textured nature of most of the rights. The courts, then, are not 
bound by this specific communitarian approach, and are, in theory, free to adopt another 
communitarian approach.70  
The distinguishing features of Singapore’s communitarian approach will be 
demonstrated by contrasting it with the approaches taken by liberal democratic courts.71 What 
is unique about Singapore’s approach is the judiciary’s circumscribed view of its role in a 
system of separation of powers. On this view, the judiciary merely interprets and applies the 
law, and does not make new laws or policies. In this regard, there are three features of 
Singapore’s communitarian approach that distinguish it from the approaches of liberal 
democratic courts.  
First, unlike some courts like the United States Supreme Court, the Singapore courts 
adopt a plain and/or narrow reading of the constitutional text and have consistently declined to 
take an expansive, moral interpretation of rights when, arguably, the open-ended nature of the 
 
70 The plausibility of the Approach will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, Part II, 222–245. 
71 The comparative work here is only minimal. The purpose is only to show how Singapore’s approach is different 
without necessarily saying that it is worse than the approaches taken by these other courts, or that these other 
approaches are the benchmark of how rights should be protected.  
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text lends itself to such an interpretation. This is because, pursuant to the courts’ narrow 
conception of the separation of powers, anything beyond a plain reading of the text would be 
creating a new right where none previously existed—and this would impermissibly encroach 
into Parliament’s sphere of expertise. For instance, the courts did not see it fit to interpret 
Article 9(3)72 as encompassing a right to be informed of a right to counsel. According to the 
High Court (HC), the imperative ‘shall be allowed’ is ‘couched in negative terms in a sense 
that there is no obligation imposed on the relevant authority to inform … the person under 
custody of his right to counsel’.73 This was contrasted with Article 9(4)74 which clearly imposes 
an obligation on the arresting authority to inform an individual of the grounds of his arrest. 
Hence, to read into Article 9(3) a right to be informed of the right to counsel would be 
‘tantamount to judicial legislation’ as it is ‘clearly contrary to Parliament’s intention’.75 A 
similar approach has been taken to the word ‘law’ in Article 9(1) which will be explored in 
more detail in Part IV below. 
The second distinguishing feature is the courts’ reluctance to inquire into whether a 
restriction of a right is proportionate, legitimate, necessary, and so on. While it could be said 
that courts generally engage in some kind of balancing exercise even if they either do not 
explicitly state it, or explicitly reject it like the Singapore courts have done, we should take the 
Singapore judiciary’s professed non-inquiry into these matters at face value because it 
demonstrates its narrow conception of its role in the system of separation of powers. It is also 
arguable that when the Singapore courts appear to engage in a balancing exercise, they are 
usually affirming the balance that has already been struck by Parliament. This is especially 
apparent when contrasted with the overt proportionality analysis undertaken by courts such as 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when assessing whether an interference with 
some rights, usually those that are not absolute, is justified. For the Singapore judiciary, 
assessing whether the purpose of a rights-restricting statute or executive action is legitimate 
 
72 Article 9(3) reads: ‘Where a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his 
arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.’ 
73 Rajeevan Edakalavan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 [19].  
74 Article 9(4) reads: ‘Where a person is arrested and not released, he shall, without unreasonable delay, and in 
any case within 48 hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey), be produced before a Magistrate, in 
person or by way of video-conferencing link (or other similar technology) in accordance with law, and shall not 
be further detained in custody without the Magistrate’s authority.’ 
75 Rajeevan (n 73) [19]. 
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would stray inappropriately into policy-making. This was what the CA explicitly stated in Lim 
Meng Suang v Attorney-General.76 The CA upheld the constitutionality of section 377A77 
(377A) of the Penal Code which only criminalises sex between men. According to the CA, it 
is not for the courts to assess whether 377A’s purpose of criminalising sex between men is 
legitimate because there are no legal standards to determine legitimacy; this will be explored 
in more detail below.78 Suffice to say for now that, by not examining whether a right is 
restricted for a legitimate purpose, or whether the restriction is proportionate, the judiciary 
exhibits considerable deference to Parliament’s statutory intention or the government’s reasons 
for issuing an executive order; and in so doing, adopts a broad interpretation, one that favours 
the collective interest, of the relevant constitutional limits.  
The third distinguishing feature of the courts’ constitutional adjudication is explicitly 
communitarian: the courts place overwhelming emphasis on the importance of the collective 
interest, such as public safety, public order, and national security and unity, that justifies the 
restriction of the right, and a corresponding lack of emphasis on the importance of the 
individual right. Hence, even though a public interest limitation is not unique to Singapore as 
it is contained in most human rights documents such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
Singapore judiciary’s public interest analysis is different in two ways. First, the courts’ 
emphasis on the importance of the various collective interests is overwhelming because there 
is comparatively little pronouncement on the importance of rights beyond vague statements to 
that effect.79 In contrast, the courts pontificate extensively on the importance of the collective 
interests that eventually outweigh the individual rights. Second, there is, at times, a palpable 
concern for the national interest, which reveals a nationalistic bent to the courts’ constitutional 
adjudication. Taken as a whole, the courts’ public interest reasoning is distinctively 
communitarian because of its lack of attention to the importance of rights, and its emphasis on 
the collective, including national, interest.80  
 
76 Lim Meng Suang (n 6).  
77 377A (n 2).  
78 See Part II(b), 38–42. 
79 Unless clearly stated otherwise, assume that, in the cases discussed here, the courts did not expound on the 
importance of the various individual rights claimed.  
80 I will argue in Chapter Four that the nation is an important constitutive community; as such, I do not distinguish 
between communitarianism and nationalism.  
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As mentioned in the Introduction, I will only analyse cases where the communitarian 
feature is explicit. What is noteworthy about the decisions is that the constitutional text is often 
vague enough that the courts are arguably unconstrained by broad restrictions contained in the 
text itself. Hence, it could be argued that Singapore’s communitarian approach is not inevitable; 
that the courts have more interpretive freedom than they acknowledge to adopt another 
communitarian interpretation that would vindicate the right(s) being claimed. These cases 
relate to the following themes: national security and national unity; sexual orientation; 
multiracialism; political protest; and the death penalty for drug trafficking. The courts’ 
reasoning in these cases reveals an imperative need to protect the collective interest against a 
supposedly detrimental exercise of the individual right that is being claimed. 
In sum, I will illustrate that the problem with Singapore’s communitarian approach to 
rights is that it a priori elevates the collective interest above individual rights in a manner that 
impedes the exercise of these rights. This approach is thus unable to reconcile the elevated 
status of these rights, situated within the country’s supreme law, and the not-unjustified 
communitarian impulse to account for the collective interest, too. The result is a disjunction 
between the rights’ constitutional status, and their non-application in practice.  
 
I. FREEDOM OF RELIGION, NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL UNITY  
The courts’ communitarian approach is clearest in a series of cases involving a clash between 
the collective interest in national security, national unity and public order, and the Article 15 
right to religious freedom.81 These claims were filed by a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses against 
three government orders that effectively banned the Singapore Congregation of the Jehovah’s 
 
81 Article 15 provides:  
(1) Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and to propagate it. 
(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in 
part for the purposes of a religion other than his own. 
(3) Every religious group has the right — 
(a) to manage its own religious affairs; 
(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and 
(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law. 




Witnesses (SCJW) and all their religious materials.  The first order82 was made in 1972 by the 
Minister for Home Affairs under section 24(1) of the Societies Act83 which dissolved the SCJW 
as a society (Deregistration Order). According to the government, the SCJW’s ‘continued 
existence is prejudicial to public welfare and good order in Singapore’ because their beliefs 
had ‘led to a number of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the National Service to refuse to do any military 
duty. Some of them even refuse to wear uniforms’.84 Subsequently, publications of the Watch 
Tower Bible and Tract Society (WTBTS), the Witnesses’ main legal entity, were banned in 
197285 (WTBTS Ban); and in 1994, another government order86 was issued to prohibit the 
importation, sale and circulation of materials printed by the WTBTS and the International Bible 
Student’s Association (IBSA) (IBSA Ban). These latter two orders were made pursuant to 
section 5 of the Undesirable Publications Act (UPA).87  
These blanket bans demonstrate the Singapore government’s broad-brushed 
communitarian approach to the issue: the Witnesses’ Article 15 right has to be restricted for 
the collective interest in maintaining national service, national security, and public welfare. In 
safeguarding these interests, Parliament interpreted the right to freedom of religion narrowly. 
Unlike the ECtHR which recognises the centrality of freedom of conscience to a person’s 
identity,88 the Singapore Parliament has explicitly rejected freedom of conscience as integral 
to the freedom of religion. In 1990, Parliament stated that Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to 
perform military service had to be court-martialled because Singapore does not recognise 
conscientious objection:  
 
82 Gazette Notification No. 179 (Order 179).  
83 Cap 311 (2014 rev ed). Section 24(1)(a) empowers the Minister to dissolve ‘any registered society is being used 
for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore’.  
84 Press statement quoted in Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 [3]. 
National service is Singapore’s compulsory military service for men.  
85 Gazette Notification No. 123 (Order 123) dated 14 January 1972.  
86 Gazette Notification No. 405 (Order 405) dated 4 February 1994.  
87 Cap 338 (1998 rev ed). Section 5(1) confers a discretion upon the Minister to ban publications if ‘[he] is of the 
opinion’ that these publications are ‘contrary to the public interest’. 
88 E.g. Bayatyan v Armenia App no 23459/03 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) [118]: ‘The Court reiterates that, as enshrined 
in Article 9, freedom of … conscience … is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” … This freedom is, 
in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that … make up the identity of believers [and] is also a 
precious asset for atheists, agnostics and the unconcerned.’  
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[C]onscientious objection does not apply in Singapore. There is no such tradition in Singapore. 
If we try to introduce the practice here, the whole system of universal National Service will 
come unstuck. Many other people will ask: why should I also not decide to have conscientious 
objections and therefore exempt myself from National Service? … Therefore, the Enlistment 
Act … does not recognize conscientious objections. National Service is a secular issue, subject 
to government laws.89 
 
a. Religious Freedom vs. National Security and Public Order 
Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor90 was decided against this backdrop. This case 
involved the conviction of five Jehovah’s Witnesses for possessing publications by the 
WTBTS, an offence under what is now section 6 of the UPA. The appellants alleged that the 
WTBTS Ban and the Deregistration Order violated Article 15(1). They argued that the 
Deregistration Order was wrong to claim that the JWs threatened national security because the 
JWs were law-abiding and respectable citizens. As such, the Order was ‘irrational, oppressive, 
unreasonable, overboard [and] a violation of [Article 15]’.91  
The HC’s rejection of the argument bears the hallmarks of Singapore’s communitarian 
approach to rights: non-inquiry into whether the WTBTS Ban and Deregistration Order were 
proportionate, and justifying them in the name of not just a social interest, but the national 
interest. The HC first dismissed as irrelevant the appellants’ argument that the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were law-abiding citizens: 
[the] issue at hand was simply their belief which prohibits any form of military or national 
service, which is a fundamental tenet in Singapore. Anything which detracts from this should 
not and cannot be upheld.92 
For the communitarian-minded HC, national service is a tenet even more fundamental 
than the appellants’ fundamental right to religious freedom. The primacy that it accorded to 
national service corresponds to the lack of importance that it placed on Article 15(1). The HC’s 
holding that the WTBTS Ban and Deregistration Order were justified pursuant to the ‘inherent 
 
89 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 23 February 1990, vol 54, col 1181.  
90 Colin Chan v PP (n 84).  
91 ibid [54]. 
92 ibid [37]. 
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limitations’ of Article 15(1) illustrates the second distinguishing feature of the courts’ 
constitutional adjudication: a lack of analysis as to whether the restricting measures are 
proportionate or necessary, and hence, arguably, a sweeping endorsement of the government’s 
restriction of the right. For the HC, the only issue at hand was whether the JWs’ refusal to do 
national service threatened public order. It held that Article 15(1) is subject to the ‘public order’ 
exception in Article 15(4) which ‘clearly envisages that the right of freedom of religion [is] not 
an absolute and unqualified right’.93 In a sweeping ratio, the HC stated that freedom of religion  
must be reconciled with the “right of the State to employ the sovereign power to ensure peace, 
security and orderly living without which constitutional guarantee of civil liberty would be a 
mockery” (Commissioner, HRE v LT Swamiar AIR 1954 SC 282). The sovereignty, integrity 
and unity of Singapore are undoubtedly the paramount mandate of the Constitution and 
anything, including religious beliefs and practices, which tend to run counter to these objectives 
must be restrained.94 
The HC’s desire to safeguard the national interest is palpable, and its assertion in italics 
suggests that the exercise of rights by the Jehovah’s Witnesses threatens Singapore’s 
sovereignty, integrity and unity. Hence, in addressing the issue of whether the Witnesses’ 
refusal to do national service threatened public order and so whether the WTBTS Ban and 
Deregistration Order satisfied Article 15(4)’s public order exception, the HC did not consider 
the proportionality or necessity of the WTBTS Ban and Deregistration Order. Unlike the 
ECtHR’s decision in Bayatyan,95 a case involving Armenia’s denial of a Jehovah’s Witness’ 
conscientious objection to compulsory military service, questions such as whether the 
interference with the applicant’s right to religious freedom ‘corresponds to a “pressing social 
need”’96  did not arise. Instead, the HC accepted the government’s determination that the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ very existence threatened public order, stating that ‘it was not for this 
court to substitute its view for the Minister’s as to whether the [JWs] constituted a threat to 
national security’. 97  The Minister’s view that ‘the continued existence of a group which 
preached … that military service was forbidden was contrary to public peace, welfare and good 
 
93 ibid [63]. 
94 ibid [64] (emphasis added). Note that the words ‘sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore’ do not appear 
anywhere in the Constitution.  
95 Bayatyan (n 88). 
96 ibid [123].   
97 Colin Chan v PP (n 84) [68]. 
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order’ 98  was sufficient to dispose of the constitutional question—which reveals a broad 
interpretation of the public order exception. This conclusion was, of course, easy for the HC to 
reach if the issue had been framed as one of national security from the very outset, when the 
HC ought to perhaps have interrogated this framing. Accordingly, the Deregistration Order and 
the WTBTS Ban did not violate Article 15(1).  
When the courts did consider the proportionality of the blanket IBSA Ban, as the HC 
did in Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v Minister for Information and the Arts,99 it was 
because the plaintiffs had argued that the IBSA Ban was so wide that it ‘[exceeded] the 
restrictions that may be permissibly imposed under Art 15(4)’ as it included ‘many publications 
about which the Minister could not have formed the opinion that they were contrary to public 
interest, eg the King James edition of the Bible’.100 Following Colin Chan v PP, the HC 
rejected the argument and held that Article 15(1) is subject to ‘a general law which deals with, 
or is invoked to preserve, public order, public health or morality’.101 The burden of proof was 
on the plaintiffs to show that there is an arguable case that an executive action, such as the 
IBSA Ban, was not made for those purposes—and the plaintiffs could not show it because the 
Deregistration Order had banned the SCJW. As held in Colin Chan v PP, this order was made 
according to the government’s determination that the Jehovah’s Witnesses threatened public 
order—a determination that the courts could not disturb, thereby rendering the Deregistration 
Order constitutional. Given that the SCJW was banned, it would be unlawful to propagate its 
beliefs, whether by word of mouth or by printed materials; and so ‘[it] is logically not possible 
to assert … a legal right to distribute or possess unlawful material’,102 such as the publications 
caught by the IBSA Ban.  
On appeal, the CA affirmed the principle that executive decisions concerning national 
security are ‘not justiciable’,103 and so the government’s determination that the Witnesses’ 
 
98 ibid. 
99 Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v Minister for Information and the Arts [1995] 2 SLR(R) 627.  
100 ibid [23]. 
101 ibid [27]. 
102 ibid [29]. 
103 Chan Hiang Leng Colin and others v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR(R) 294 [36].  
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objection to military service per se threatened national security established the ‘factual basis 
that issues of national security are involved’104 and could not be scrutinised by the courts:  
It is not for the courts to say how many men must refuse to do National Service before the 
Government can legitimately consider that the refusal constitutes a threat to national security. 
Nor is it for the courts to say what effect allowing even only a handful of conscientious objectors 
exemption from National Service will have on the morale of those doing National Service or 
whether it will encourage others to refuse to do National Service. Such issues can only be 
judged by those on whom the responsibility for national security lies. A refusal to do National 
Service which is required by law is disruptive of the national ethos and is unquestionably a 
matter in “the public interest” and relating to “public order”.105 
These decisions illustrate the communitarian flavour of the courts’ adjudication in the 
following ways. First, the courts did not scrutinise the proportionality or necessity of the bans 
on the SCJW and their religious materials, and accepted the government’s determination that 
they are necessary to safeguard public order and national security. Second, there is an 
overwhelming concern for not just the general social interest, but the national interest. These 
two factors are evident in the CA’s endorsement of the blanket bans in Colin Chan v MITA 
(CA) despite the fact that the CA was ‘prepared to accept that there could well be other less 
restrictive methods which the Minister could conceivably adopt’.106 What appears to be the 
CA’s primary concern is the importance of safeguarding national service and its smooth 
operation. As such, the CA was not prepared to hold that the IBSA Ban contravened the test 
for irrationality, i.e. no reasonable Minister would have issued the IBSA Ban. Even though the 
CA accepted that the IBSA Ban ‘deprives Jehovah’s Witnesses who are women or senior 
citizens, and who are not required to do National Service, of literature which are necessary’107 
for their beliefs, the burden imposed on this group of people was justified. In the CA’s view, it 
was reasonable for the Minister to ‘consider that although there are women and other members 
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith who do not have to do National Service, they may have some 
influence on male members who do have to do National Service or even on male citizens who 
are not members of the faith’.108  
 
104 ibid [35]. 
105 ibid [36] (emphasis added).  
106 ibid [45]. 
107 ibid. 
108 ibid [47]. 
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It is worth noting, too, that the broadness of the IBSA Ban was justified on an ancillary 
ground by the HC in Colin Chan v MITA (HC) and Liong Kok Keng v Public Prosecutor:109 
administrative efficiency. In Colin Chan v MITA (HC), the HC stated that  
the width of the ban did not make it unreasonable per se since the Minister’s actions were 
clearly to stop the dissemination and propagation of beliefs of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and this 
would of necessity include every publication by IBSA. Any order other than a total blanket 
order would have been impossible to monitor administratively.110 
In Liong Kok Keng, the Jehovah’s Witness appellant was charged under the UPA for 
possessing materials that violated the WTBTS and IBSA Bans, and unsuccessfully challenged 
the constitutionality of these bans. Apart from the questions already settled in Colin Chan v PP 
and Colin Chan v MITA (CA) of whether the two Bans contravened Article 15(1), the HC also 
considered whether they were too wide and therefore ran afoul of Article 15(4). The HC 
answered the question negatively and reiterated the decision in Colin Chan v PP:  
[Any] order other than a total blanket order would be administratively inconvenient. It would 
be absurd to expect every published material to be vetted. Hence a total blanket order was the 
only possible administrative solution.111 
Whereas the ECtHR in Bayatyan ruled that a system which fails to allow conscience-
based exceptions to military service ‘[fails] to strike a fair balance between the interests of 
society as a whole and those of the applicant’,112 under Singapore’s communitarian approach, 
the collective interest in safeguarding national service is paramount and justifies a sweeping 
and overly restrictive ban on the congregation and religious materials of a religious minority. 
What is at stake here, according to the courts, is not only society’s interests as a whole, but the 
national interest too: national security and the national ethos. The overriding importance of 
these collective interests means that the Witnesses’ Article 15(1) right can be restricted even 
for administrative efficiency, a standard below ‘a pressing social need’. Once again, this reveals 
a broad interpretation of Article 15(4)’s public order exception, one that conflicts with elevated 
status of Article 15(1).  
 
109 [1996] 2 SLR(R) 683.  
110 Colin Chan v MITA (HC) (n 99) [32] (emphasis added).  
111 Liong Kok Keng (n 109) [27]. 
112 Bayatyan (n 88) [124].  
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A possible argument in Singapore’s defence is that the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not 
denied the right to hold their religious beliefs, for it is ‘not illegal to profess the beliefs of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses per se, nor is it an offence to be a Jehovah’s Witness’. 113  All that 
Singapore’s communitarian solution mandates is that, in professing their religious beliefs, the 
Witnesses ‘may not be a member of the SCJW … and they may not have access to the 
prohibited publications’114—in other words, they do not have the right to manifest their 
religious beliefs. The distinction between the right to hold and right to manifest is similarly 
recognised by other courts, such as the UK House of Lords (UKHL) in R v Williamson: the 
right to hold a religious belief is absolute, but the right to manifest is qualified.115  
However, what distinguishes Singapore’s approach is that scant protection is given to 
the right to manifest when it clashes with the collective interest in national security and national 
service. In contrast, the UKHL in Williamson laid down three criteria to determine whether the 
right to manifest is protected, namely: whether the belief is consistent with the standards of 
human dignity; whether the belief relates to more than trivial matters and is adequately serious 
and important; and whether it is capable of being understood.116 What is telling is that the 
activities that Singapore banned—being a member of the SCJW and accessing the banned 
publications—are ‘intimately linked to the belief’,117 such that the restriction on the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ right to manifest arguably encroaches into their right to profess these beliefs. It is 
likely that, for the deeply devout, having access to the relevant religious texts and being able 
to gather with like-minded individuals to worship and practise their religion is inextricable 
from professing that religion; that it is impossible to separate, in the manner that Singapore’s 
communitarian approach has done, the profession from the practice. Unsurprisingly, the 
Witnesses continued to congregate and worship decades after the Deregistration Order. In Chan 
Cheow Khiang v Public Prosecutor,118 the Jehovah’s Witness appellant was convicted under 
the Societies Act for being a member of the unlawful SCJW. In Kok Hoong Tan Dennis and 
 
113 Colin Chan v MITA (CA) (n 103) 18. 
114 ibid [18]. 
115 Regina v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others (Respondents) ex parte Williamson 
(Appellant) and others [2005] 2 AC 246 [16].  
116 ibid [23].  
117 ibid [32]. 
118 Chan Cheow Khiang v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 620.  
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others v Public Prosecutor,119  the appellants were convicted under the Societies Act for 
attending a SCJW meeting held at one of the appellant’s premises. Furthermore, Singapore’s 
failure to recognise a right to conscientious objection has also caused Jehovah’s Witnesses who 
persistently fail to perform their state-mandated military duties to be court-martialled.120 
Singapore’s communitarian approach to the issue at hand is evident in its explicitly 
restricting Article 15(1) to safeguard national security by adopting a broad interpretation of 
Article 15(4), resulting in the sweeping and arguably disproportionate bans on the SCJW and 
their religious materials.121 The broadness of the restrictions on Article 15(1) demonstrates 
little appreciation for the right’s elevated status, thus weakening the right.  
 
b. Religious Freedom vs. National Unity  
The Witnesses’ right to religious freedom has also been trumped by the collective interest in 
national unity. In Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education,122 the Jehovah’s 
Witness appellant failed in his wrongful dismissal claim against the Institute of Technical 
Education (ITE) when he was dismissed from his teaching position for refusing to conform to 
one manifestation of this national unity. The ITE, pursuant to a mandatory Ministry of 
Education (MOE) policy, required its teaching staff to take the National Pledge, which involves 
placing one’s right fist over the heart, and sing the National Anthem during daily flag-raising 
morning assembly. Although Nappalli was present at morning assembly, he conspicuously did 
not take part in the pledge and anthem ceremony as his ‘right fist was not raised when the 
pledge was taken’.123 For Nappalli, the pledge and anthem ceremony violated his religious 
convictions: it amounted to an act of worship that ‘should be reserved exclusively for God and 
not for country’.124 The ITE dismissed him for breaching his employment contract.  
 
119 Kok Hoong Tan Dennis and others v Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR(R) 570. 
120 E.g. PTE Chai Tshun Chieh v Chief Military Prosecutor [1998] SGMCA 3. The Singapore Military Court of 
Appeal applied the Colin Chan decisions.  
121 I argue this point more fully in Chapter Five, Part II(a)(i), 224–227. 
122 [1999] 2 SLR(R) 529.  




For the HC, even though Nappalli’s Article 15 right ‘must be jealously guarded’, it 
must also be viewed in the light of his employment contract with the ITE ‘which he willingly 
entered into’, knowing full well that he was required to participate in the pledge and anthem 
ceremony.125 Hence,  
it follows that as the plaintiff voluntarily entered into his contract of employment … with the 
knowledge that he had to take the National Pledge and sing the National Anthem during the 
ITE assembly, he cannot say that he has a constitutional right to refuse to take the National 
Pledge or sing the National Anthem during the ITE assembly.126 
The HC’s reasoning finds some consonance in a UKHL case. In Begum, R (on the 
application of) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School,127 the UKHL rejected 
the applicant’s claim that her right to religious freedom had been violated by her school’s 
refusal to exempt her from its uniform policy and allow her to wear the jilbab. The UKHL 
reasoned, based on the ECtHR’s previous jurisprudence, that ‘where a person has voluntarily 
accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate [his/her religious] practice or 
observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her 
religion without undue hardship or inconvenience’,128 it cannot be said that his/her right to 
religious freedom has been violated. Begum, however, is outdated: the subsequent Bull and 
another (Appellants) v Hall and another (Respondents)129 followed the ECtHR’s decision in 
Eweida v UK. The ECtHR revised its previous jurisprudence on which Begum was based as 
follows: 
Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court considers that, 
where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion on the workplace, rather 
than holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any interference with the right, 
the better approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering 
whether or not the restriction was proportionate.130  
 
125 Peter Williams Nappalli v Institute of Technical Education [1998] SGHC 351 [35]. 
126 ibid [37]. 
127 [2007] 1 AC 100.  
128 ibid [23]. 
129 [2014] 1 WLR 3741.  
130 Case of Eweida and others v The United Kingdom App no. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 
(ECtHR, 15 January 2013) [83]. 
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Hence, the HC’s freedom of contract approach to Nappalli’s claim is consonant only 
with the outdated UKHL approach in that it treated Nappalli’s voluntariness in entering into an 
employment contract with the ITE as dispositive of the constitutional issue. Furthermore, the 
Singapore courts’ lack of a proportionality analysis means that the ECtHR’s Eweida approach 
is not one that they would undertake explicitly. More importantly, the HC identified an 
additional issue—and this marks out the distinguishing, and communitarian, feature of its 
decision. This is 
whether in the special circumstances of Singapore, an educational institution is entitled to insist 
that its teachers encourage students to be good and useful citizens by complying with an implied 
term in their contracts of employment requiring them to lead their students in the taking of the 
National Pledge and the singing of the National Anthem… With no natural resources of its 
own, Singapore’s success depends on, among other things, the unity of its multi-racial and 
multi-cultural population … Surely the Ministry of Education is entitled to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the future generations of Singaporeans understand the importance of 
preserving the sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore.131  
The need to foster national unity is thus an additional ground—on top of voluntariness 
of contract—on which the HC held that Nappalli’s Article 15 right was not violated. This 
collective interest in fostering national unity through the education system is so important that, 
although the HC acknowledged that ‘the Constitution should be given a generous interpretation 
… so as to give individuals the full measure of their constitutional rights’, in this case, ‘the 
interest of the State in the education system must prevail over those of the individual’.132 
For the CA, however, in dismissing Nappalli’s appeal against the HC’s decision, there 
was no question whatsoever of a clash between fostering national unity and Article 15. In sharp 
contrast to Williamson where the UKHL noted that ‘it is not for the court to embark on an 
inquiry into the asserted belief and judge its “validity” by some objective standard’,133 the 
‘enforcing theologian’134 CA denied that Article 15 was engaged at all. This was one of the 
few instances where the courts explicitly denied that a claimed right was applicable at all. The 
 
131 Peter Williams Nappalli (n 125) [46], citing Colin Chan v PP (n 84). 
132 Peter Williams Nappalli (n 125) [53]. 
133 Williamson (n 115) [22].  
134 Angela Wu Howard, ‘Leveraging Legal Protection for Religious Liberty’ in Allen D Hertzke (ed), The Future 
of Religious Freedom (Oxford University Press 2012) 124. 
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CA asserted that ‘there was no valid religious belief protected by the Constitution’135 because 
Nappalli’s interpretation of the pledge and anthem ceremony as a religious one was a 
‘philosophical choice’, a ‘distortion of secular fact into religious belief [and is] not accepted as 
a religious belief’.136 If ‘Article 15 as a whole demonstrates that the paramount concern of the 
Constitution is a statement of citizen’s rights framed in a wider social context of maintaining 
unity as one nation’,137 then beliefs, such as Nappalli’s refusal to participate in the pledge and 
anthem ceremony, that appear to undermine this national unity cannot be protected. Here, the 
CA placed overwhelming emphasis on the collective interest in national unity and denied that 
Nappalli had a valid constitutional claim at all.  
In a rather confused few paragraphs, the CA rejected the suggestion that ‘religion’ in 
Article 15 refers to a system of belief in one’s own country and opined that ‘religion’ refers to 
‘a citizen’s faith in a personal God’. Hence, ‘[the] State commands no supernatural existence 
in a citizen’s personal belief system’.138 Given this definition of ‘religion’, the CA went on to 
hold that ‘not every conviction or belief … qualifies as a religious belief’. 139  Nappalli’s 
understanding of the pledge and anthem ceremony as ‘[demanding] worship of the flag as a 
symbol’ is thus a ‘philosophical choice’140 and not protected under Article 15. To accept 
otherwise, the CA asserted, ‘would rob the Constitution of any operative effect’, for it could 
not guarantee religious freedom by simultaneously coercing citizens to participate in a religious 
ceremony when asking citizens to pledge their allegiance to country.141 
The CA’s decision is confusing. It seems unnecessary for the CA to hold that Nappalli 
did not have a valid religious belief, for it could have simply held, like the HC did, that he 
could not claim a breach of Article 15 if he had voluntarily entered into the employment 
contract with the ITE. But the CA’s fervour in denying that Article 15 was applicable illustrates 
its communitarian impulse. The CA could not accept that the pledge and anthem ceremony had 
any religious significance, for that would undermine the ceremony’s legitimacy as a secular 
form of nation-building in multireligious Singapore. The purpose of the ceremony is to 
 
135 Nappalli Peter Williams (n 122) [29]. 
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‘encourage and instil a student’s allegiance to the nation’.142 If the ceremony were to be seen 
as a religious one, then it could be objected to by others on religious grounds, like Nappalli did, 
thereby potentially undermining its legitimacy. Once again, the communitarian element of the 
CA’s decision consists in an overarching concern for the national interest; in this case, the 
maintenance of a pledge and anthem ceremony designed to instil allegiance to the nation. In 
contrast, it was denied outright that Nappalli had a valid Article 15 claim. This illustrates the 
overwhelming primacy that Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights accords to the 
collective interest, one that overrides the elevated status of the claimed constitutional right.  
 
II. EQUALITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND PUBLIC MORALITY 
Singapore’s communitarian approach is similarly evident in a series of cases involving an 
unsuccessful constitutional challenge to section 377A of the Penal Code which criminalises 
sexual conduct between men. No other forms of sexual conduct between consenting adults are 
criminalised. 377A has been challenged for violating the Article 9(1) right to life and liberty,143 
 
142 ibid [24]. 
143 Article 9 provides: 
(1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law. 
(2) Where a complaint is made to the High Court or any Judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully 
detained, the Court shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall 
order him to be produced before the Court and release him. 
(3) Where a person is arrested, he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds of his arrest and shall 
be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. 
(4) Where a person is arrested and not released, he shall, without unreasonable delay, and in any case within 
48 hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey), be produced before a Magistrate, in person or 
by way of video-conferencing link (or other similar technology) in accordance with law, and shall not be 
further detained in custody without the Magistrate’s authority. 
(5) Clauses (3) and (4) shall not apply to an enemy alien or to any person arrested for contempt of Parliament 
pursuant to a warrant issued under the hand of the Speaker. 
(6) Nothing in this Article shall invalidate any law — 
(a) in force before the commencement of this Constitution which authorises the arrest and detention 
of any person in the interests of public safety, peace and good order; or 
(b) relating to the misuse of drugs or intoxicating substances which authorises the arrest and 
detention of any person for the purpose of treatment and rehabilitation, 
by reason of such law being inconsistent with clauses (3) and (4), and, in particular, nothing in 
this Article shall affect the validity or operation of any such law before 10th March 1978. 
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and Article 12(1), the right to equal protection. These two failed challenges will be considered 
in turn.  
 
a. No Substantive Right to Liberty   
It is trite law in Singapore that ‘liberty’ in Article 9(1) is a procedural right that protects 
individuals against ‘unlawful incarceration or detention’144 only. A plain reading of Article 9 
has allowed the courts to conclude that, because the rest of Article 9 contains procedural rights, 
Article 9(1) is only a procedural right.145 The courts have repeatedly rejected attempts by 
litigants to claim a substantive liberty right; and so not only does Article 9(1) not refer to a 
‘right of personal liberty to contract’,146 but it does not contain a right to privacy and personal 
autonomy either.  
The latter expansion of Article 9(1) was decisively rejected by the CA in Lim Meng 
Suang.147 The applicants, three gay men, argued that 377A violated Article 9(1) because it does 
not ‘[allow] a person to enjoy and express affection and love towards another human 
being’148—an argument based on a substantive conception of liberty and a reading of Article 
9(1) to include a right to personal autonomy. The CA rejected this argument for three reasons, 
the first two of which demonstrate a plain, narrow reading of Article 9(1). First, the CA 
reiterated that ‘liberty’ in Article 9(1) refers only to a right against unlawful incarceration or 
detention. 149  Second, in the context of the rest of Article 9 which provides procedural 
safeguards against unlawful incarceration or detention, ‘it is clear that the phrase “life or 
personal liberty”…refers only to a person’s freedom from an unlawful deprivation of life and 
unlawful detention or incarceration’.150 Third, the CA referred to Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution from which Article 9(1) was derived, and noted that Article 21 intends only to 
 
144 Lo Pui Sang v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2008] 4 SLR(R) 754 [6].  
145 Lim Meng Suang (n 6) [46]. 
146 Lo Pui Sang (n 144) [6]. 
147 Lim Meng Suang (n 6). 
148 ibid [43]. 
149 Affirming Lo Pui Sang and Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General (n 1) [120]. 
150 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General (n 6) [46]. 
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protect Indians from unlawful detention.151 Since Article 9(1) confers only a right against 
unlawful detention and incarceration, a law that criminalises male homosexual conduct does 
not violate it.  
The communitarian flavour of the CA’s judgment is in its remarks on the right to 
privacy. Asserting that the applicants’ claimed constitutional right to privacy ‘ought … to be 
developed by way of the private law on privacy instead’, the applicants could not ‘obtain by 
the (constitutional) backdoor what they cannot obtain by the (private) law front door’. More 
illuminatingly, the CA saw in this right ‘the seeds of an unlimited right’:  
Put simply, such a right could be interpreted to encompass as well as legalise all manner of 
subjective expressions of love and affection, which could (in turn) embody content that may be 
wholly unacceptable from the perspective of broader societal policy.152 
Resistance to treating the rights of sexual minorities as a privacy issue is not unique to 
Singapore. The South Africa Constitutional Court (SACC), for instance, in National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice153 cited Edwin Cameron’s argument against 
using the right to privacy to protect sexual minorities. It wrongly suggests, Cameron argues, 
that ‘discrimination against gays and lesbians is confined to prohibiting conduct between adults 
in the privacy of the bedroom’, which ‘may subtly reinforce the idea that homosexual intimacy 
is shameful or improper: that it is tolerable so long as it is confined to the bedroom’.154 The 
SACC acknowledged that Cameron’s concerns are valid insofar as the issue were to be treated 
as one of privacy only; but since the SACC found that the South African equivalent of 377A 
violated the rights to dignity, equality and privacy, the inadequacy of the privacy argument was 
ameliorated.155 
It is apparent that the CA’s contrasting approach was motivated by society’s general 
interest: whereas the SACC recognised that the right to privacy alone could not adequately 
protect the rights of homosexuals, the CA took the opposite view and expressed concern that 
recognising a right to privacy would afford too much protection not just to homosexuals, but 
 
151 ibid [47]. But note that the Indian Supreme Court has recognised the right to privacy as a fundamental right 
under Article 21: Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India [2017] 10 SCC 1.  
152 Lim Meng Suang v (n 6) [49]. 
153 National Coalition (n 7).  
154 Quoted in ibid at [29].  
155 ibid [30].  
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to other forms of expressions of love which society may find unacceptable. The communitarian 
quality of the CA’s comments is thus apparent in its circumspection that expanding Article 9(1) 
to include the right to privacy/autonomy, plausible given the open-ended nature of the text, 
might impinge on broader societal policy, including, perhaps, Singapore’s policy of 
maintaining the collective interest in the traditional one-man-one-woman family unit.156 That 
the CA placed overwhelming weight on this particular collective interest is evident in the scant 
attention that it paid to the value of a right to personal autonomy and privacy to the individual; 
indeed, the CA said nothing about this issue. The CA’s denial of a general right to personal 
autonomy and/or privacy is communitarian because it expresses the anxiety that the exercise 
of this general right might conflict with the collective’s interest in maintaining the traditional 
heterosexual family unit. By suggesting that societal disapproval of certain forms of conduct 
could be reason enough to foreclose a general right to personal autonomy/privacy, the CA is 
indirectly allowing public morality and the vagaries of public opinion to delimit the scope of a 
constitutional right, which arguably does not recognise the elevated status of rights.  
 
b. Maintaining a Conservative Society 
The more problematic aspect of Lim Meng Suang is the CA’s Article 12157 decision. In the 
battle between the individual and the collective, Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights 
has downgraded gay men’s constitutional right to equality to a triviality easily sacrificed for 
the collective interest in maintaining a conservative society—and the CA has vindicated this 
 
156 See section (b) below.  
157 Article 12 provides: 
(1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. 
(2) Except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens of 
Singapore on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law or in the appointment 
to any office or employment under a public authority or in the administration of any law relating to the 
acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, 
profession, vocation or employment. 
(3) This Article does not invalidate or prohibit — 
(a) any provision regulating personal law; or 
(b) any provision or practice restricting office or employment connected with the affairs of any 




balance by deciding the constitutional question on a purely doctrinal basis. The doctrinal tool 
that the courts use to adjudicate Article 12 cases is the reasonable classification test which 
consists of two limbs.158 First, the statute’s prescribed classification must be based on an 
intelligible differentia, i.e. a classification that makes logical sense. Second, the differentia 
must bear a rational relation to the statutory purpose.  
The CA held that 377A does not violate the right to equality because it satisfies the 
reasonable classification test. The differentia that 377A prescribes, men who have sex with 
other men, is intelligible because we can understand logically what it means, and is neither 
extremely illogical and/or incoherent;159 as such, the differentia satisfies limb (a). Next, as 
377A’s purpose is to criminalise sex between men, there is a rational relation between limbs 
(a) and (b). Therefore, 377A does not violate gay men’s right to equality. 
This was the entirety of the CA’s ratio. Whereas the HC recognised a third limb—
whether the purpose of the statute is legitimate160—the CA rejected this test. The CA asserted 
that a test of legitimacy would impermissibly breach the separation of powers because there 
are no legal standards to determine legitimacy.161 Hence, absent an ‘extreme provision’ enacted 
by an ‘[unreasonable] Parliament,162 the courts will refrain from declaring that ‘Parliament 
should defer to the views of the court’ on issues of ‘morality and societal values’. 163 
Substantive moral issues such as whether it is legitimate for the criminal law to enforce public 
morality164 were deemed ‘extra-legal’ and beyond the CA’s jurisdiction because the courts are 
not ‘mini-legislatures’.165 
A few things are distinctive about the CA’s judgment. First, the CA’s reasoning 
exemplifies the lack of proportionality/necessity/legitimacy analysis in its constitutional 
adjudication which other courts undertake. For instance, the ECtHR in Dudgeon v United 
Kingdom held that Northern Ireland’s retention of its 377A equivalent violated the right to 
 
158 Lim Meng Suang (n 6) [60]. 
159 ibid [67], [86]. This is the substantial element that the CA introduced to the rational classification test: a 
differentia that is extremely illogical and/or incoherent will not pass constitutional muster.  
160 Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2013] 3 SLR 118 [113].  
161 ibid [85]. 
162 Lim Meng Suang (n 6) [114]. 
163 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2013] 4 SLR 1059 [94].  
164 Lim Meng Suang (n 6) [162]–[175]. 
165 ibid [77], [82], [84], [92], [93], [101], [154], [173], [189].  
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privacy because there was no pressing social need to criminalise sexual conduct between men, 
and so the justifications for the law were outweighed by the harm that the law could cause to 
homosexuals.166 In Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India,167 the Indian Supreme Court held that 
the Indian equivalent of 377A violated the Indian Article 14 right to equality because it is 
manifestly arbitrary: it ‘fails to make a distinction between consensual and non-consensual 
sexual acts between competent adults’, thereby failing to consider that ‘consensual sexual acts 
between adults in private space are neither harmful nor contagious’ to society.168 In Lawrence 
v Texas, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor opined that moral disapproval of homosexuality was 
not a legitimate state interest to justify a law that bans only homosexual sodomy and hence 
such a law violates the right to equality.169 
Having said that, it appears from the HC’s judgment that, even if there were a test of 
legitimacy of purpose, Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights would uphold 377A’s 
constitutionality anyway, as the HC concluded. In arguing for a test of legitimacy, the HC 
asserted that  
If the legislation in question is truly discriminating arbitrarily and without a legitimate purpose, 
the court cannot … do nothing. Parliament cannot introduce arbitrary and unjustified 
discrimination by simply hiding behind the curtain of words and language used in impugned 
legislation, or behind statements in Parliamentary debates which will yield an apparent purpose 
of the legislation … that invariably relates rationally to the differentia underlying the 
classification… The courts can, and will, critically examine and test such legislation where 
necessary and appropriate.170 
However, in contrast with the approaches taken by other courts outlined above, the HC 
went on to hold that 377A’s purpose (i.e. to criminalise male homosexual conduct) was not 
illegitimate. The relevant reason here is that ‘some portions of Singapore society today still 
hold certain deep seated feelings with regard to procreation and family lineage’ and these views 
cannot be readily dismissed by the courts in favour of some other views prevailing in society—
especially when ‘Parliament has made clear its position on the matter’.171 This portion of the 
 
166 Dudgeon (n 6) [60].  
167 Navtej (n 6).  
168 ibid, page 148, [239].  
169 Lawrence (n 6) 583. 
170 Lim Meng Suang (HC) (n 160) [114]. 
171 ibid [127]. 
41 
 
HC’s judgment is communitarian because it affords overwhelming weight to prevailing views 
in society, and comparatively little to the right to equality.  
More crucial, however, is that the HC deferred to Parliament’s position on the matter—
a position that favours the conservative, anti-homosexuality views in Singapore society. In the 
same vein, the CA’s rejection of a test of legitimacy is arguably a vindication of Parliament’s 
reasons for retaining 377A. The HC pointed out that, when a possible 377A repeal was debated 
in Parliament in 2007,  
[the] majority of the MPs were of the view that … repealing [377A] would result in the loss of 
a moral signpost and would not reflect the views of a vast majority of society who were not 
ready to accept homosexuality as part of our mainstream way of life. The majority were against 
putting homosexual couples on par with normal heterosexual couples who conceived children 
and formed the basic building blocks of families in our society.172  
Hence, even though 377A ‘arguably violates the Art 12(1) rights’ 173  of gay men 
because ‘it is arguable that there is no social objective that can be furthered by criminalising 
male but not female homosexual intercourse’,174 Parliament chose to retain 377A because of 
conservative Singapore’s opprobrium against homosexuality. The ‘majority’ of Singapore 
society ‘found homosexual behaviour offensive and unacceptable’,175 which, in turn, was a 
reflection of Singapore society’s conservativeness:  
Singapore is basically a conservative society. The family is the basic building block of our 
society. It has been so and, by policy, we have reinforced this and we want to keep it so. And 
by ‘family’ in Singapore, we mean one man one woman, marrying, having children and bringing 
up children within that framework of a stable family unit.176 
 
172 ibid [84]. 
173 Tan Eng Hong (n 1) [126]. This case involved whether the applicant had standing to constitutionally challenge 
section 377A, given that his original charge under 377A (for engaging in oral sex with another man in a public 
toilet) was amended to public indecency. The CA was not tasked to decide 377A’s constitutionality.  
174 Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General [2011] 3 SLR 320 [16].   
175 Lim Meng Suang HC (n 160) [81]. 
176 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 23 October 2007, vol 83, col 2397. This reasoning is consistent with the 
White Paper’s second value, family as the basic unit of society.  
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It should be pointed out that Parliament has stated that it will not ‘proactively enforce 
[377A]’177 as a compromise between sharply divergent views: it would uphold a stable society 
with traditional heterosexual family values and, simultaneously, allow homosexuals to live 
their lives and contribute to society.178 Parliament thought it important to keep the status quo 
and retain 377A instead of ‘[forcing] the issue and [settling] the matter definitively’179 which 
would ‘divide and polarise our society’.180  
While it may seem that 377A has only symbolic value, the CA’s affirmation of its 
constitutionality nevertheless fails to recognise the elevated status of the right to equality. This 
is especially apparent given that 377A’s constitutionality was affirmed on arguably flimsy 
grounds; that is, if the CA had acknowledged the elevated status of Article 12(1), it would have 
upheld 377A on a firmer basis. One example might be that 377A is necessary for the protection 
of morals, which is an arguably more substantive181 basis than the technical and legalistic 
reasonable classification test. But perhaps this argument was not open to the CA anyway. Quite 
apart from how it had followed the established Article 12 jurisprudence, Parliament’s non-
enforcement policy shows that 377A only has symbolic value when it comes to protecting the 
public interest, which then prevents the CA from upholding it on a protection of morals ground. 
As the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Toonen v Australia said of Tasmania’s 
non-enforcement of its 377A equivalent, it implies that ‘[the laws] are not deemed essential to 
the protection of morals in Tasmania’.182 Seen in this light, the constitutional right to equality 
has been negated for reasons that have nothing to do with preventing harm to the public interest. 
Indeed, the CA’s affirmation of 377A indirectly justifies Parliament’s purpose of retaining it 
to maintain a certain type of conservative society, thereby demonstrating that, when pitted 
against the collective interest in this type of society, the elevated status of the right to equality 
is nugatory.  
 
 
177 ibid col 2401. 
178 ibid cols 2399–2400. 
179 ibid col 2405. 
180 ibid. 
181 But unpersuasive; see discussion in Chapter Five, Part II(a)(ii), 231–233. 
182 Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) [8.6].  
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III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, MULTIRACIALISM AND POLITICAL 
PROTEST  
Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights is particularly unforgiving when it comes to the 
Article 14 right to freedom of expression.183 A plain reading of the Article reveals that the 
‘collective over individual’ essence of Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights is built 
into Article 14 itself. All that Parliament needs to show, pursuant to Article 14(2), is that a 
restriction of Article 14(1) is ‘necessary or expedient’ in the interest of national security and 
public order.  
The courts have adhered to a plain reading of Article 14 in their adjudication of the 
clash between an exercise of an Article 14(1) right and the relevant competing collective 
interest—and the broadness of the Article 14(2) limits means that, very often, the courts need 
only adopt a plain reading of the text to reach the conclusion that the individual right is trumped 
by the competing collective interest. Despite this, in some cases, the courts have brought in 
‘communitarian values, particularly, the importance of social harmony and public order’184 in 
their decisions. Even though, unlike Articles 9, 12 and 15, Article 14’s structure leaves the 
courts very little room to manoeuvre, these cases illustrate the courts’ communitarian approach 
to rights, and so they will be discussed here.  
 
183 Article 14 provides:  
(1) Subject to clauses (2) and (3) — 
(a) every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) all citizens of Singapore have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms; and 
(c) all citizens of Singapore have the right to form associations. 
(2) Parliament may by law impose — 
(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient 
in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with other 
countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of 
Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence; 
(b) on the right conferred by clause (1)(b), such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient 
in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof or public order; and 
(c) on the right conferred by clause (1)(c), such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient 
in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, public order or morality. 
(3) Restrictions on the right to form associations conferred by clause (1) (c) may also be imposed by any law 
relating to labour or education. 




a. Multiracialism and Sedition  
Singapore’s multiracial and multireligious185 population has been used as the raison d'être for 
strict laws that prohibit speech and other modes of expression that may threaten Singapore’s 
racial and religious harmony. Hence, the collective interest in maintaining racial and religious 
harmony a priori outweighs the competing individual Article 14 right to freedom of speech 
and expression, and the Article 15 freedom of religion. This balance between the two is codified 
in a number of statutes,186 the most pertinent being the Sedition Act (SA).187 When convicting 
individuals under the SA, the courts’ reasons are heavily communitarian.  
The SA defines a seditious tendency as a tendency to ‘promote feelings of ill-will and 
hostility between different races or classes of the population of Singapore’.188 The relatively 
low threshold of mere promotion of feelings of ill-will and hostility, compared to the higher 
requirement of, for instance, ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words’ intended to ‘stir up racial 
 
185 I will use ‘multiracial’ as a shorthand to include ‘multireligious’. In Singapore, race and religion are closely 
related, and the terms ‘multiracial’, ‘multireligious’ and ‘multicultural’ tend to be used interchangeably. Hence, 
subsequent uses of ‘multiracial’ should be understood to include ‘multireligious’.  
186 Another noteworthy provision is section 298 of the Penal Code which punishes the ‘deliberate intention of 
wounding the religious or racial feelings of any person’, effectively creating a legal right not to be racially or 
religiously offended. This section was used against Amos Yee, a teenager who gained infamy in 2015 when he 
insulted the late Lee Kuan Yew in a YouTube video shortly after Lee’s death. He was charged and convicted 
under section 298 (among others) for a few insulting remarks against Christianity. See Public Prosecutor v Amos 
Yee Pang Sang (MAC Nos 902694 & 902695 of 2015). Yee has since left Singapore and attained asylum in the 
United States, who considered him a political prisoner; see In the Matter of Amos Pang Sang Yee (United States 
Department of Justice, Executive for Immigration Review, Immigration Court, Chicago, Illinois), March 24 2017, 
11: ‘So, though Yee’s prosecutions may have been legal under Singapore law, they clearly served a “nefarious 
purpose,” namely, to stifle political dissent.’ Regardless of the real motivation behind his prosecution, his case 
highlights the zealousness of Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights to maintain religious harmony even 
at the cost of prosecuting an immature 16-year-old. 
187 Cap 290 (2013 rev ed).    
188 ibid section 3(1)(e). Sedition is punishable under section 4 of the Act, and punishable offences include doing 
or conspiring to do an act that would have a seditious tendency (section 4(1)(a)); uttering seditious words (section 
4(1)(b)); printing, distributing, publishing etc seditious publications (section 4(1)(c)); and importing any sedition 
publication (section 4(1)(d)). These offences attract a maximum fine of $5,000 and/or a maximum jail term of 3 
years for first-time offenders, and a maximum jail term of 5 years for subsequent offenders.  
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hatred’189 in the UK Public Order Act 1986, demonstrates that preserving racial and religious 
harmony is paramount in Singapore, such that any threat to this harmony is seen as sedition—
that is, existential threat against Singapore. Hence, protecting racial harmony safeguards not 
just the dignity of each individual, but also Singapore’s multiracial social fabric. Given such 
an important collective interest, there is no requirement, as there is in the UK, of a higher 
standard of stirring up racial hatred to curtail the freedom of expression on race and religious 
matters; all that is required is the promotion of feelings of ill-will and hostility.  
This rationale has underpinned the courts’ sentencing judgments in two cases where 
individuals were charged under the SA. Note, though, that it was not claimed in the two cases 
that the accused’s rights were infringed. Nonetheless, the courts’ remarks reveal a strong 
communitarian element that illustrates the overwhelming importance that Singapore’s 
communitarian approach gives to the collective interest. This also suggests that, had it been 
claimed that the SA infringed upon Articles 14 and 15, the claims would have been rejected.  
In Public Prosecutor v Benjamin Koh,190 the two accused, Benjamin Koh and Nicholas 
Lim, were convicted under the SA and given deterrent custodial sentences for posting anti-
Malay and anti-Muslim remarks online. Koh had ‘parodied the halal logo and placed it next to 
a pig’s head, spewed vulgarities at the Muslim community, derided and mocked their customs 
and beliefs and … even compared their religion to Satanism’ on his website,191 and Lim had 
posted his racist remarks in a discussion forum. In Public Prosecutor v Ong Kian Cheong,192 a 
Christian evangelical couple was convicted under the SA for distributing evangelical tracts that 
promoted their version of Christianity partly by denigrating other religions, including Islam 
and Catholicism. Despite the fact that they had distributed tracts which were, for a time, ‘freely 
available for sale to the public’193 which reasonably created the impression that the tracts were 
 
189 UK POA section 18(1)(a). Jeremy Waldron provided a concise summary of hate speech legislation in Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, New Zealand and the UK, and stated that ‘all of them are concerned with the use of words 
which are deliberately abusive and/or insulting and/or threatening and/or demeaning directed at members of 
vulnerable minorities, calculated to stir up hatred against them’: Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech 
(Harvard University Press 2014) 8–9. Singapore’s much lower threshold of ‘stirring up of feelings of ill-will and 
hostility’ is thus even more marked in this light.  
190 Public Prosecutor v Koh Song Huat Benjamin and Another Case [2005] SGDC 272. 
191 ibid [11]. The judgment does not contain details of Nicholas Lim’s comments.  
192 Public Prosecutor v Ong Kian Cheong and Another [2009] SGDC 163. 
193 ibid [67]. 
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not legally objectionable, the couple was given deterrent sentences of eight weeks’ 
imprisonment each.  
Two aspects of these cases demonstrate Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights. 
First, the facts concretely illustrate that any infraction against racial and religious harmony is 
treated as serious enough to constitute an existential attack on Singapore. This is especially so 
if we compare the facts of these cases with cases that have arisen under the racial hatred 
provisions of the UK POA, such as R v Sheppard & Whittle:194 the two accused variously 
distributed and wrote pamphlets and articles doubting the Holocaust, denigrating Jewish and 
black people, and managed 15 websites (including nazi.org and whitepower.co.uk) where these 
articles and pamphlets were published.195 While it might be196 that Benjamin Koh’s actions and 
the ‘virulent response’ that it provoked197 were as grave as the actions of the accused in 
Sheppard, it is less clear whether the actions of the evangelists were as grave and whether they 
deserved imprisonment. More importantly, Singapore’s materially different conception of two 
similar crimes instructively demonstrates the communitarian impulse of the SA and the courts’ 
approach to it: what is of utmost importance is the preservation of racial and religious harmony 
because Singapore’s existence depends on it; and so racist speech that might not attract penal 
sanctions in other jurisdictions are punishable as sedition in communitarian Singapore. As 
such, too, the offence’s evidentiary requirement is not particularly robust. In Ong Kian Cheong, 
the District Court (DC) relied on the subjective feelings of anger of the Muslims who received 
the offending tracts to ‘clearly [prove]’ that the tracts had a seditious tendency198—even if ‘the 
distributed tracts did not spark off a widespread and virulent response’.199 It is also ‘deemed to 
be irrelevant’200 whether the offenders had the intention to promote feelings of ill-will and 
hostility by distributing the offending tracts.  
Second, the courts’ reasons for imposing deterrent sentences also reveal their 
communitarian impulse. In Benjamin Koh, the DC stated that the seditious tendency of 
 
194 [2010] EWCA Crim 65. 
195 ibid [7]–[15].  
196 The sentencing judgment did not give details of his posts.  
197 Benjamin Koh (n 190) [11]: ‘They sparked off more than 200 comments, some of which involved the slinging 
of racial slurs at Chinese and Malays.’ 
198 Ong Kian Cheong (n 192) [59]. 
199 ibid [71]. 
200 Sedition Act (n 187), section 3(3).  
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promoting hostility and ill-will between races and religious groups warrants a deterrent 
sentence because it is ‘mala per se [sic]’, and because of the ‘especial sensitivity of racial and 
religious issues in our multi-cultural society, particularly given our history of the Maria 
Hertogh incident in the 1950s and the July and September 1964 race riots’.201 It is so important 
to maintain racial and religious harmony that a deterrent sentence is necessary to remind 
Singaporeans that ‘callous and reckless remarks on racial or religious subjects have the 
potential to cause social disorder’.202 As such, the freedom of expression  
must always be balanced by the right of another’s freedom from offence, and tampered [sic] by 
wider public interest considerations. It is only appropriate social behaviour, independent of any 
legal duty, of every Singapore citizen … to respect the other races in … our multi-racial society. 
Each individual living here irrespective of his racial origin owes it to himself and to the country 
to see that nothing is said or done which might … plunge the country into racial strife and 
violence. … [The] Sedition Act statutorily delineates this redline on the ground in the subject 
at hand. Otherwise, the resultant harm is not only to one racial group but to the very fabric of 
our society.203 
The DC’s communitarian impulse is evident in the strong consideration given to the 
need to maintain racial and religious harmony which, if undermined, would threaten Singapore 
society as a whole. Further, the national interest is at stake as well, as suggested by the DC’s 
invocation of a duty to country. What is striking about this decision, and Singapore’s general 
approach to the balance between freedom of expression and racial/religious harmony, is that 
there is an overwhelming concern with the preservation of the Singaporean nation or society, 
and not the protection of the individual’s dignity as a member of the targeted race. Instead, the 
latter is an incidental benefit that the individual derives from Singapore’s communitarian 
motivation to preserve racial/religious harmony for the collective’s sake.   
 
201 There were two separate clashes between the Malays and Chinese in 1964. The first occurred in 21 July during 
a Muslim procession to celebrate the Prophet’s birthday; 23 people died and 454 were injured. The second 
occurred on 2 September when a Malay trishaw driver was killed, resulting in 13 deaths and 106 injuries. See 
National Library Board, ‘Communal Riots of 1964’ (Singapore Infopedia) 
<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_45_2005-01-06.html> accessed 3 September 2019. 
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Similarly, in Ong Kian Cheong, the DC cited the Benjamin Koh remarks above and said 
that it applied equally to ‘insensitive and denigrating remarks about religion or religious 
beliefs’ because 
[i]n our multi-racial and multi-religious society, distributing tracts with callous, denigratory 
[sic], offensive and insensitive statements on religion with aspersions on race do have a 
tendency to cause social unrest thereby jeopardizing racial and religious harmony.204 
The DC went on to suggest that, in line with Benjamin Koh’s notion of ‘duty to country’, 
the accused had a responsibility to ensure that the evangelical tracts were suitable for 
distribution before distributing them. ‘As citizens of Singapore,’ the DC opined,  
the accused cannot claim to be ignorant of the sensitivity of race and religion … [By] 
distributing the seditious … tracts to Muslims [the accused demonstrated] their intolerance, 
insensitivity and ignorance of delicate issues concerning race and religion … They both acted 
on their own accord without ensuring that the tracts were suitable for distribution to the general 
public.205 
These cases illustrate the courts’ communitarian approach to safeguarding 
racial/religious harmony in multiracial and multireligious Singapore: as it implicates 
Singapore’s very existence, any exercise of a right that might undermine it must be curtailed, 
and offenders given a custodial deterrent sentence. The DC’s remarks on the balance between 
freedom of expression and the collective interest in racial and religious harmony demonstrates 
that, had it been alleged that Articles 14 and 15 were violated, their elevated status would have 
been overlooked in favour of the collective interest.  
 
b. Political Protest and Public Order  
Political protest and public assembly are strictly controlled in Singapore. Before they were 
amended,206 the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act (MOA), particularly 
section 5 and rules 2(1) and 5 of its subsidiary legislation, the Miscellaneous Offences (Public 
Order and Nuisance) (Assemblies and Procession) Rules (MOR), were used against protesters 
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who publicly objected to perceived government misconduct. Section 5 of the MOA regulated 
public assembles of five or more persons. Rule 2(1) of the MOR provided that the MOR ‘shall 
apply to any assembly or procession of 5 or more persons in any public road, public place or 
place of public resort’ intended to support or oppose the views or actions of any person; to 
publicise a cause or campaign; or to commemorate an event. Rule 5 made it an offence for any 
person who participates in a public assembly or procession when he knows, or ought reasonably 
to have known, that the assembly or procession is held without a permit. The police has the 
discretion to grant or reject an application for a permit. 
This legislative framework was challenged for violating Article 14 in a few cases, most 
notably in Chee Siok Chin and others v Minister for Home Affairs and others.207 The applicants 
staged a peaceful four-person political protest outside the Central Provident Fund208 (CPF) 
Building. They wore t-shirts bearing various political slogans such as ‘Be Transparent Now’209 
and stood in a row along the walkway leading to the CPF Building. The police ordered them 
to disperse, stating that their protest ‘was one of public nuisance under the MOA’. 210  In 
particular, section 13A criminalised ‘[intentional] harassment, alarm or distress’ by using 
‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour’, or displaying any sort of ‘visible 
representation’ that is ‘threatening, abusive or insulting’. Section 13B made it an offence to 
take the aforementioned action that is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. The police’s 
order for their dispersal was thus made on the basis that their protest fell within sections 13A 
and 13B.  
The applicants alleged that the order for them to disperse violated their Article 14(1)(b) 
right because the police had exceeded their powers. Article 14(1), read with section 5 of the 
MOA and Rule 2(1) of the MOR, permitted peaceful assemblies ‘four or less persons’.211 The 
main issue before the HC was ‘what the Constitution … considers “necessary or expedient” so 
 
207 Chee Siok Chin and others v Minister for Home Affairs and others [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582. Note, however, that 
the applicants clarified in court that they did not contest the constitutionality of the MOA, only that the police had 
exceeded its powers in ordering them to disperse: [57]. The HC nonetheless discussed, and affirmed, the MOA’s 
constitutionality.  
208 Singapore’s compulsory national savings scheme. 
209 An allusion to rumours, rife at the time, of corruption in the CPF. 
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as to strike a balance between the exercise of certain individual rights on the one hand and the 
perceived wider public interest on the other hand’.212  
In striking out the applicants’ motion, the HC made several communitarian remarks. It 
held that the police had not exceeded its powers because ‘it would be reasonable for any police 
officer at the scene [of the protest] to conclude … that the [protestors’] words were “insulting” 
and/or “abusive” apropos those responsible for managing the [impugned] institutions’.213 It 
was also reasonable for a police officer to conclude that the protest was intended to ‘harass’ 
those responsible for the institutions, particularly the CPF Board, given that the protest was in 
front of the CPF Building.214 Hence, the police had not acted unconstitutionally in ordering the 
protestors to disperse. 
The HC’s affirmation of the MOA’s constitutionality helped it to reach this conclusion. 
It held that the phrase ‘“necessary or expedient” [in Article 14(2)] confers on Parliament an 
extremely wide discretionary power … that permits a multifarious and multifaceted 
approach’ 215  to legislate in the interest of security and public order. The hallmark of 
constitutionality is solely ‘whether the impugned legislation can be fairly considered 
“necessary or expedient”’; there is no further requirement of reasonableness such as that 
contained in the Indian Constitution’s Article 14 equivalent. 216  There is also no further 
requirement of proportionality,217 and so an impugned legislation is constitutional as long as a 
nexus is established between its object and one of the permissible restrictions contained in 
Article 14(2). Article 14(2)’s authorisation of merely expedient restrictions sets a lower 
threshold than Articles 10(2) and 11(2) of the ECHR which allow for restrictions on freedom 
of expression, assembly and association that are ‘necessary in a democratic society’ only. 
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216 The limiting Articles 19(2)–(6) of the Indian Constitution authorise ‘reasonable restrictions’ to be placed on 
the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, etc.  
217 Chee Siok Chin (n 207) [87]: ‘Proportionality is a more exacting requirement than reasonableness and requires, 
in some cases, the court to substitute its own judgment for that of the proper authority. Needless to say, 
proportionality has never been part of the common law in relation to the judicial review of the exercise of a 
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This lower threshold allows Parliament to restrict Article 14(1) in the interest of public 
order, not what is required by the maintenance of public order. The HC pointed out that this is 
‘a much wider legislative remit that allows Parliament to take a prophylactic approach in the 
maintenance of public order’.218 It is also perfectly usual for Parliament to have the ‘right to 
limit the right of assembly or freedom of speech’ 219  to resolve the tension between the 
individual right and the collective interest in security and public order. This involves ‘a delicate 
balancing exercise involving several imponderables and factors such as societal values, 
pluralism, prevailing social and economic considerations as well as the common good of the 
community’.220 The HC went on to say: 
The right of assembly can never be absolute and may be subordinated to public convenience 
and good order for the protection of the general welfare whenever it is “necessary or expedient”. 
From time to time, for the common welfare and good, individual interests have to be 
subordinated to the wider community’s interests.221 
The HC held that the MOA is a permissible restriction on Article 14(1) given the nexus 
between its object and the ‘public order’ exception in Article 14(2)(b). The MOA’s long title 
declares that it is an ‘Act relating to offences against public order, nuisance and property’, and 
the relevant Parliamentary debates reveal that the MOA was enacted to maintain public 
order.222 Hence, the MOA is intended to restrict freedom of speech and/or assembly when it is 
‘necessary or expedient’ to ensure public order in certain situations; as such, ‘there can be no 
challenge … to the constitutionality of the MOA’. 223  In other words, the ‘public order’ 
exception in Article 14(2)(b), and the lack of a proportionality analysis, means that the MOA, 
being enacted by Parliament to safeguard public order, passes constitutional muster. 
The HC’s holding bears the hallmark of the Singapore judiciary’s broad interpretation 
of the permissible restrictions on rights. The relative unimportance that the HC gave to the 
rights in Article 14(1) viz. the importance of the collective interest can be gleaned from the 
rather circular reasoning with which the MOA’s constitutionality was affirmed. If the test of 
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constitutionality is whether the impugned law is enacted in the interest of public order, then the 
MOA’s constitutionality is already assumed by its self-proclaimed object of upholding public 
order. Even though the HC stated that ‘the Government must satisfy the court that there is a 
factual basis on which Parliament has considered it “necessary or expedient”’224 to enact the 
impugned legislation, the HC seemed to have overlooked this requirement in accepting that the 
MOA was enacted in the interest of public order without considering whether, and how, the 
‘necessary or expedient’ requirement has been satisfied.  
Article 14(1)’s relative unimportance can also be gleaned from the fact that the HC did 
not say very much about the value of the freedom of speech and assembly. Pointing out that 
Article 14(1) is subject to the inherent limits in Article 14(2), the HC commented that Articles 
14(1)(a) and (b) ‘can be restricted in the wider interests of … public order so that they do not 
impinge on or affect the rights of others [in order to protect] the wider and larger interests of 
the community and country’. 225  It is in its elaboration of these ‘larger interests of the 
community and country’ that the HC’s judgment is most communitarian. In its concluding 
dicta, it asserted that the applicants’ protest was detrimental to the national interest. The HC 
claimed that the applicants’ constitutional challenge was ‘not in effect about the freedom of 
speech’, but about ‘an unfettered right to undermine the legitimacy of public institutions 
without being held accountable for the consequences of their conduct’.226 The protest against 
the public institutions was ‘a grave attack on the financial integrity of key public institutions’ 
for which ‘[not] even a modicum of effort has been made in the present proceedings to justify 
the attacks’.227 The HC then went on to say that 
[different] countries have differing thresholds for what is perceived as acceptable public 
conduct; differing standards have also been established when it comes to the protection of 
public institutions and figures from abrasive or insulting conduct. … Standards set down in one 
country cannot be blindly … adopted … without a proper appreciation of the context in 
another.228 
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In Singapore’s context, the applicants’ allegedly irresponsible undermining of the 
integrity of these public institutions ‘without any justification … can hardly be described as a 
“peaceful protest”’,229 and so, presumably, cannot be an exercise of Article 14(1). This is 
because of the importance of the collective interest that it threatens:  
The integrity of public institutions … forms an integral part of the foundation that grounds 
Singapore. It accounts in no small measure for the singularly able and upright stature that 
Singapore has managed to uphold. … Domestically as well as internationally, public 
governance in Singapore has been equated with integrity. To spuriously cast doubt on that 
would be to improperly undermine both a hard-won national dignity and a reputable 
international identity.230  
This passage demonstrates Singapore’s distinctively communitarian approach to rights. 
The HC was concerned with how the freedom of speech and assembly would impact both 
public order and the nation, including a national identity partly constituted by the integrity of 
public institutions. As such, Singapore’s communitarian approach to the tension between 
Article 14(1) and Article 14(2) resolves it in favour of the broad restrictions in Article 14(2). 
In this regard, Article 14 is unique in that Article 14(1) begins with an express limitation that 
weakens the rights from the very outset. Hence, for Article 14(1), it is unclear whether it enjoys 
any elevated status at all—which only goes to show the ‘premium’ that Singapore has placed 
on ‘public order, accountability and personal responsibility’.231  
 
IV. THE DEATH PENALTY AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 
The most controversial manifestation of Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights is the 
death penalty for drug trafficking. As will be shown, the collective interest in combating drug 
trafficking to safeguard society from its harm has prevailed over the individual drug trafficker’s 
various rights, especially the right to life. Before 2012, the death penalty was mandatory for 
anyone found guilty of drug trafficking; this will be discussed in section (a). In 2012, a limited 
sentencing discretion was introduced, to be discussed in section (b). The ensuing analysis will 
demonstrate that the courts’ communitarian approach focuses heavily on the threat that drug 
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trafficking allegedly poses to society, and the supposed need to have a strong regime to combat 
drug trafficking and protect society from these threats, rather than punishing the individual 
offender or protecting individuals from drug abuse. The death penalty for drug trafficking thus 
demonstrates the paramount importance that Singapore’s communitarian approach places on 
the collective interest in protecting society from drug trafficking. When faced with such an 
important interest, the elevated status of constitutional rights becomes a mere formality. 
 
a. The Mandatory Death Penalty 
The Misuse of Drugs Act232 (MDA) was amended in 1975 to provide for the mandatory death 
penalty to deter drug trafficking after Parliament noted an ‘almost 112 times’ increase in heroin 
abuse in 12 months, suggesting that existing penalties for drug trafficking did not adequately 
deter traffickers.233 Parliament viewed drug abuse as a serious problem that would undermine 
‘national security and viability’: if young men became addicted to drugs, it would compromise 
‘vital and sensitive institutions of the State, like the Police and Armed Forces’, which would 
‘strike at the very foundations of our social fabric and undermine our economy’. 234  This 
deterrence-based sentencing rationale feeds into communitarian Singapore’s overall policy of 
deterrence: a ‘balancing of communitarian values and concerns against individual interests’235 
supposedly justifies adopting a deterrence-based approach to crime control. 
As the various collective interests were allegedly under threat, the mandatory death 
penalty was introduced for anyone found guilty of trafficking (section 5), manufacturing 
(section 6) or importing and exporting (section 7) a certain amount of a controlled drug.236 
Section 2 of the MDA defines ‘traffic’ as ‘to sell, give, administer, transport, send, deliver or 
distribute’ or offer to do the same. The seriousness with which Singapore views drug offences 
is also reflected in the MDA’s reversal of a cardinal criminal law principle, the presumption of 
innocence: section 17 provides that, if an accused were found with drugs above the statutory 
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threshold,237 he ‘shall be presumed to have had that drug in possession for the purpose of 
trafficking unless it is proved that his possession of that drug was not for that purpose’.  
 
i. The Lawfulness of the Mandatory Death Penalty  
The mandatory death penalty has been challenged for violating two constitutional rights: 
Article 9’s right to life, and Article 12’s right to equal protection. It was argued in Yong Vui 
Kong v Public Prosecutor238 that the MDA, by providing for the mandatory death penalty, 
violated Article 9(1) because the mandatory death penalty is an inhuman punishment and 
therefore not ‘law’ according to which life can be deprived. However, the CA rejected the 
argument that ‘law’ should be read as ‘[excluding] a law that provides for an inhuman 
punishment [e.g. the mandatory death penalty]’239 essentially because there is no constitutional 
right against torture and/or inhuman punishment. Since Parliament expressly rejected this 
prohibition in 1969, the CA asserted that it is ‘not legitimate for this court to read into Art 9(1) 
a constitutional right which was decisively rejected’240 because the courts would be ‘acting as 
legislators in the guise of interpreters of the Singapore Constitution’. 241  It follows from 
Parliament’s rejection that ‘the right to freedom from inhuman punishment was not elevated to 
a constitutional right’, and so ‘there is no legitimate basis for this court to now expand … the 
scope of Art 9(1) so as to include a prohibition against inhuman punishment’.242 In fact, 
because Parliament’s rejection of this proposed right ‘was unambiguous, whatever the reasons 
for such rejection were’,243 it forecloses an interpretation of Article 9(1) as excluding inhuman 
punishment from the meaning of ‘law’.  
 
237 For example, more than 2 grams of heroin; more than 3 grams of cocaine; and more than 15 grams of pure 
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Ultimately, ‘the plain wording of Art 9(1) does not support the conclusion that 
Parliament cannot make the death penalty mandatory’.244 Since the mandatory death penalty 
‘is provided by law’ under the MDA, and since Article 9(1) provides for the deprivation of life 
in accordance with law,245 the mandatory death penalty does not violate the right to life. The 
CA came to this conclusion despite Article 9(1)’s arguably open-ended nature due to the 
contested meaning of the word ‘law’. Article 2(1) of the Constitution defines ‘law’ non-
exhaustively as including ‘written law and any legislation of the United Kingdom … which is 
in operation in Singapore and the common law in so far as it is in operation in Singapore and 
any custom or usage having the force of law in Singapore’. A court more willing to adopt a 
substantive interpretation of Article 9(1) might have accepted the appellant’s argument that 
‘law’ precludes inhuman punishment such as the mandatory death penalty. If the courts had 
read into Article 9(1) a right against inhuman punishment, they might have agreed with the 
Privy Council in Reyes v The Queen,246 where it was held that the mandatory death penalty 
violated section 7 of the Constitution of Belize 1981:247 
To deny the offender the opportunity, before sentence is passed, to seek to persuade the court 
that … to condemn him to death would be disproportionate … is to treat him as no human being 
should be treated and thus to deny his basic humanity, the core of the right which section 7 
exists to protect.248 
But in developing ‘[the] common law of Singapore … for the common good’,249 the 
courts have avoided a substantive, unavoidably moral reading of the word ‘law’ as precluding 
inhuman punishment such as the mandatory death penalty. Instead, they have adhered to a plain 
reading of the constitutional text and their self-imposed circumscribed role in the separation of 
powers, and distinguished decisions like Reyes on the basis that the Singapore Constitution 
does not contain a right against inhuman punishment. In so upholding the constitutionality of 
the mandatory death penalty, the courts have also vindicated Parliament’s communitarian 
approach to drug trafficking, i.e. using the death penalty to deter drug trafficking in order to 
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safeguard society from its dangers, even at the expense of individual traffickers’ right to life. 
The outcome of Singapore’s communitarian approach to the issue is that the elevated status of 
Article 9(1), when weighed against the collective interest in combating drug trafficking, has no 
practical force.   
 
ii. The Reasonableness of the Mandatory Death Penalty Classification 
Article 12(1) challenges to the mandatory death penalty have also failed, partly due to the Privy 
Council Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor250 precedent. In this case, the appellants were 
convicted of trafficking more than the statutory threshold of 15g of heroin that attracted the 
mandatory death penalty (the 15g Differentia) and sentenced to death. The Council had to 
consider whether the 15g Differentia violated Article 12(1) by ‘debarring the court in punishing 
offenders from discriminating between them according to their individual blameworthiness’.251 
In holding that Article 12(1) was not violated, the Council stated that Article 12(1) required 
only that ‘like should be compared with like’:  
What Art 12(1) of the Constitution assures to the individual is the right to equal treatment with 
other individuals in similar circumstances. It prohibits laws which require that some individuals 
within a single class should be [punished] more harshly than others; it does not forbid 
discrimination in punitive treatment between one class of individuals and another class in 
relation to which there is some difference in the circumstances of the offence that has been 
committed.252  
This was so even if this ‘difference in the circumstances of the offence’ is merely the 
amount of drugs trafficked, because the question of whether such dissimilarity is enough to 
justify the statutory classification is a social policy matter for the legislature to decide. Given 
that the MDA seeks to stamp out the illicit drug trade, it was not unreasonable for Parliament 
to prescribe this classification—that is, the 15g Differentia. Even if it may be that the 
mandatory death penalty may not sufficiently account for different moral blameworthiness 
between offenders with the same legal guilt, it nevertheless does not violate Article 12(1) which 
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is ‘not concerned with equal punitive treatment for equal moral blameworthiness; it is 
concerned with equal punitive treatment for similar legal guilt’.253 
The Privy Council has distanced itself from Ong Ah Chuan in subsequent cases. In 
Watson v The Queen (Attorney General for Jamaica intervening),254 Lord Hope of Craighead 
stated, ‘It is no longer … possible to say, as Lord Diplock did … in [Ong Ah Chuan], that there 
is nothing unusual in a death sentence being mandatory.’255 In contrast, Ong Ah Chuan has 
been affirmed by the Singapore courts in Article 12(1) challenges to the mandatory death 
penalty, 256  the most salient case being the just-discussed Yong Vui Kong where the 15g 
Differentia was also challenged under Article 12(1). The appellant argued before the CA that 
the 15g Differentia was arbitrary and bore no rational relation to the MDA’s purpose because, 
inter alia, 257  the death penalty would be mandatory where an offender trafficked in, for 
instance, 15.01g of heroin, but not when the offender trafficked in 14.99g of heroin. This is 
illogical because the distinction between the two situations is so miniscule that ‘the courts 
cannot take the view that so long as the 15g differentia goes some distance towards advancing 
the social object of the MDA, a rational relation will be found’.258  Even though the CA 
‘[agreed] that the difference between the punishment [in the two situations] is stark’,259 it 
rejected the appellant’s Article 12(1) challenge on two grounds: Ong Ah Chuan as binding 
precedent, and the reasonable classification test. With regard to the latter, the CA reasoned:  
We would also add that the quantity of addictive drugs trafficked is not only broadly 
proportionate to the quantity of addictive drugs brought onto the illicit market, but also broadly 
proportionate to the scale of operations of the drug dealer and, hence, broadly proportionate to 
the harm likely to be posed to society by the offender’s crime.260 
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The italicised words demonstrate the courts’ communitarian approach: the harm posed 
to society, and so the collective interest in preventing this harm, is an overt consideration for 
the CA to hold that the 15g Differentia satisfied the reasonable classification test—and 
accordingly, that the MDA’s mandatory death penalty did not violate Article 12(1). The CA 
reached this conclusion despite acknowledging that ‘a differentia which takes into account 
something more than merely the quantity of controlled drugs trafficked may be a better 
differentia’. 261  For the CA, however, ‘what is a better differentia is a matter on which 
reasonable people may well disagree’ and is ‘a question of social policy [that] lies within the 
province of the Legislature’. Adhering to its circumscribed role in the separation of powers, 
the CA concluded that the judiciary ‘will only act to ensure that [the 15g Threshold] bears a 
rational relation to the social object of [the MDA]’. For reasons set out in the quotation above, 
the CA held that such a rational relation exists. In other words, even though the 15g 
Differentia—which attracts the mandatory death penalty—is not the best differentia to further 
the MDA’s objectives, it does not violate Article 12(1) because it was ‘broadly proportionate’ 
to the harm caused to society—and in Singapore’s communitarian paradigm, the collective 
interest in preventing this harm must prevail. In contrast to the CA’s emphasis on the collective 
interests that the MDA protects, there is no mention of the importance of Article 12(1) and the 
interests that it protects.  
We can glean two things from the CA’s decision. First, the reasonable classification 
test is loose enough that the second limb—the rational relation between the classification and 
the social object of the impugned statute—can justify virtually any social object as long as it is 
not plainly absurd. Since statutes are usually enacted to serve a social purpose in which the 
collective has an interest, the looseness of the test would easily serve the collective interest. 
This is because it is tautological that the classification in limb (1) will have a rational relation 
to the purpose in limb (2): ‘A statute’s classifications will be rationally related to [its] purpose 
because the reach of the purpose has been derived from the classifications themselves.’262 The 
test, then, is particularly amenable to Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights. In the 
present case, without a more demanding classification than the quantity of drugs trafficked, the 
communitarian aspect of the CA’s decision demonstrates that the collective interest in 
preventing the harm posed by drug trafficking to society is so paramount that the statutory 
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classification of which offenders would be mandatorily sentenced to death need only be 
‘broadly proportionate’ to the harm caused. Once again, the courts’ failure to demand a more 
exacting relationship between the differentia and the object of the MDA, and their endorsement 
of a merely ‘reasonable’ classification to ascertain which offenders will be sentenced to death, 
does not account for Article 12’s elevated status. 
Second, one might come to the CA’s defence and say that the CA was merely adhering 
to its narrow conception of the separation of powers: since Parliament has decided that the 15g 
Differentia determines when the mandatory death penalty applies, the CA cannot interfere, and 
could only apply the reasonable classification test. But this response overlooks the inherent 
malleability of the test which could have allowed the CA to reach a different outcome. The 
looseness of the reasonable classification test is a double-edged sword: it is as capable of 
allowing the CA to reach the decision that it did as it is of allowing the CA to reach the opposite 
conclusion. That is: simply classifying the severity of trafficking crimes according to the 
quantity of drugs trafficked does not further the MDA’s purpose of preventing harm to society 
because it is not targeted enough at the sort of criminals whose activities would harm society. 
The statutory classification can only achieve this specific targeting by taking into account more 
than the quantity of drugs trafficked, such as the offender’s position in the drug syndicate, 
whether he intends to sell the drugs in Singapore, whether he has previous drug-related 
antecedents, etc. Granted, the 15g Differentia could be defended on the basis that it errs on the 
side of caution by casting a wide enough net to include all kinds of trafficking activities that 
could have a harmful effect on society. But this wide net is problematic because it is so broad 
that it cannot take into account the mitigating circumstances of the individual trafficker, and 
thus it does not take seriously enough the severity of the individual life that is at stake. It 
therefore overlooks, inappropriately, the elevated status of the rights to life and equal 
protection. 
 
b. The Discretionary Death Penalty Regime under the MDA 
In 2012, Parliament amended the MDA and gave the courts a narrow sentencing discretion in 
specific situations. Under section 33B(2), the courts have the discretion to impose life 
imprisonment and not less than 15 strokes of the cane in lieu of death after two conditions are 
satisfied. First, the accused has to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he acted as a drug 
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courier in the criminal enterprise (the Drug Courier Requirement).263 Second, upon meeting 
the first condition, the Public Prosecutor (Prosecutor) must issue him a certificate of substantive 
assistance as proof that he ‘has substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau [CNB] in 
disrupting drug trafficking activities within or outside Singapore’ 264  (the Substantive 
Assistance Requirement). Section 33B(3)(b) provides that, if the accused meets the Drug 
Courier Requirement and proves, on a balance of probabilities, that he suffered from an 
abnormality of mind which ‘substantially impaired his mental responsibility’265 for his acts, 
the courts must sentence the accused to life imprisonment in lieu of the death penalty. Section 
33B(4) allows for the Prosecutor’s decision to be challenged on grounds of bad faith and/or 
malice only; otherwise, the Prosecutor has the ‘sole discretion’ to determine whether 
substantive assistance has been rendered.  
While the discretionary regime appears to be a concession to the accused person’s right 
to life, its dominant purpose is still to combat drug trafficking and protect society against its 
dangers. Any ameliorating effect that the discretionary regime might have on the individual is 
incidental at best. As the Minister for Law stated during parliamentary debates on the proposed 
amendment, the amendment seeks to enhance the CNB’s operational effectiveness: 
The issue is not what we can do to help couriers avoid capital punishment. It is about what we 
can do to enhance the effectiveness of the [MDA] in a non-capricious and fair way without 
affecting our underlying fight against drugs. Discretionary sentencing for those who offer 
substantive assistance is the approach we have taken. For those who cannot offer substantive 
assistance, then the position is as it is now.266 
 
i. The Lawfulness of the Discretionary Death Penalty 
The MDA amendments have been challenged for violating Article 9(1)—and the courts’ 
decisions are communitarian to a large degree, mostly by affirming Parliament’s intention for 
the amendment. In Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v Public Prosecutor,267 the CA held that section 
33B(2) did not breach Article 9(1). The appellants in the case, who were convicted of drug 
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trafficking and sentenced to death, raised three arguments, two of which will be canvassed 
here.268  First, the Substantive Assistance Requirement breached the fundamental rules of 
natural justice: the Prosecutor’s determination of whether the appellants fulfilled Substantive 
Assistance Requirement is ‘opaque’ because the appellants had no notice of the factual 
allegations on which the determination was made and could not challenge the decision, save 
for the narrow one in section 33B(4); resultingly, the Substantive Assistance Requirement 
breached the hearing rule. The CA rejected this argument and affirmed its earlier decision269 
on a similar issue: it is the Prosecutor, and not the courts, who has the unique competence to 
determine whether an accused has provided substantive assistance because of the ‘express 
stipulation in s 33B(2)(b) and the fact that it would seriously undermine the operational 
capability of the CNB and jeopardise our war on drugs’270 if the issue were to be determined 
by the courts. Given this, the CA saw no reason ‘why the hearing rule requires that an offender 
be given a chance to address the [Prosecutor] on extra-legal factors which the offender would 
be in no position to comment on’.271  
The appellants’ second argument is that the Substantive Assistance Requirement ‘is so 
absurd and arbitrary in nature that it cannot constitute “law”’272 and hence violates Article 9(1) 
for the following reasons, among others. First, the fact that the Prosecutor does not have to give 
reasons for not issuing the certificate makes it impossible to challenge the decision. Second, 
couriers are usually at the lower levels of a syndicate and are unlikely to be able to provide 
substantive assistance. Third, the requirement of an actual disruption to drug trafficking 
activities may lead to the absurd result that a courier is sentenced more severely than an 
offender who is higher up in the hierarchy and is therefore more likely to be able to provide 
substantive assistance. Once again, the CA rejected this argument, holding that, where it is 
alleged that a law is arbitrary and in breach of Article 9(1), ‘the assessment is directed at the 
purpose of the law’.273 In affirming Parliament’s intention for amending the MDA, the CA’s 
reasoning is communitarian for valorising the collective interest in combating drug trafficking 
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and enhancing the CNB’s operational effectiveness over the constitutional right to life. First, it 
stated that the Substantive Assistance Requirement has a ‘clear purpose … targeted at 
enhancing law enforcement capabilities in the war against drugs’.274 It then cited with approval 
the reasons given by the Minister for Law for why assistance rendered by an offender must 
enhance enforcement effectiveness:  
…every courier, once he is primed, will seem to cooperate. … So if you say just cooperate, just 
do your best, all your couriers will be primed with beautiful stories, most of which will be 
unverifiable but on the face of it, they cooperated… And the death penalty will then not be 
imposed and you know what will happen to the deterrent value. Operational effectiveness will 
not be enhanced.275 
Hence, section 33B(2) ‘was not born of mere compassion to couriers and an intention 
that they be treated less harshly’.276 Given Parliament’s reasons for adopting this ‘outcome-
centric approach’ to the issue, ‘the fact that some couriers may not be able to provide 
substantive assistance by virtue of their role in the syndicate does not render the provision 
absurd or arbitrary. It is not necessary that it must be the best means of furthering the object 
and purpose of the statute’.277 
This shows that the collective interest in combating drug trafficking was an explicit 
ground on which the CA held that the Substantive Assistance Requirement did not violate 
Article 9(1). Evidently, then, Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights places 
overwhelming emphasis on the collective interest; in this case, it is the need to combat drug 
trafficking and to protect society from the dangers of drug abuse. Hence, the CA’s 
overwhelming emphasis on the collective interest in combating drug trafficking shows that 
Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights does not sufficiently take into account the 




275 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 14 November 2012, vol 89.  
276 Prabagaran (n 267) [38].  
277 ibid [95] (emphasis added), citing Quek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 563 where the CA held 
that the classifications in section 33B does not have to be ‘the best differentia possible and that there is no other 




ii. Substantive Assistance and Equal Protection  
The problem with the Substantive Assistance Requirement lies also in the sometimes unequal 
treatment between two accused persons involved in the same criminal enterprise, which 
implicates the elevated status of Article 12(1). In Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-
General, the appellant was involved in the same drug trafficking enterprise with Abdul Haleem, 
but only Haleem was issued the certificate of substantive assistance. The appellant alleged that 
the Prosecutor’s failure to grant him the certificate despite their being in ‘apparently the same 
or similar circumstances’278 was a violation of Article 12(1). The CA reiterated that Article 
12(1) ‘in essence requires that like be treated alike’.279 The issue was: where two accused 
persons participated in the same drug enterprise, is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
under section 33B(4) MDA to issue the certificate of substantive assistance to only one co-
offender a violation of Article 12(1)?  
For executive actions, the test for a breach of Article 12(1) is ‘deliberate and arbitrary 
discrimination against a particular person’; ‘[a]rbitrariness implies the lack of any 
rationality’.280 The CA rejected the appellant’s claim, holding that he had failed to discharge 
his evidentiary burden to ‘raise a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that the [Prosecutor] 
acted arbitrarily in choosing to grant only one co-offender the certificate of substantive 
assistance’.281 In order to discharge this burden, Ridzuan was required to show two things: first, 
that his level of involvement in the offence and knowledge of the drug syndicate was 
‘practically identical’ to Haleem’s, and second, that despite having provided ‘practically the 
same information to CNB’, only Haleem was given the certificate by the Prosecutor.282 It is 
insufficient that Ridzuan had provided ‘largely similar’283 information as Haleem because the 
paramount objective of combating drug trafficking required the higher ‘practically the same 
information’ threshold in order to serve the amended MDA’s purpose of adding ‘another string 
to our bow … to combat drug trafficking—to get at the real kingpins behind the couriers’.284  
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The CA’s communitarian approach is apparent in the high evidentiary threshold of 
‘practically identical information’—which indirectly reveals its interpretation of what ‘like be 
treated alike’ means. One way of analysing the case would be that, because Ridzuan and 
Haleem were involved in the same enterprise, they were two similarly placed accused persons 
and so satisfied the ‘like’ requirement of ‘like be treated alike’. But by requiring that Ridzuan 
provided ‘practically identical information’, and then holding that Article 12(1) was not 
violated because Ridzuan’s ‘largely similar’ information was insufficient, the CA was, in 
effect, suggesting that ‘like be treated alike’ requires that co-accused be in practically identical 
situations. This demanding interpretation of ‘like be treated alike’ is motivated by the amended 
MDA’s purpose; namely, to ‘maintain a tight regime’ by having ‘an additional avenue for our 
enforcement agencies to reach further into the networks, and save lives from being destroyed 
by drugs and hence make our society safer’.285 Anything lower than ‘practically identical 
information’ does not serve this purpose; and so Ridzuan could not demonstrate a prima facie 
case that the Prosecutor had acted arbitrarily, let alone argue successfully that his Article 12(1) 
right had been violated.  
Furthermore, the primacy of the collective interest in protecting society from the harms 
of drug trafficking means that the question of whether the drug trafficker would be spared the 
death penalty hinges entirely on ‘the outcome of assistance rendered, independent of an 
offender’s ability to provide such assistance’.286 Consequently, because the courts are in no 
position to assess whether the assistance rendered has led to the disruption of drug trafficking 
activities, the Prosecutor’s discretion to grant a certificate of substantive assistance is not 
justiciable by the courts. To treat the certification ‘as if it were a matter to be proven and 
justified at trial’ would be contrary to Parliament’s intention underlying the discretionary 
regime; it would be to ‘seriously [jeopardise]’ Singapore’s battle against drug trafficking, and 
along with it, ‘the general interest of society’.287 
This outcome-centric approach places overwhelming emphasis on protecting society 
from drug trafficking, such that whether a co-accused is afforded protection under Article 12(1) 
is contingent on his role in the criminal enterprise. It is worth noting that Ridzuan’s role made 
it factually impossible for him to provide ‘practically identical’ information as Haleem. 
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Although Ridzuan had arranged the drug deliveries, he did not have the contact details of the 
syndicate members whereas Haleem did; further, during one of the operations, Haleem was in 
a car with one of the syndicate members but Ridzuan was not.288 Hence, although it is arguable 
that Ridzuan and Haleem were similarly placed because they were involved in the same 
criminal enterprise, Singapore’s overwhelming emphasis on the collective interest in protecting 
society from drug trafficking demands the co-accused to be in identical situations, and thus be 
able to provide practically identical information, before Article 12(1) might apply. In 
interpreting Article 12(1)’s ambit narrowly in favour of the collective interest, Singapore’s 
communitarian approach to the issue has negated the elevated status of Article 12(1)—and the 
result is that Ridzuan was sentenced to death.  
 
CONCLUSION  
I have shown how Singapore’s communitarian principle, ‘collective over individual’, is 
manifest in the courts’ constitutional rights case law. This approach has led to a disjunction 
between the elevated status of constitutional rights and their practical application. As the 
approaches taken by other courts have highlighted, a less restrictive, more calibrated approach 
could have been taken to resolve the contestation between the collective and the individual. 
While it is not suggested that the Singapore judiciary ought to adopt these other approaches, 
the disjunction produced by Singapore’s communitarian approach is problematic for producing 
an empty idea of rights. Under Singapore’s communitarian approach, the fact that the rights 
are enshrined in the Constitution, the nation’s supreme law, bears little meaning beyond mere 
formality.  
It would be tempting to conclude that the idea of communitarian constitutional rights is 
a conceptual contradiction and ought to be abandoned. The larger issue, however, is not 
communitarianism per se; rather, it is Singapore’s conception of it as necessarily premised on 
‘collective over individual’. The influence of this basic principle can be seen in the courts’ 
broad restrictions of individual rights in favour of the competing collective interest. Hence, 
although the desire to protect the interests of the community is laudable, Singapore’s ‘collective 
over individual’ brand of communitarianism is not the best conception of it, as these cases have 





and concludes that it is not necessarily communitarian and hence should be abandoned. Once 
‘collective over individual’ is rejected, an alternative conception of communitarianism will 






A Normative Critique of ‘Collective Over Individual’ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
I have shown in Chapter One how Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ communitarian 
approach to constitutional rights is incongruous with their elevated constitutional status due to 
Singapore’s a priori disproportionate weightage of interests between the collective and the 
individual. I suggested at the end of Chapter One that the problem with Singapore’s 
communitarian approach is not communitarianism per se, but ‘collective over individual’. In 
order to preserve the elevated status of constitutional rights within a communitarian framework, 
two conceptual questions need to be addressed: is ‘collective over individual’ a necessary 
feature of communitarianism, and is there an alternative conception of communitarianism that 
can vindicate the elevated status of constitutional rights in appropriate cases?  
The main obstacle in the way of such a conception is the basic assumption that animates 
Singapore’s communitarianism—namely, ‘[central] to communitarianism is the idea that 
collective interests are placed above individual ones’.289 In this chapter, I subject this basic 
‘collective over individual’ principle to a normative critique in light of both ‘Western’ and 
‘Asian’—specifically, Confucian—communitarianism. My purpose is to show that ‘collective 
over individual’ does not necessarily, and certainly does not always, follow from 
communitarianism’s central tenets. This critique asks the questions: 1) Does ‘collective over 
individual’ follow from the communitarian conception of the self? 2) Does ‘collective over 
individual’ follow from the concept of community and the communitarian politics of the 
common good? The answer is ‘no’.  
In the course of this normative critique, I make a conceptual claim about the most 
favourable interpretation of communitarianism: it is one that does not prioritise the collective 
over the individual. Rather, it takes individual and community seriously in negotiating the 
normative boundaries between the individual and her variegated communal attachments, 
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including the family, her social groups, 290  and the nation. This conception of 
communitarianism is what Thio describes as  
a “third way” between a radical individualism and a statist conception of the individual in 
instrumental terms to benefit the collective; a normatively desirable version of 
communitarianism would treat individual dignity as an intrinsic good, while appreciating that 
individuals are not atomistic but live in communities and value community life.291  
Embedded in this broad claim are two specific ones. First, communitarianism conceives 
of the self as a social, situated and relational self, and is premised on a pluralistic conception 
of community. Second, and accordingly, communitarianism’s politics of the common good 
advances only a thin theory of the good and not a substantive one as is commonly assumed. I 
will show that, in this light, ‘collective over individual’ does not survive the normative critique. 
As such, Singapore should abandon its current conception of communitarianism and adopt the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach, to be developed in Chapters Three and Four.  
I undertake this normative critique by reconstructing the arguments that a defender of 
Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ communitarianism might make; hence, I have as my 
interlocutor this imaginary (but certainly plausible) defender. In Part I, I set out the defender’s 
best case in favour of ‘collective over individual’: it is a communitarian paradigm. Falling short 
of this strong claim, the defender might say either that it is paradigmatic of Asian 
communitarianism, or it is Singapore’s unique definition of communitarianism which should 
not be challenged by ‘foreign’ sources. I argue that these two weaker claims are unpersuasive. 
First, ‘Asian’ and ‘Asia’ are concepts too amorphous to ground a normative argument. Second, 
communitarianism is a value-laden and contested concept that is always open to challenge; as 
such, what communitarianism should be is not a mere matter of definition. In Part II, I show 
that ‘collective over individual’ does not necessarily follow from the communitarian 
conception of the self as a social, situated and relational self, and that, on the contrary, the 
communitarian conception of the self necessarily values the individual and community equally. 
Similarly, Part III shows that ‘collective over individual’ does not necessarily follow from the 
concept of community—which is necessarily pluralistic given the communitarian self—and 
communitarian politics of the common good. Instead, a necessary consequence of the 
communitarian self is that both community and the communitarian politics of the common 
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good cannot advance a substantive conception of the good, thereby foreclosing ‘collective over 
individual’.  
A caveat and a point of clarification. First, I use the terms ‘Western’ and ‘Asian’ as 
convenient shorthand to refer only to the geographical origins of the theories discussed; I will 
use quotation marks to indicate that I do not endorse normative implications associated with 
these terms. Second, my discussion of ‘Asian’ communitarianism focuses only on Confucian 
communitarianism in light of the fact that Singapore’s communitarianism was tailored to 
approximate some form of Confucianism; this is evident from some Confucian influences 
present in the White Paper.292 The White Paper invokes Confucianism to support ‘collective 
over individual’, claiming that one of the many Confucian ideals that are relevant to Singapore 
is ‘the importance of human relationships and of placing society above self’. 293  It is a 
commonly held notion that Confucianism endorses ‘collective over individual’; some scholars 
have described Confucian communitarianism as ‘advocating that individual values should be 
subordinate to community values’.294 Hence, Confucian communitarianism is probably the 
form of communitarianism that Singapore’s communitarianism most closely resembles. 
However, due to the complexity of Confucianism and Confucian communitarianism, I will 
only refer to ideas in both theories that are relevant in supporting or disputing ‘collective over 
individual’. Finally, although Singapore’s communitarianism does not claim to be ‘Western’, 
it is still necessary to discuss ‘Western’ communitarianism in order to fully grasp 
communitarianism as a concept.  
 
I. DEFENDING SINGAPORE’S COMMUNITARIANISM 
a. A Communitarian Paradigm?  
The defender of Singapore’s communitarianism would say that ‘collective over individual’ is 
a communitarian paradigm; that is, it is ‘a requirement of [communitarianism] if anything is’.295 
Singapore’s communitarianism appears to take just this view. Founding Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew had stated that Singapore is committed to ‘communitarian values where the interests 
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of society take precedence over that of the individual’.296 The White Paper claims that, as an 
Asian society, Singapore has ‘always weighed group interests more heavily than individual 
ones’.297 Singapore’s ‘communitarian concerns’ are also reflected in the judiciary’s ‘rights 
balancing process’ which is informed by ‘the prioritisation of the collective welfare over 
individual concerns’.298 Evidently, Singapore’s communitarianism prioritises the collective 
over the individual.  
To support her strong claim that ‘collective over individual’ is a communitarian 
paradigm, the defender would have to show that it is not uniquely Singaporean. To do this, she 
would trawl the relevant literature to support her contention—and she would be richly awarded, 
for it is a common misconception that communitarianism prioritises the collective over the 
individual. For instance, communitarianism has been defined as a ‘20th [century] political 
doctrine which emphasizes the interest of communities and societies over those of the 
individual’. 299  George Kateb, writing scornfully of communitarianism, says that 
communitarianism sees a good society as one which lords over its inhabitants and ‘provides 
the script’, such that ‘in good societies all play their parts and say their lines 
unselfconsciously’.300 Kim Sungmoon contends that one of communitarianism’s central aims 
is to ‘put the core argument of deontological liberalism in reverse, that is, to place the common 
good and civility prior to the right’.301 
Beau Breslin’s reconstruction of communitarianism’s core tenets 302  provides 
particularly strong support for the defender’s claim. Breslin argues that communitarians 
promote a collectively arrived-at conception of the good that is more substantial than a merely 
procedural conception, such as liberalism’s state neutrality, and it takes priority over individual 
interests and rights. Communitarianism is thus premised on the priority of the good over the 
right: ‘[The] community’s values exist prior to, and are more critical than, the wants of any 
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single resident of the polity.’ 303  He claims, too, that all communitarians, liberal and 
conservative alike, ‘defend the principle that the community’s values supersede all competing 
noncommunal interests’.304 As such, communitarianism would resolve controversial issues, 
such as abortion and gay marriage, according to the community’s ‘collective and shared will’, 
with policies on these issues based ‘entirely on the interests of the collective whole’.305  
The defender might also use Michael Walzer’s shared meanings argument to show that 
‘collective over individual’ is a communitarian paradigm. Walzer argues that a community’s 
governing political principles can only be derived from an interpretation of the community’s 
shared understandings. The fact of ‘the particularism of history, culture and membership’306 
that situates individuals in a particular context gives rise to a continuing shared culture and 
shapes a common life based on shared understandings. Accordingly, political arguments must 
appeal to these common meanings307 because the pluralistic nature of the principles of justice 
is ‘the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism’.308 The logical conclusion is 
that ‘[a] given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way—that is, in a way 
faithful to the shared understandings of the members’.309 
The defender would then claim that Walzer’s shared meanings argument itself 
prioritises the collective over the individual. If we agree with Walzer that principles of justice 
should be derived from a community’s shared meanings, then it follows that the community, 
as the legislator of what justice requires, is sovereign; and its determination of what justice 
requires reigns supreme over the individual’s competing ones. For example, if a community 
interprets its shared understanding of the sacredness of life to mean that abortion is murder, or 
conceives of its shared commitment to family values as requiring marriage to be reserved for a 
man and a woman, then these shared determinations would trump the individual’s assertion of 
a right to abortion or same-sex marriage. An external critique of these shared determinations 
would be irrelevant because, according to Walzer, justice depends on, and is determined by, 
the community’s shared understandings. Hence, the counter-argument that the foetus’s right to 
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life cannot outweigh the woman’s right to choose, or that same-sex couples can equally uphold 
family values, would have little relevance to a community whose shared meanings do not 
contain these countervailing principles of justice.  
The defender would go on to say that the above shows that ‘collective over individual’ 
is a communitarian paradigm because of communitarianism’s emphasis on the community’s 
normative significance. To do it justice, the defender would say, its interests and values must 
be taken seriously and take precedence over individual rights and interests. Therefore, 
‘collective over individual’ is a communitarian paradigm. Since Singapore’s 
communitarianism is premised on this paradigmatic principle, it is the most favourable 
interpretation of communitarianism. As such, my normative critique is wholly unnecessary. 
But even if the defender were wrong about ‘collective over individual’ being a communitarian 
paradigm, she would have two further arguments: it is an Asian communitarian paradigm and 
so entirely suitable for Asian Singapore; and that Singapore possesses the definitional fiat to 
conceptualise its own communitarianism as it sees fit.  
To assess whether ‘collective over individual’ is a communitarian paradigm, we need 
to test it against the values that the various communitarian theories promote, which will 
simultaneously give rise to the most favourable interpretation of communitarianism. The rest 
of the chapter will refute the defender’s argument that ‘collective over individual’ is a 
communitarian paradigm by showing that it neither follows from the communitarian 
conception of the person, nor from communitarian politics of the common good. As a 
preliminary matter, however, the defender’s latter two weaker claims can be dispensed with 
first.  
 
b. ‘Asian’ Communitarianism? 
The defender’s weaker claim is as follows. ‘Collective over individual’ is paradigmatic of 
Asian communitarianism. As an Asian society, it is appropriate for Singapore to adopt Asian 
communitarianism. Indeed, as the White Paper asserts, Singapore’s communitarianism is 
avowedly Asian: its very inception juxtaposed Singapore’s pristine ‘Asian’ values against 
supposedly degenerate ‘Western’ ones. As then-President Wee Kim Wee elaborated, Singapore 
needed the White Paper’s set of shared values because Singapore’s ‘openness … has exposed 
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us to alien lifestyles and values’.310 Specifically, ‘[traditional] Asian ideas of morality, duty 
and society which have … guided us in the past are giving way to a more Westernised, 
individualistic, and self-centred outlook on life’.311 As such, the White Paper embodies a 
paradigmatic Asian communitarianism that prioritises the collective over the individual.  
 
i. Singapore’s Questionable ‘Asianness’ 
The defender, however, goes astray in making claims based on simplistic assumptions and 
cultural essentialism. The defender simplistically accepts Singapore’s ‘Asianness’ at face value 
without interrogating whether Singapore is uniquely or wholly ‘Asian’. On the contrary, as a 
hybrid of East and West, Singapore is an apt example of a country in Asia that is not wholly or 
uniquely ‘Asian’. Located in Southeast Asia, Singapore is indigenous to the Malay population 
and comprises immigrants from China and India, with a small minority of Eurasians (mixed 
European and Asian ancestry). Simultaneously, Singapore is a former British colony that 
inherited the Westminster Parliamentary system, the common law and English as the official 
and common language amongst Singaporeans. As Simon Tay correctly points out, ‘[a] blend 
of Asia and the West … was the starting point for the Singaporean nation-state’.312  
If Singapore’s birth was not uniquely, wholly or purely ‘Asian’, its coming-of-age was 
even less so because ‘Western influence continues [in Singapore] today in economic 
development that is encouraged by (mainly Western) multi-national companies’. 313 
Singapore’s openness to globalisation has been accompanied by its reception of ‘Western’ 
influences—and the White Paper readily acknowledges them, speaking positively of ‘values 
from European and American civilisations which we have rightfully adopted and made our 
own, such as parliamentary democracy and the rule of law’.314 The confluence of East and West 
in Singapore, and the attendant mix of values that Singaporeans have been exposed to, arguably 
dilutes Singapore’s ‘Asianness’, insofar as this notion is meaningful. 
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If Singapore is a mix of East and West, it seems that the defender’s assertion that 
Singapore’s communitarianism is rightly premised on the ‘Asian’ communitarian paradigm 
‘collective over individual’ because ‘Asian’ is too quick a move. More is needed to support the 
defender’s position that ‘Asian’ Singapore should adopt ‘Asian’ communitarianism, for this 
assumes a perfect one-to-one mapping between the two based on an ‘Asianness’ to which 
Singapore cannot fully lay claim. 315  This assumes, too, that the ‘Asian’ communitarian 
paradigm ‘collective over individual’ seamlessly fits ‘Asian’ Singapore, which arguably fails 
to account for individualistic impulses existent in Singapore society. Take, for instance, 
Singapore’s commitment to the principle of meritocracy. Meritocracy is ‘widely regarded as a 
core principle of governance in Singapore’316 regularly advanced by the government as ‘the 
only viable principle for organising and allocating the nation’s scarce resources to optimise 
economic performance and political leadership’.317 Meritocracy is also the governing principle 
in education318 and the civil service, including the political leadership.319 The ‘logical outcome’ 
of this meritocracy, however, is individualism, as Chua points out: ‘Meritocracy concurrently 
encourages individuals in the pursuit of excellence and serves, at both the societal and 
 
315 It is true that a system or society that is receptive to external influences is still strongly rooted in a particular 
cultural tradition; for instance, the US and Britain are ‘Western’. The difference with Singapore, however, is that, 
as a very young immigrant nation, it is not as deeply rooted in any particular cultural tradition, which makes it 
more likely for ‘Western’ influences to significantly challenge the various ‘Asian’ ones.  
316 Donald Low, Hard Choices: Challenging the Singapore Consensus (National University of Singapore Press 
2014) 48. 
317 Kenneth Paul Tan, ‘Meritocracy and Elitism in a Global City: Ideological Shifts in Singapore’ (2008) 29 
International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique 7, 11. 
318 Singapore’s education system is known for being highly competitive and which largely awards students based 
on examination results. For a snapshot of the meritocratic nature of the education system and inter-racial 
inequalities it has produced, see Jason Tan, ‘Education in Singapore: For What, and for Whom?’ Revue 
internationale d’éducation de Sèvres (5 June 2014) <https://ries.revues.org/3856> accessed 3 September 2019. 
319 Tan, ‘Meritocracy and Elitism in a Global City’ (n 317). See also Nur Diyanah Binte Anwar, ‘Negotiating 
Singapore’s Meritocracy’, East Asia Forum (28 February 2015) 
<www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/02/28/negotiating-singapores-meritocracy> accessed 3 September 2019, 
highlighting the negative effects of Singapore’s meritocracy (for example, elitism and social inequalities), as well 
as the government’s attempts to curb these negative effects (for instance, mooting the idea of ‘compassionate 
meritocracy’ that encourages Singaporeans who have benefited from the system to give back to society). 
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individual levels, to legitimise social inequalities as the natural outcome of individual 
differences in effort and/or intelligence, thereby, justifying and reinforcing individualism.’320  
The individualistic culture that Singapore’s meritocracy has produced raises doubts 
about how far the ‘Asian’ principle ‘collective over individual’ fits ‘Asian’ Singapore. Indeed, 
there is arguably a lack of fit between ‘collective over individual’ and Singapore society. For 
instance, after spending three years in Singapore, Bell noted a ‘glaring gap between the 
communitarian rhetoric and the individualistic reality’.321 This is why Chua describes the 
White Paper as a ‘moralising statement rather than [a] descriptive and/or prescriptive statement 
of the extant conditions’.322 So if ‘collective over individual’ is an ‘Asian’ communitarian 
paradigm, then it does not seem to suit a Singapore society imbued with individualistic 
elements.  
Of course, Singapore’s communitarianism was devised precisely to correct these non-
‘Asian’ individualistic elements in society. The defender would then say that the lack of fit 
challenge is no challenge at all: the whole point of the White Paper is to anchor an excessively 
individualistic society to values that its members inherently possess by virtue of being ‘Asian’. 
But this response fails to counter the objection. It makes the mistake of, first, assuming the 
existence of something that can be called ‘Asian’ in a meaningful sense; and second, purporting 
to know what it is—more precisely, purporting to speak authoritatively that to be Asian entails 
an innate impulse to prioritise the group over the individual; that, indeed, ‘Asian’ 
communitarianism is ‘collective over individual’. Appeals to ‘Asianness’ to justify normative 
arguments in this way are problematic; this will be explained fully in the next section.  
For now, it suffices to say that a blithe appeal to Singaporeans’ ‘Asianness’, effectively 
an appeal to their ‘inherent instinct as Asians’ to place the interests of the group over their own, 
cannot meet the lack of fit objection because ‘collective over individual’ and ‘Asian’ 
communitarianism is a false equation—and this is because ‘Asian’ is an amorphous concept 
that cannot ground normative claims. Even if, arguendo, it could be shown that it is an ‘Asian’ 
impulse to place the interests of the group above individual ones, this still does not assist the 
defender because an empirical observation about culture is an insufficient basis for a normative 
claim. Hence, if Singapore is not uniquely or wholly ‘Asian’, then the defender cannot rely on 
 
320 Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (n 28) 27. 
321 Bell and de-Shalit (n 31) 80. 
322 ibid.  
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Singapore’s ‘Asianness’ to justify Singapore’s adoption of the purported ‘Asian’ 
communitarian paradigm, ‘collective over individual’.  
 
ii. What is ‘Asian’? 
The second problem with the defender’s position is that it relies on the vague concept of 
‘Asian’. Its vagueness is simultaneously over- and under-inclusive: by claiming to capture the 
diverse societies, cultures and traditions in Asia by describing them all as ‘Asian’, it inevitably 
becomes a reductive and overly broad cultural essentialism that means little beyond a 
convenient shorthand for places, people, cultures, traditions etc that can be found in Asia. This 
lack of specificity matters when ‘Asian’ is used to support a normative argument, such as the 
claim that ‘collective over individual’ is ‘Asian’ communitarianism. 
 The current objection is reminiscent of the problems of the ‘Asian values’323 challenge 
to ‘Western’ liberal democracy and universal human rights that originated in Singapore.324 The 
‘Asian values’ challenge makes a few claims about some allegedly innate differences between 
‘Asia’ and the ‘West’ that make liberal democracy and human rights inappropriate for extant 
conditions in Asia. One of these claims is that the individualistic nature of civil-political rights 
is unsuitable for Asia’s communitarian ethos, and that the antagonistic assertion of rights 
against the state goes against the preference of ‘most people’ in Asia for a less adversarial 
relationship between the state, society and the individual.325 I will challenge the claim that it is 
‘Asian’ to be communitarian and to prioritise the group over the individual; and as I will 
demonstrate shortly, the contention is not a mere matter of semantics. Resorting to the cultural 
essentialist label ‘Asian’ to justify normative positions is dangerous because of its potential to 
silence competing voices in Asia, too easily dismissed for diverting from the sweeping cultural 
essentialist definition of ‘Asian’ and, thus, not-Asian.  
 
323 See e.g. the Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights 
(adopted 2 April 1993) A/CONF.157/ASRM/8 A/CONF.157/PC/59.  
324 Michael D Barr, ‘Lee Kuan Yew and the “Asian Values” Debate’ (2000) 24 Asian Studies Review 309; and 
Donald K Emmerson, ‘Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through Southeast Asia’ (1995) 8 The 
Pacific Review 223 where it was stated, at 236, ‘The notion of ‘Asian values’, for all its vast scope, originated in 
Singapore in the late 1980s and early 1990s as Lee Kuan Yew and his fellow ministers pondered their city-state’s 
identity and how to strengthen it.’ 
325 Bilahari Kausikan, ‘Asia’s Different Standard’ (1993) Foreign Policy 24, 36. 
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 A few remarks are necessary to clarify what I am neither contesting nor endorsing. 
First, the ‘Asian values’ argument, because advanced by strong states like Singapore, has been 
criticised for being ‘self-serving … attempts by authoritarian regimes to take refuge in 
“traditional” values or to exploit their societies’ resentment of the West’. 326  Donald K. 
Emmerson, for instance, characterised ‘Asian values’ as ‘a mystification by certain 
authoritarian elites hoping to … legitimize illiberal politics in order to keep themselves in 
power’.327  Christopher Lingle, too, argues that ‘[essentially], the clash behind the “Asian 
values” debate emerges out of the efforts to preserve an authoritarian political status quo 
against the forces of modernity’.328  Whatever morsels of truth that this facially attractive 
critique contains, it is rather too dismissive of some intrinsic merits of the ‘Asian values’ 
argument, regardless of the degree of power wielded by those who advanced it.  
 Hence, I do not contest the plausibility of some of its claims. One such claim is that the 
‘Western’ prioritisation of civil-political rights over socio-economic rights is misconceived 
because ‘order and stability [are] preconditions for economic growth, and growth [is] the 
necessary foundation of any political order that claims to advance human dignity’.329 This 
claim is plausible insofar as it means that it is fantastical to promote civil-political rights while 
the country’s population does not have the basic requirements—for instance, food, water, 
shelter—to exercise them.330  Another plausible claim is that ‘Western’ liberal democracy 
cannot be transplanted wholesale to other countries, including those in Asia. This is because 
‘each country has its own unique set of natural, human, and cultural resources, as well as 
historical and political experiences’; as such, ‘the mode of governance … of a country must 
not accommodate these unique features but also devise responses that will resonate with … 
 
326 Surain Subramaniam, ‘The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy’ (2000) 
27 Asian Affairs 19, 27 (references omitted). 
327 Emmerson (n 324) 236. 
328 Christopher Lingle, Singapore’s Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political 
Dependency (The Locke Institute 1996) 43. 
329 Kausikan (n 325) 35. 
330 However, there may not be any real conflict between the two categories of rights; see Amartya Sen, Human 
Rights and Asian Values (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs 1997) 11. It is also plausible that 
civil-political rights are necessary to allow citizens to protest—by voting, by freedom of speech, by political 
protest—against their country’s poor economic and/or social conditions. Hence, so long as the ‘economics first’ 
argument is not used to justify suppressing civil-political rights, it is persuasive. 
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that society’.331 This claim is plausible also because liberal democracy has emerged from a 
specific tradition in a particular part of the world, and so it would be naïve to expect that it 
could be seamlessly imported to societies that do not share this cultural heritage.  
My contention, then, is with the label ‘Asian’, and the way those who use it purport that 
‘Asian’ is a coherent concept capable of grounding a normative argument—namely, because it 
is ‘Asian’ to prioritise the collective over the individual, Asian societies ought to do so, and 
Singapore’s communitarianism is justified in doing so. My objection is two-fold. First, as 
alluded to above, ‘Asian’ encapsulates such a diverse range of societies, cultures and traditions 
in Asia that it becomes an overly broad cultural essentialism. To begin with, it is questionable 
whether Asia really exists beyond mere geography. Historically, Asia was defined in 
opposition to Europe; the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’ are European in origin and are essentially 
the ‘globalization of Greek geographic categories’.332 Hence, as Teemu Ruskola notes, ‘Asia, 
as a concept, stands for little more than not being Europe.’333 Amartya Sen makes the same 
point:  
The temptation to see Asia as one unit reveals, in fact, a distinctly Eurocentric perspective. 
Indeed, the term “the Orient,” which was widely used for a long time to mean essentially what 
Asia means today, referred to the direction of the rising sun. It requires a heroic generalization 
to see such a large group of people in terms of the positional view from the European side of 
the Bosporus.334 
This explains why cultures as various as those in India and China are grouped together 
as ‘Asian’—which shows that ‘Asian’, by purporting to generalise the vast diversity that exists 
in Asia, does not really mean very much at all. This raises the question: if Asia is a collective 
of discrete countries, nations, cultures and traditions coincidentally located in a part of the 
world historically labelled ‘Asia’, why should this incidence of history infuse ‘Asian’ with 
normative meaning? While it is convenient, especially in everyday parlance, to use ‘Asian’ to 
describe people, traditions, values, cultures, food, etc from Asia, this convenience becomes 
objectionable when it is used to generalise everyone in Asia based on a particular culture or 
 
331 Subramaniam (n 326) 22. 
332 Teemu Ruskola, ‘Where Is Asia? When Is Asia? Theorizing Comparative Law and International Law’ (2011) 
44 UC Davis Law Review 879, 882. 
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tradition, etc in Asia. While we can, and should, speak of values in Asia, referring to them as 
‘Asian values’ is neither here nor there. Since ‘Asia’ as a category ‘has no coherent historical 
or cultural referent’, the notion of ‘Asian values’ is ‘groundless insofar as it purports to 
represent the values of all of Asia’.335 Conflating Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism (just to 
name a few traditions in Asia) ‘into one single “Asian” value system’ is thus to ‘[distort] 
reality’.336  
My second objection is a normative one. The label ‘Asian’ traps those onto whom the 
identity ‘Asian’ is foisted into a monolithic, essentialist identity—including its associated 
normative implications. By defining the amorphous label ‘Asian’ in a particular way—say, 
Asians prioritise the collective over the individual—those who are seen as Asian, including 
those who identify as such, are trapped into a particular understanding of what it means to bear 
this identity. This risks drowning out competing voices in Asia that reject or do not conform 
with this particular definition of ‘Asianness’. Tatsuo Inoue’s analysis of the ‘trap of identity’337 
is instructive. Tatuso proceeds from the premise that the ‘Asian values’ discourse ‘[asserts] 
Asian cultural uniqueness, based on the old dualism of Asia as the Orient and Euro-American 
countries as the Occident’338 which posits that the ‘West represents Modernity, and Asia must 
… represent Countermodernity’. 339  The problem with the assertion of ‘Asian’ cultural 
 
335 Ruskola (n 332) 886. Of course, proponents of ‘Asian values’ have said that this is not the point of the debate; 
rather, ‘[the] real debate … is about which values, in what degree and in what proportion, are necessary for 
sustained development, the maintenance of social cohesion, and the avoidance of serious problems’: Bilahari 
Kausikan, ‘The “Asian Values” Debate: A View from Singapore’ in Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner (eds), 
Democracy in East Asia (Johns Hopkins University Press 1998) 24. Nonetheless, describing something as ‘Asian’ 
is problematic when the description has normative and political implications. 
336 Fernando N Zialcita, ‘Is Communitarianism Uniquely Asian? A Filipino’s Perspective’ (1999) 14 Sojourn: 
Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 313, 318.  
337 Tatsuo Inoue, ‘Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism’ in Joanne R Bauer and Daniel A Bell (eds), The 
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uniqueness is that, by reclaiming the ‘imposed Asian identity’340 from ‘the West’, those that 
use it positively risk imposing, tyrannically, the proper ways of being Asian:341 
[The assertion of Asian identity] represses the recognition of Asia’s internal diversity and 
potential for endogenous transformation, and tempts one to discourage and even to oppress 
Asian demands for human rights and efforts at democratization … The cult of Asian identity 
has even produced the label “bananas” to express contempt for yellow-skinned Asians 
mimicking the values of whites. This cult will reinforce the Orientalist prejudice that Asian 
culture is inadequate for human rights and democracy…342 
Beyond reinforcing historical ‘Western’ prejudices against ‘Asians’, equating the 
‘Asian’ identity with certain normative values, such as ‘collective over individual’, defines 
away legitimate attempts by those in Asia who believe that a more balanced calibration 
between the interests of the collective and the individual is both necessary and desirable. These 
legitimate viewpoints thus run the risk of being shut out simply on the basis that these ‘Asians’ 
are not ‘Asian’ enough. Considering the vagueness of the label ‘Asian’, the power of the 
‘Asian’ identity to stop a conversation about enacting change dead in its tracks before it even 
begins further underscores how problematic it is to use ‘Asian’ to ground normative arguments. 
To return to the defender’s argument that ‘collective over individual’ is paradigmatic 
of ‘Asian’ communitarianism: in order for this claim to make sense, the defender must specify 
which society in Asia, if any, subscribes to ‘collective over individual’. Since ‘Asian’ is a vague 
concept incapable of grounding a normative claim, the defender’s claim is unpersuasive, and 
so Singapore’s communitarianism cannot be justified as an instance of ‘Asian’ 
communitarianism.  
 
c. Against Definitional Disputes 
The defender might pose a definitional challenge to my normative critique: it does not matter 
whether ‘collective over individual’ is the most favourable interpretation of communitarianism 
 
340 ibid 40. 
341 Cf. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s caution that ‘acts of recognition [do not] ossify the identities that are their 
object’: Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton University Press 2007) 110. See also the 
discussion of the communitarian self’s autonomy in Chapter Three, Part II, 129–144. 
342 Tatsuo (n 337) 40–41. 
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so long as Singapore has defined communitarianism in this particular way. As such, its 
definitional will should prevail.  
This position, however, is unconvincing. Taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean 
that theoretical disagreements about what concepts mean can be defined out of existence by 
claiming the definitional fiat. Conceptual disputes cannot be resolved in this manner, especially 
when a particular concept carries with it expectations of certain baseline meanings that cannot 
be defined away. Take justice as an example. If a society had a law that punishes those who 
give birth to babies with blue eyes, it would be absurd to argue that this law accords with the 
requirements of justice because this society has defined justice to mean that no one should be 
born with blue eyes, and so its definition of justice should prevail. This understanding of justice 
does not fit our ordinary understanding of its meaning: this law seems so arbitrary that it has 
little, if anything, to do with justice—and so it cannot plausibly be defended as just in any 
meaningful sense of the word. Like justice, then, communitarianism is a value-laden concept 
that contains certain expected understandings of its necessary features.  
The defender might say, however, that, unlike justice, communitarianism is amorphous 
and ill-defined. While we can reasonably disagree about whether Robert Nozick or John Rawls 
is right about what justice demands because the libertarian and liberal conceptions of justice 
share similar features and are disputes along a spectrum, communitarianism does not have the 
luxury of basic, fundamental conceptual certainty. While Nozick and Rawls disagree about 
whether justice is compatible with redistribution of wealth, they both agree that justice requires 
that individual rights cannot be unduly violated. But there is no such basic conceptual 
agreement as to what communitarianism means, the defender might say, apart from the overly 
vague and unhelpful edict that the community should be valued. This vagueness, then, lends 
communitarianism well to a flexibility that allows Singapore to define it as ‘collective over 
individual’ and still be within the bounds of communitarianism as a concept, for ‘collective 
over individual’ values the community greatly. This is evident, the defender would continue, 
from the examples that she cited in Part I, section (a) to support her claim that ‘collective over 
individual’ is a communitarian paradigm. Hence, Singapore is not defining theoretical disputes 
about communitarianism out of existence, but specifying what it means for itself.  
The defender’s rejoinder fails on two grounds. First, even if communitarianism’s 
relative conceptual vagueness allows more conceptual room for Singapore to manoeuvre, it 
does not mean that communitarianism becomes an open-ended free-for-all once the 
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community’s value has been accounted for. Second, and accordingly, it is precisely this 
conceptual vagueness that makes the current normative critique necessary. Communitarianism 
does not exist in a vacuum, and so by calling its ideology ‘communitarianism’, Singapore 
inadvertently shoulders the conceptual baggage that comes with the term. This baggage has 
implications for the fidelity of Singapore’s conception of communitarianism to the broader 
concept of communitarianism in which it has squarely placed itself. After all, why use 
‘communitarianism’ if not to associate with its positive normative connotations, especially 
when ‘collective over individual’ is arguably more descriptive of collectivism? The fact that it 
is unclear what these connotations are, and what else communitarianism entails apart from 
valuing the community, does not mean that an ideology can be comfortably termed 
‘communitarian’ so long as it has accounted for the community’s value. On the contrary, this 
conceptual vagueness is a compelling reason to identify other basic features of 
communitarianism so that it can be understood more favourably. If ‘collective over individual’ 
ends up falling short of the most favourable interpretation of communitarianism, Singapore’s 
communitarianism would be harder to defend.  
In light of the above, the defender’s claims that ‘collective over individual’ is 
paradigmatic of Asian communitarianism, and that ‘collective over individual’ is Singapore’s 
definition of communitarianism, cannot be sustained. What, then, of her main argument that 
‘collective over individual’ simply is a communitarian paradigm? I will argue that 
communitarianism does not necessitate ‘collective over individual’, and that the most 
favourable interpretation of communitarianism cannot a priori prioritise the collective over the 
individual.  
 
II. CONTESTING THE SELF   
My first conceptual claim about communitarianism is that communitarianism values the 
individual as much as the community, and does not a priori prioritise the collective over the 
individual. This claim follows from the communitarian conception of the self. One of 
communitarianism’s core theses is that the self is situated within, and shaped by, a particular 
social context. ‘Western’ communitarianism largely has as its interlocutor a specific liberal 
conception of the self, paradigmatically represented by John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice343—
 
343 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 2005). 
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that is, an atomistic, radically detached self. Confucian communitarianism, in turn, is grounded 
in the Confucian conception of the role-bearing person. Generally, then, the communitarian 
self is situated and relational, not atomistic or unencumbered. Singapore’s communitarianism 
is also premised on such a conception: the individual is not ‘pristine and separate’ but ‘exists 
in the context of his family [which is] part of the extended family, and then friends and the 
wider society.’344 These conceptions of the person will be discussed to show that ‘collective 
over individual’ does not follow from either conception, and that communitarianism, properly 
understood, values the individual and the community. 
 
a. ‘Western’ Communitarian Critique of Liberalism  
i. Rejecting the Liberal Conception of the (Unencumbered) Self 
Discussions of ‘Western’ communitarianism’s conception of the self must begin with a caveat. 
Although the four philosophers—Michael Sandel,345 Charles Taylor,346 Alasdair MacIntyre,347 
and Michael Walzer348—whose works challenged some problematic aspects of liberalism have 
been called communitarians, the label has not been endorsed by any of them.349 Nevertheless, 
they have in common their rejection of the individualistic conception of the self that is most 
famously implied by Rawls’ thought experiment, the original position and the veil of 
ignorance; 350  hence, for convenience’s sake, I will refer to these philosophers as 
communitarians.  
 
344 Zakaria (n 34) 113. 
345 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (n 19). 
346 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Harvard University Press 1992). 
347 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Bloomsbury Academic 2013). 
348 Walzer (n 306). 
349 E.g. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Wiley-Blackwell 1996) xv., pointing 
out that the label ‘communitarian’ is ‘not one which [the philosophers] employ to any great extent, and it is 
certainly not part of their self-understanding in the same way as the term “liberal” is for liberals’. In the Prologue 
to the third edition of After Virtue, MacIntyre states that a communitarian is something that he has never been: 
MacIntyre (n 347) xv. 
350 Rawls, as is well known, later revised his ideas to account for the communitarian critique. Acknowledging the 
communitarian challenge that we are all constituted, at least in part, by our social world, Rawls stated that his 
justice as fairness is ‘the most reasonable doctrine for us. We can find no better charter for our social world’: John 
Rawls, ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’ (1980) 77 The Journal of Philosophy 515, 519. Nonetheless, 
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What, then, do communitarians reject? The argument is two-fold. First, the liberal 
conception of the self implied by Rawls’ thought experiment—I will invoke Sandel and call 
this the Unencumbered Conception—is a mistaken understanding of the self, for it does not 
sufficiently account for ‘the importance of community for personal identity, moral and political 
thinking, and judgements about our well-being’.351 Second, the Unencumbered Conception 
causes normatively undesirable consequences in its ‘exclusive pursuit of private interests’ 
which ‘erodes the network of social environments on which we all depend’,352 thus causing a 
breakdown in civil society. Further, the ‘increased atomisation of western societies’353 caused 
by the Unencumbered Conception has led to ‘unshackled greed, rootlessness, alienation from 
the political process, [and] rises in the rate of divorce’. 354  The claim here is that the 
Unencumbered Conception leads to an uncivil self and thus a breakdown in civil society. I will 
call this second claim the Uncivil Self Claim. 
Before discussing the Unencumbered Conception and the communitarian critique of it, 
it is noteworthy that the communitarian critique has been criticised for taking the 
unencumbered self to be the liberal self, and for failing to distinguish between a civil and 
uncivil self. The unencumbered self is not the liberal self, as liberals could concede that the 
liberal self is encumbered by the liberal tradition. Further, Kim’s criticism of the Confucian 
communitarian critique of liberalism reveals something important about the Uncivil Self 
Claim. Kim argues that the Confucian communitarian critique fails to distinguish between two 
liberal selves: the ‘liberal moral self and the Hobbesian amoral self’.355 Kim contends that the 
 
the communitarian critique of old Rawls (as it were) is still relevant because what is at issue here is the 
communitarian conception of the self, which was developed in response to Rawls’ metaphysics in A Theory of 
Justice (n 343).  
351 Daniel A Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Clarendon Press 1993) 4. Of course, it is important to note 
that communitarians were not the only ones who objected to the Unencumbered Conception and other aspects of 
liberalism; the feminist critique is an equally prominent one. Though there are some similarities between the two 
critiques, my focus is on communitarianism, and so I will not discuss the feminist critique. 
352  The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, ‘Preamble’ 
<www.gwu.edu/~ccps/platformtext.html> accessed 3 September 2019.  
353  Amitai Etzioni, ‘Communitarianism’, The Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (1st edn, 2015) 
<https://icps.gwu.edu/sites/icps.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Communitarianism.Etzioni.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2019.  
354 Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (n 351) 1.  
355 Kim (n 301) 32. 
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Uncivil Self Claim, and arguments along those lines, actually target the Hobbesian amoral self 
because the unencumbered liberal self, such as the Kantian self, is a moral self. This is because 
Kantian autonomy is ‘accompanied by moral as well as civil and legal responsibilities for the 
social consequences of the freely chosen action’.356 Likewise, the Rawlsian self is a moral self 
because it would eventually choose two principles of justice357 that uphold the moral principles 
of equality and the redistribution of wealth. If this is right, then the communitarian critique is 
perhaps not as salient as it seems, for the liberal conception of the self could be readily re-
conceptualised to take into account its situatedness per the communitarian critique.  
To avoid the mistake of conflation, I refer only to a particular liberal conception—the 
Unencumbered Conception—in my discussion of the communitarian critique. As for Kim’s 
argument, while he is right to point out that the communitarian critique might go too far too 
quickly in its Uncivil Self Claim, nevertheless, the critique makes an important point about 
how the Unencumbered Conception undermines the value of community. As such, I will 
disregard the Uncivil Self Claim and focus only on the first part of the communitarian critique.    
What, then, is the Unencumbered Conception? The communitarian critique is that 
Rawls’ thought experiment implies an individualistic and atomistic—hence unencumbered—
conception of the self. For Rawls, principles of justice should be universally applicable and 
equitable, unblemished by social inequalities. He places individuals in the original position 
behind a veil of ignorance, such that they have no knowledge of their social context—their 
place in society, their natural assets or skills, their rational life plans, their social status, their 
family background, the circumstances of their own society, etc.—in order to arrive at principles 
of justice that are fair and just. Hence, when Rawls claims that the self is ‘prior to the ends that 
are affirmed by it’,358 it suggests that, in A Theory of Justice, he conceives of individuals as 
radically free, unencumbered to any pre-existing social context, with total autonomy to paint 
on the blank canvases of their lives.  
 
356 ibid 33. 
357 The two principles are: (1) each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others; and (2) social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all: Rawls 
(n 343) 60. 
358 ibid 560. 
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If the self is prior to its ends in this way, then the right is prior to the good: the 
unencumbered self, with the unfettered freedom to choose its own ends, requires a political 
framework that guarantees, in the form of rights, the exercise of its radical freedom. The liberal 
politics of rights must thus be neutral between competing conceptions of the good because the 
unencumbered self must not be barred from choosing some ends that it affirms a posteriori. 
Similarly, it must not be decided, a priori, for the unencumbered self what ends it should 
choose. Accordingly, a just society in which the right is prior to the good is one that ‘[refuses] 
to choose in advance among competing purposes and ends’.359  
 
ii. The Priority of the Good over the Right? 
The communitarian critique rejects the Unencumbered Conception as a mistake because it is 
an implausible way of understanding ourselves. Communitarianism, then, rejects the priority 
of the right over the good; but does it follow that it endorses the priority of the good over the 
right? This is the claim the defender of Singapore’s communitarianism wants to make. If it is 
right, then she is also right that ‘collective over individual’ is a communitarian paradigm 
because it follows from an important, arguably paramount, aspect of communitarianism: the 
communitarian critique of the liberal self. Indeed, the defender would have good reasons to 
believe that she is right; as we have seen in Part I(a) above, it is commonly thought that 
communitarianism prioritises the community’s values and needs over the individual’s. 
Unfortunately, the defender’s argument is a non-sequitur, and it is a common 
misconception that communitarianism endorses ‘collective over individual’ as a matter of 
course. Simply put, it does not necessarily follow from communitarianism’s rejection of the 
right over the good that the good is, or should be, prioritised over the right. The communitarian 
critique of the Unencumbered Conception essentially stresses the normative significance of 
community without forcing the individual into normative insignificance. The critique is two-
fold. First, it criticises the Unencumbered Conception for disregarding the fact that we are all 
born into and embedded in a particular social context. As such, the Unencumbered Conception 
fails to consider the moral significance of our constitutive attachments to ‘family or community 
 
359 Michael Sandel, Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics (Harvard University Press 2006) 157. 
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or nation or people’360 and their importance in shaping our self-understanding. Similarly, our 
inheritance of the history of the family, tribe or nation to which we belong gives our lives their 
‘own moral particularity’.361 Because we are so encumbered, we cannot be totally (or, arguably, 
sufficiently) abstracted from these particular attachments and their morality when thinking 
about principles of justice. As such, the Unencumbered Conception is false.  
Second, the communitarian critique argues that what follows from the falsity of the 
Unencumbered Conception is a corresponding failure to sufficiently account for the normative 
significance of community. We can understand this by considering two related implications of 
the Unencumbered Conception. The first implication is that, for the unencumbered self, choice 
itself is of the highest value.362 Being unencumbered by any antecedent attachment and placed 
in a position to choose freely, the only thing that the unencumbered self can affirm as valuable 
is that which it chooses—which implies that its freedom of choice is of utmost value. Without 
choice, it cannot act as the self-determining agent that it is. Second, it follows that the 
Unencumbered Conception leads to a self that is unable to affirm as valuable anything that is 
unchosen—such as its communal attachments. The fact that we are all born into a particular 
social context means that our identity is constituted, at least partly, by our communal 
attachments;363 our ends are not things that we choose, but discover.364  
Thus, communitarians argue that the unencumbered self is not only false, but is unable 
to value community’s normative significance because the constituent communal features of her 
identity are unchosen. This inability ‘rules out the possibility that common purposes and ends’ 
could describe a community as ‘the subject … of shared aspirations’.365 For the unencumbered 
self, community is little more than an instrumental association of self-interested individuals 
who come together to solve coordination problems. This thread-bare notion of community 
neglects the constitutive nature of our communal attachments and precludes the possibility that 
individuals could consider their membership in communities an integral part of their identity.366 
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The communitarian critique thus demands a more substantive conception of community, one 
that sees it as a constituent of our identity. If community is so constitutive, then, contra Rawls, 
the self cannot be prior to its ends, for it is these ends which partly constitute the self. If the 
self is not prior to its ends, then it follows that the right is not, or should not be, prior to the 
good.  
But notice that the communitarian critique of the Unencumbered Conception does not 
claim that the partially constituted self ought to allow community to be the legislator and final 
arbiter of what the self should affirm as valuable. All the critique says is that the Unencumbered 
Conception leads to a self that cannot value community because it is unchosen. It would be too 
quick for the defender of Singapore’s communitarianism to extrapolate from this critique—
which essentially demands a greater emphasis on the value of community—that, because the 
critique stresses the constitutive nature of the individual’s communal attachments, then the 
individual is so thoroughly constituted that she is nothing but her attachments. It would be too 
quick because the partially constitutive nature of communal attachments allows room for a 
sphere of agency within the individual that is left uncolonised by community.367 As Bell notes, 
the fact that we are ‘deeply bound up in [our] social world’368 such that our identity is partly 
constituted by it does not mean that one ought to ‘subordinate [one’s] individuality to the good 
of the community’.369 ‘Collective over individual’ would lead to precisely such subordination: 
the interests that rights protect, such as the freedom to profess and practise a religion, are 
subordinated to communal goods, such as national defence. Automatically subordinating the 
individual to the collective in this way is undesirable because, even though it is a part of human 
existence and daily life that one’s well-being is affected by others, ‘[no] individual is so 
thoroughly socialised that there is no trace of a “residual” sense of self, of agency, that does 
not react to repressions by the social’.370 As such, it would be a mistake to argue from the 
communitarian rejection of the Unencumbered Conception, and the priority of the right over 
the good, that communitarianism prioritises the good over the right. Rather, the communitarian 
critique of Unencumbered Conception stresses the value of community to the individual who 
is partially constituted by it. If the communitarian critique does not lead to ‘collective over 
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individual’, as I have shown here, then ‘collective over individual’ is not a paradigmatic 
communitarian principle.  
At this juncture, it is appropriate to point out a mistake in Breslin’s reconstruction of 
communitarianism, described in Part I(a). Though cognisant of the danger of ‘building a 
communitarian strawman’,371 that is precisely what Breslin ends up doing with his factually 
false claim that all communitarians prioritise the community’s values and interests over the 
individual’s values, interests and rights. Sandel, for instance, rejects the ‘communitarian’ label 
insofar as it implies that ‘rights should rest on the values or preferences that prevail in any 
given community at any given time’. 372  However, this does not entail ‘collective over 
individual’; rather, in advancing a politics of the common good, the issue is not whether rights 
should be respected, but whether rights can be justified without presupposing a conception of 
the good.373 In his review of Breslin’s book, Etzioni rejects Breslin’s mistaken claim and says 
that the issue is not whether rights should be respected, but how to calibrate the balance 
between competing communal and individual interests. The debate, then, focuses on ‘how 
much licence to give communities, and never treats them as the social entities whose values 
trump all others’.374 Indeed, Etzioni has stressed this point repeatedly in his own work. He 
argues that when communitarians criticise the overly individualistic nature of American 
society, they are not also aiming to ‘[encourage] a community that suppresses individuality. 
We aim for a judicious mix of self-interest, self-expression, and commitment to the 
commons—of rights and responsibilities’.375 In his discussion of the relationship between 
autonomy and society, he emphasises that not only are human beings social by nature, but ‘their 
sociability enhances their human and moral potential’.376 Hence, the ‘social fabric sustains, 
nourishes, and enables individuality rather than diminishes it’; 377  indeed, ‘communal 
attachments and individuality go hand-in-hand, enrich one another, and are not antagonistic’.378 
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In this light, not only does ‘Western’ communitarianism not necessarily entail 
‘collective over individual’, but it can hardly be said that ‘collective over individual’ is a 
communitarian paradigm. This undermines the defender’s claim that it is paradigmatic of 
communitarianism. The next section considers whether it is supported by Confucian 
communitarianism.  
 
b. Confucian Role-Bearing Person  
Even though it is commonly thought that Confucianism advocates ‘collective over 
individual’,379 it is at least doubtful whether the Confucian communitarian conception of the 
person supports the defender’s claim. Although the defender would argue that the Confucian 
conception of the person as a social380 role-bearing person381 would lead to ‘collective over 
individual’, this is arguably a non-sequitur. Like the ‘Western’ communitarian critique of the 
liberal self, the Confucian conception of the person does not force the individual into normative 
insignificance.  
 
i. The Absence of an Individual Self 
Prima facie, the defender appears to have a strong case. The Confucian conception of the 
person goes further than the ‘Western’ communitarian rejection of the Unencumbered 
Conception; indeed, it seems to reject altogether the very notion of the individual self. Whereas 
the liberal self is a free, rational and autonomous individual, 382  the Confucian person is 
constituted by her social roles through the practices of ritual propriety, practices which dissolve 
the tension between the self and society.383 As Henry Rosemont Jr puts it, we do not simply 
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play the roles of daughter, sister, mother, and friend; we live them, and are constituted by them, 
such that we are the ‘aggregate sum of the roles [we] live’.384 If we are thoroughly constituted 
by our social roles, it follows that there is ‘no essential self’385 that remains at the core of the 
person who, for instance, is now a mother in addition to her role as a daughter. In other words, 
there is no individual that is independent of our social relations.  
The defender would say that, in light of the above, there is simply no question whether 
‘collective over individual’ is a sound prioritisation of values because there is no individual. A 
metaphysical ‘individual’ with interests and needs independent of her social roles does not 
exist; and these social roles, the defender would say, are an extended web of social relations 
that, together, make up the ‘collective’. Understood in this way, the collective is embodied in 
the person in the form of the various social roles that constitute her. Thus, ‘individual’ has 
neither metaphysical nor normative significance, and refers only to discrete persons. 
Consequently, if Confucianism does not contain a conception of the person as a free and 
autonomous individual, then ‘collective over individual’ is normatively unproblematic. 
Individuals qua discrete persons have no special sphere of personhood and individuality that 
needs protection from the collective, and so these discrete persons bear no moral costs when 
the collective interest is placed above their own. The defender would even say that the needs 
of the collective are the needs of individuals qua discrete persons. In this light, then, ‘collective 
over individual’, as a core feature of Confucian communitarianism, is a communitarian 
paradigm; and since it raises no normative problems in the context of Confucian 
communitarianism, my normative critique cannot be made viz. Confucian communitarianism.   
 
ii. Confucian Roles-Based Ethics of Reciprocity  
On closer inspection, however, ‘collective over individual’ does not clearly or automatically 
follow from the Confucian role-bearing person. The defender’s case is flawed in two ways. 
First, her characterisation of the ‘collective’ as the sum total of the Confucian person’s social 
roles is suspect; and second, it misses the important point that the Confucian person is based 
on the Confucian roles-based ethics of reciprocity. The problem with the defender’s case is 
that it is unclear how reciprocity operates, if at all, between the Confucian person and the 
 




collective. If it cannot be shown that there is such reciprocity, then the Confucian conception 
of the person does not clearly, if it does at all, support ‘collective over individual’ because 
‘individual/collective’ would not be a valid Confucian role.   
In Confucian ethics, the family is the source of the Confucian role-bearing person’s 
moral knowledge: it is in the family that the role-bearing person learns true reciprocity of the 
roles.386 In an ideal Confucian family, children cultivate from childhood the virtue of filial piety 
(孝) from which flows an ‘unswerving loyalty’ and gratitude387 to parents. Parents, in turn, do 
things for their children’s sake, and so children feel a sense of joy when they have the 
opportunity to care for them.388 The parent-child relationship is the foundational reciprocal 
relationship on which the other roles embodied by the Confucian person are based; hence, 
reciprocity is not quid pro quo, but ‘loving integrated actions’.389 The Confucian role-bearing 
person works towards the goal of cultivating a common humanity based on mutual concern 
and respect, and a genuine willingness to carry out her responsibilities to others, unfettered by 
feelings of resentment that these responsibilities compromise her autonomy.390 
If reciprocity is integral to a Confucian role, then reciprocity in the form of ‘loving 
integrated actions’ needs to exist between the Confucian person and the collective. But even 
before this: can the collective be collapsed into the totality of the Confucian person’s social 
relations? Let us notice what the five Confucian roles are: parent/child; ruler/minister; 
husband/wife; siblings; and friends. What is conspicuously missing from these five roles is 
something along the lines of ‘person/society’, or even ‘person/neighbourhood’, or simply 
‘neighbours’. A tentative implication that we can draw, then, is that Confucian roles-based 
ethics is silent on the relationship between person and society.  
Nonetheless, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we can interpret Confucian 
roles-based ethics to include some notion of ‘society’. The defender might say something like 
this: it is a fact of modern-day life that our relations extend beyond the five Confucian relations. 
Not only are we a parent, a sibling, a child, etc., we are also a neighbour, a constituent of a 
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town, and a citizen of a country. So long as we can find some reciprocity between these 
relations, they can count as a Confucian role embodied by the Confucian person. In this sense, 
the defender would be right to say that the collective is the sum total of the Confucian person’s 
roles; and since the person has no needs or wants outside of these roles, the collective interest 
can take precedence over individual ones precisely because the latter does not exist. However, 
this is still problematic because of Confucianism’s emphasis on the family. If the family is the 
source of the Confucian person’s moral knowledge and behaviour, then it suggests that the 
family is more salient than other Confucian relations. Hence, the primacy of familial relations 
in itself precludes the defender from conflating all social relations as the ‘collective’, for doing 
so would undermine the family’s normative power.  
Alternatively, the defender might say that the collective can be understood as the 
country of which the Confucian person is a citizen. Once again, as long as we can identify some 
reciprocity between country and citizen, ‘citizen/country’ can count as a Confucian role; and 
if this is so, then the collective interest can be prioritised over the individual qua Confucian 
person. The problem, however, with conceiving of the collective as the counterparty to the 
‘citizen/country’ relation is that the reciprocity in this relation is insufficient for it to be a 
Confucian role. Going back to the parent/child example: we owe loyalty and sacrifice to our 
parents to reciprocate the sacrifices that they have made for us. Notice, though, that this 
particular relation is a concrete reciprocal one of mutual giving and love—but the 
‘citizen/country’ relation is of a qualitatively and saliently different sort. Instead of having a 
tangible person (my parent) with whom I share a reciprocal relation, my relationship with my 
country is abstract, my counterparty a sea of anonymous faces, most of whom I would never 
know on an intimate level. Although we could say that there is some reciprocity when I make 
sacrifices for my country—for instance, when I give up two years of my life for compulsory 
military service in exchange for national security—whatever benefit I gain from this relation 
is qualitatively different from that which I gain in the parent/child—indeed, in all the traditional 
Confucian roles—relation. This is because ‘country’, ‘nation’, ‘the national collective’, etc lack 
the tangibility of a face-to-face relationship that a Confucian relationship requires. Hence, 
whatever reciprocity that exists between citizen and country is too insubstantial for 
‘citizen/country’ to count as a Confucian role, and so the Confucian role-bearing person does 




iii. The Confucian Role-Bearing Person’s Moral Agency 
The defender would object to this and reiterate a prior argument: that there is no individual self 
within the Confucian role-bearing person. Since there is no individual self as such, the 
Confucian person bears no moral cost when he makes sacrifices for the collective. This logic, 
however, focuses too much on the autonomous self. Even accepting that the Confucian person 
is not an autonomous self, individual autonomy is not the only value at stake when the 
individual’s interests are sacrificed for the collective. The Confucian person can, for instance, 
be called upon to make other types of sacrifices, such as sacrificing familial relationships for 
the nation. To illustrate with Singapore’s national service scheme, say that war breaks out 
between Singapore and Malaysia, and every male citizen is called upon to fight in the war. 
Xiaoming is obliged to the nation to go to war, but his parents do not want him to fight because 
they fear that he would lose his life. Xiaoming thus faces conflicting moral obligations between 
filial piety to his parents (abiding by their wishes) and loyalty to his nation (fighting in the 
war). 
Xiaoming eventually fights in the war.391 If the defender’s logic is right, he bears no 
moral cost because his autonomy was not at stake; indeed, it could not have been at stake as he 
is not autonomous. On the contrary, however, Xiaoming bears an onerous moral cost: it is the 
cost incurred by abandoning his duty of filial piety. Given that the family is the moral centre 
of the Confucian person, and that filial piety is one of the bedrock tenets of Confucianism, this 
moral cost is just as burdensome as the loss of autonomy that Xiaoming qua individual self 
suffers by fighting in the war against his will. The defender is thus wrong to say that the 
Confucian person bears no moral cost when it makes sacrifices for the collective. Since the 
Confucian person does bear a moral cost, ‘collective over individual’ does not necessarily 
follow from the Confucian role-bearing person.  
 
 
391 Assume that he has no legal choice in the matter. In any event, Singapore does not recognise a right of 
conscientious objection to compulsory service as we have seen in Chapter One’s discussion of the freedom of 
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c. Communitarianism, Properly Understood: The Individual’s Normative 
Significance  
I have argued that ‘collective over individual’ necessarily follows from neither the ‘Western’ 
communitarian critique of the liberal self, nor the Confucian role-bearing person. I will now 
make a conceptual claim about communitarianism’s conception of the individual. Far from 
being a communitarian paradigm, ‘collective over individual’ is arguably a distortion of 
communitarianism because communitarianism does not play a zero-sum game between the 
individual and the community. Rather, since communitarianism conceives of the self as a 
situated and relational one, it follows that communitarianism values the individual as much as 
the community because one cannot exist without the other. ‘Collective over individual’ is thus 
mistaken for discounting the individual’s normative significance which communitarianism 
values.  
This claim is relatively uncontroversial and somewhat obvious in the context of 
‘Western’ communitarianism, which has been called a ‘correction of liberalism’.392 We can see 
how this is so from communitarianism’s emphasis on the community’s normative significance 
in shaping our self-understanding. In arguing for the community’s normative significance, 
what ‘Western’ communitarians are concerned with is what is important to the individual, and 
the community is normatively important insofar as it informs and shapes the individual’s self-
understanding, identity and well-being. This uncontroversial observation is intelligible: even 
‘Western’ communitarians work within a rights/individual-centric liberal tradition, which 
means that their critique is framed within the terms of the debate fixed ex ante by liberalism. It 
is for this reason that Rosemont, who rejects the very notion of the individual self, calls 
philosophical communitarians such as Sandel ‘foundational individualists’ despite their 
rejection of the Unencumbered Conception.393 So long as communitarians do not reject the 
conception of the individual as a free, rational and autonomous self, ‘Western’ 
communitarianism allows conceptual scope for the individual to assume normative 
significance. If this is so, then the very idea of ‘collective over individual’ threatens to subvert 
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the individual’s importance to communitarianism. Hence, ‘collective over individual’ is 
incompatible with ‘Western’ communitarianism. 
My conceptual claim is more controversial in the context of Confucian 
communitarianism because it works with a conception of the person that is radically different 
from the ‘Western’ notion of the individual self. It is plausible that someone defending 
Singapore’s communitarianism would conclude from Confucian roles-based ethics and the 
Confucian role-bearing person that, per Rosemont, ‘there can be no me in isolation’,394 and 
thus the collective can be prioritised over the individual. But as argued earlier, even Confucian 
role-bearing persons bear moral costs when they make sacrifices for the collective—which 
tacitly suggests that there is a ‘me’ that exists outside of the Confucian person’s roles, a residual 
individual caught in the crossfire between conflicting moral obligations. It is thus questionable 
whether the Confucian person ought to be conceived as so thoroughly constituted by its social 
roles that it completely precludes the notion of an individual outside of these roles, one that 
possesses moral agency. As Joseph Chan argues, it is a mistake to view Confucian roles-based 
ethics as subjugating the needs and interests of individuals to the collective. In the Confucian 
paradigm of reciprocity and mutual concern, ‘what are we supposed to care for if not that 
person’s needs and interests’? 395  Indeed, what other purpose would there be to stress 
reciprocity when a Confucian person carries out the obligations of his roles if not to ensure that 
the Confucian person’s needs and interests are taken care of? We care for, and are benevolent 
towards, others for at least two reasons: these ‘others’ are discrete persons whose needs and 
interests matter as much as our own; and we are individual persons, constantly cultivating our 
ability to realise ren (仁) 396 for our self-improvement. The person, then, is important as well 
in Confucian communitarianism. 
Accordingly, given the communitarian conception of the person, ‘collective over 
individual’ is not a necessary feature of communitarianism because it does not follow from the 
communitarian social, situated and relational self. Communitarianism, properly understood, 
values the individual as much as the community. Part III will consider whether ‘collective over 
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individual’ follows from the concept of community and the communitarian politics of the 
common good.  
 
III. COMMUNITY AND POLITICS OF THE COMMON GOOD  
a. Substantive Conception of the Good?  
The defender of Singapore’s communitarianism has not lost the battle yet. She could concede 
that the individual is significant in communitarianism: the individual, as a moral agent, has 
legitimate interests that are protected by rights because the individual incurs a cost when her 
interests are sacrificed for the group. The question, then, is whether this cost is justified—which 
does not mean that ‘collective over individual’ is not communitarian. The defender could argue 
that ‘collective over individual’ is still a communitarian paradigm in the following way. 
‘Collective over individual’ means that a communitarian society organises itself around a 
collectively arrived-at conception of the good to which the individual moral agent chooses to 
yield when his own conception of the good conflicts with the community’s. This thick 
conception of community is not incompatible with a conception of the individual as an 
autonomous moral agent. To substantiate this claim, the defender would rely on three 
communitarian arguments, the first two of which are related: the Walzerian ‘shared meanings’ 
argument referred to in Part I;397 the communitarian politics of the common good contra the 
liberal politics of rights; and the Confucian conception of community. 
‘Collective over individual’ is paradigmatic of communitarianism’s emphasis on the 
community’s normative significance as follows. Communitarianism advocates the ‘politics of 
the common good’398 which can be understood in at least two ways. First, following Walzer, a 
community’s principles of justice should be derived from its shared meanings and not an 
external and/or universal standard. Second, a community should organise itself around its own 
politics of the common good based on ‘a substantive moral belief powerful enough to inspire 
the citizenry’399 and ‘a set of public values which the community considers important and seeks 
to honour and preserve’.400 The idea is essentially that, instead of liberalism’s politics of rights 
 
397 See Part I(a), 72–73 above. 
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that advocate state neutrality between competing conceptions of the good, communitarianism’s 
politics of the common good uphold and advance the community’s conception of the good. The 
common good of a communitarian society, according to Will Kymlicka, ‘is conceived of as a 
substantive conception of the good which defines the community’s “way of life”’; and this 
common good ‘provides a standard by which [people’s] preferences are evaluated’.401 Thus 
conceived, the politics of the common good resolve conflicts between values and 
comprehensive worldviews, and allow the public pursuit of the community’s way of life to 
‘[take] precedence over the claim of individuals to the liberties and resources needed to choose 
and pursue their own ends’.402 
The community, then, acts as the individual’s moral voice and guides her actions. Far 
from imposing its will on individuals, the ideal communitarian society can also be understood 
in the Confucian sense: a ‘genuine community’ comprising not of self-interested individuals 
pursuing their own ends, indifferent to others in the community, but is instead ‘composed of 
virtuous members thinking of shared goals and values over one’s own’.403 This makes sense, 
the defender would say, because it is only when a community is organised around a shared 
conception of the good, comprising shared goals and ‘shared moral values’,404 that individual 
members are willing to put the interests of the community above their own. For the defender, 
this is what ‘collective over individual’ is really about, and it is in this way that it is a 
communitarian paradigm. Nothing about this communitarian ideal presupposes a 
heteronomous conception of the individual; all this means is that the individual sometimes has 
to conform to the community’s conception of the good which is what a virtuous citizen would 
do in any event. It would thus be a mistake, the defender would say, to ascribe to ‘collective 
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b. Against a Substantive Conception of the Communitarian Common Good  
This argument, however, does not accord with the most favourable interpretation of 
communitarianism. Although communitarianism is often thought to advocate a substantive 
common good around which the community organises itself,405 communitarianism, properly 
understood, cannot advance a substantive conception of the common good for two reasons. 
First, it does not follow from the communitarian conception of the self; and second, it is not 
supported by Confucian communitarianism.  
 
i. The Multifaceted Communitarian Self   
The communitarian conception of the self does not allow for a substantive conception of the 
communitarian common good. The communitarian self is a moral agent whose identity is 
constituted by its multifarious communal attachments, not just one communal attachment. If 
the ideal communitarian society advances a thick conception of the good, which specific 
community’s conception of the good, amongst competing ones, is being advanced? On the 
contrary, it follows from the communitarian self that communitarianism cannot advance a 
substantive conception of the good. Such a substantive conception, in order to satisfy 
communitarianism’s valuing of community, necessarily presupposes either that community is 
homogeneous with a unifying telos, or that the individual is more or less constituted by only 
one community. Both of these presuppositions are at odds with the communitarian recognition 
that the individual’s identity is partly constituted by multiple communities.   
To this the defender would say that some communitarians, when writing about 
community, have argued for the homogeneous community with a unifying telos that I am 
rejecting. MacIntyre, for instance, argues for a return to an Aristotelian community where ‘my 
good as a man is one and the same as the good of those others with whom I am bound up in 
human community’. 406  In this community, the good of individuals is the good of the 
community, and there is no tension between individual and community. However, the 
metaphysical component of MacIntyre’s longing for this ideal community must not be 
overlooked. MacIntyre’s ideal community is not just any community, but a specific type of 
Aristotelian and Thomistic community. This ideal is grounded in the metaphysical stipulation 
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that humans have a specific nature that directs them to a particular end,407 the ‘ultimate human 
good’. In this ideal community, members work towards ‘the shared achievement of those 
common goods without which the ultimate human good cannot be achieved’.408 MacIntyre’s is 
thus a conception of community that is inextricable from a specific Thomistic metaphysics. In 
fact, he categorically states that ‘I see no value in community as such—many types of 
community are nastily oppressive’.409 It would thus be a serious mistake to take MacIntyre’s 
argument for his ideal community that coheres around a substantive Thomistic conception of 
the common good to be an argument for a substantive conception of the common good 
simpliciter.  
In any event, we need not decide whether MacIntyre’s ideal community is really ideal, 
or whether it is compatible with communitarianism’s basic premise that the individual is partly 
constituted by many communal attachments. MacIntyre’s ideal community operates at a 
different metaphysical level which does not translate to an argument for just any substantive 
conception of the common good. Instead of getting distracted by metaphysics, the salient point 
here is that MacIntyre’s ideal community does not support the defender’s claim that it 
advocates whatever strong conception of the good that a community advances. Hence, the 
defender still has to specify which community’s conception of the good ought to be advanced 
above other communities’ conceptions when it is a fact of modern societies that our ‘communal 
attachments [and] loyalties stretch to more than one community—home-town, nation, 
family’.410 
A seemingly obvious candidate would be the national community. Just as it is a fact of 
modern life that our loyalties stretch to more than one community, it is similarly a fact of 
modern life that most of us are citizens of a country that claims our allegiance and which has 
constituted our identity in some way. Assuming that the national community refers to the 
political community contained in a single country,411 the defender might say that the national 
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411 I am using ‘national community’ in exactly this way, and I am assuming that the state enacts laws on the 
national community’s behalf. I am not referring to the different nations that might exist within a country based on 
some commonalities, such as ethnicity or religion (e.g. the Basque within Spain). My usage of ‘nation’ will be 
made clearer in Chapter Four.  
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community’s substantive conception of the good should prevail over all others because it is the 
only community that has the authority to impose legally binding obligations on its members. 
Since it is one of the many communal attachments that constitute our identity, allowing the 
national community’s substantive conception of the good to prevail comports with the 
communitarian ideal because it is not per se a denial of our identification with many 
communities. Rather, it can recognise this fact but it declares that, because conflicts of values 
in society have to be resolved, the pragmatic way out is to allow the national community’s 
conception of the good to prevail since it has the authority to impose political obligations on 
its members via the state.  
This pragmatic solution, however, is an unsatisfactory response to the question of 
principle that the defender cannot escape. The national community’s prerogative to enact 
legally binding resolutions to conflicts per se is not a good reason for its conception of the good 
to prevail over competing conceptions. Advancing a single substantive conception of the good 
undermines the essence of communitarianism; namely, that we should value the normative 
significance of community to our self-understanding, not value a community above all others. 
Doing the latter is likely to undermine community and the notion of equality of membership 
that it implies. I will illustrate with the instructive example of Israel.  
Breslin describes Israel’s constitutional model as communitarian412 because the Israeli 
nation is constituted by a commitment to a substantive conception of the good, i.e. Judaism, 
which the state promotes at the expense of competing conceptions. According to Breslin, Jews 
enjoy ‘participatory citizenship’ which comes with the responsibility to shape the nation’s 
good, while non-Jews are left with ‘nonparticipatory citizenship’: they are left to practise 
religions that conflict with the nation’s religion in private, as long as they do not interfere with 
Israel’s promotion of Judaism.413 One manifestation of this disparity is the ban on political 
parties who challenge ‘the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people’.414 
Such a ban attenuates the right of citizens, especially non-Jewish citizens, to participate 
meaningfully in the political process; anyone who wishes to challenge the primacy given to the 
 
412 Breslin (n 302) 186–195. 
413 ibid 187. 
414 Israel’s Basic Law, quoted in ibid 193 (emphasis added). 
103 
 
Jewish way of life at the national level, even by Jewish groups who call for ‘increased attention 
to the values of equality and liberalism’,415 are prohibited by the law from doing so.  
This divide between Jews and non-Jews was recently deepened when the Israeli 
government passed the Jewish Nation-State Law416 which stated that ‘the right of national self-
determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people’ and downgraded Arabic’s 
official status to a ‘special status’. Israel’s promotion of one substantive conception of the good 
in a pluralistic state creates the impression that there are two classes of citizenship: those that 
conform to the nation’s conception, and those that do not. Such inequality arguably cannot 
foster a genuine communitarian community, for it does little to allow the latter group of citizens 
to feel a sense of belonging to the national community when they feel that they are being treated 
unequally by the majority.  
The defender might object that there must be some instances when the national 
community’s conception of the good can prevail over other communities’ conflicting 
conceptions. After all, the national community, as represented by the state, can impose legally 
binding obligations on its members to resolve conflicts, suggesting that the national community 
has some elevated status viz. other communities. This objection is not incorrect. In fact, the 
national community does have some added significance, and it can promote a conception of 
the good—but only a thin conception, as section (c) below will establish. Suffice to say for 
now that if the national community compels some members to give up their community’s 
conception of the good, the national community can only do so if there is adequate justification. 
An example would be if the community promulgated a racist worldview; in this case, the 
justification would be that this worldview denigrates the equal membership of other members 
in the national community. More will be said about this in Chapter Four.   
To sum up: given communitarianism’s recognition of the multifaceted nature of our 
communal attachments, community does not refer to a community, but encompasses all these 
various communal attachments. As such, community is pluralistic, encompassing these 
different communal attachments, and promotes a sense of belonging and inclusiveness. It does 
not prescribe in advance standards by which to choose which community should prevail, and 
neither does it inherently suggest the superiority of any one community over all others. If our 
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communal attachments are multifarious, then communitarianism, properly understood, 
recognises and values the different communities contained within the larger national 
community, and so cannot advance a substantive conception of the good. We now turn to 
consider whether the defender can successfully rely on Confucian communitarianism for her 
claim that communitarianism can advance a substantive conception of the good.  
 
ii. What is Community in Confucian Communitarianism? 
The defender’s Confucian communitarianism argument is as follows. Confucian 
communitarianism regards ‘the interest and value of the community [as] higher than those of 
the individual’. 417  It ‘advocates and thinks highly of community values, advocating that 
individual values should be subordinate to community values, and [that] the former can be 
achieved only through the execution of the latter’.418 This is one way in which Confucian 
communitarianism prioritises the community’s values over the individual’s. The other way is 
that, as Hu Weixi argues, community in Confucian communitarianism ‘is more of a vertical 
understanding of political composition rather than a lateral understanding of civil society’, 
which extends upwards from the family to the kin, then the state, and finally the world.419 
Given this conception of community, the state lies at the centre of Confucian 
communitarianism;420 and in the context of the nation-state, the state represents the interests of 
the nation qua national community. One could then say that the community in this context is 
the national community as represented by the state. As such, the substantive conception of the 
good that communitarianism advances is the national conception, which means that the 
collective interest qua the national conception of the good can be prioritised over the 
individual’s interests.  
This argument, however, is problematic. To begin with, Hu’s claim that Confucian 
communitarianism regards the interest and value of the community as higher than the 
individual is somewhat confusing. He derives his claim from the Confucian concept of the 
union of heaven and man (天人合一), but his brief explanation of the concept does not explain 
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why, or how, it supports his contention that Confucian communitarian places the community’s 
interest higher than the individual’s. According to Hu, the concept says that the way (道 dao) 
of heaven and man are the same, and it is from this concept that ‘Pre-Qin Confucians found a 
foundation for the possible union of individual value and social value’.421 The quest for a union 
between individual and society does not suggest that the community’s interest is placed higher 
than the individual’s since ‘union’ suggests a fusion of community and individual, not a 
prioritisation of community over individual. A further argument is required to substantiate Hu’s 
claim.  
However, it is unclear if we can find this argument in the concept of the union of heaven 
and man, which indicates the larger problem with the defender’s reliance on Confucian 
communitarianism to support ‘collective over individual’: the lack of a similar concept of 
community. First, though, the concept of the union of heaven and man takes a holistic view of 
the individual’s role in society.422 The individual is not opposed to his surroundings, but is an 
integral part of it, which in Confucian terms extends outwards from the family to the country 
and then to the world. The individual becomes a holistic person, a person with仁 ren, when he 
realises his ren within the family, the country and the world when he cares for others in the 
same way that he cares for his family. This, however, does not mean that the individual person 
is subordinated by society. Rather, there is a symbiotic relationship between individual and 
society: the individual realises his ren and becomes a moral person in society, and society 
benefits from having morally responsible individuals as members. It is thus difficult to see how 
one could infer from the concept of the union of heaven and man that the community’s interests 
are valued more than the individual’s.  
But there is a deeper problem with the defender’s attempt to rely on Confucian 
communitarianism—and it is that Confucianism does not seem to have a concept of community 
that is used in ‘Western’ philosophy and as we understand it today. I have said briefly in this 
chapter that community refers to those communal attachments that constitute our identity. More 
generally, community also refers to ‘groups that have certain common interests within a 
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country, and the associations or groups that are formed by social contacts and connections, e.g. 
race, religion, and other social and cultural activities’.423 Confucianism—and by extension, 
Confucian communitarianism—does not appear to contain such a concept; and if it does not, 
then there is arguably no a notion of ‘the group’ whose interests can be placed above the 
individual’s. As Wm Theodore De Bary points out, while Confucian ethics have developed a 
sophisticated system of thought regarding the family, little work has been done to develop the 
concept of the group. Without a concept of the group, the ‘Western’ concepts of community 
are not easily translatable into meaningful Confucian terms.424  
Where scholars have identified and explicated on a Confucian community, the idea is 
rather different from that of social groupings based on common interests and identity traits. 
Instead, it is one in which its members cultivate their potential for, and strive towards, the 
ultimate Confucian moral value of ren. Tan Sor-hoon argues that a Confucian community 
‘should be understood not as a closed collective—an abstract entity to be set above its 
individual members—but as an open network of relationships’. 425  Since ren is achieved 
through ritual propriety conducted in relation to others, the Confucian community is achieved 
through Confucian rituals. Put another way, Russell Arben Fox states that ‘community in 
classical Confucianism is a horizontal concept’ 426  and it is ‘a morally immanent 
community’.427 Members strive to achieve ren through the performance of their role rituals, 
and it is through their participation in community activities that ‘everyone, in different times 
and places, has the potential to show forth … the sort of authority which binds the community 
together’.428 Note that ‘authority’ in this Confucian community is not concentrated in one 
person or institution. Rather, ‘the moral authority of [ren] is inherent in one’s own sphere of 
activity’429—that is, the performance of one’s role rituals. The extent to which one’s authority 
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should be respected is determined by ‘one’s understanding of and dedication to the common 
good’.430  
This does not mean, however, that all members of the community must ‘submit to one 
objective truth’,431 and so neither the Confucian community nor Confucian communitarianism 
would endorse ‘collective over individual’. Instead, the Confucian community points to an 
ideal of authority that is exercised ‘with a sense of judiciousness, difference and reserve’.432 
Further, because Confucianism presupposes that everyone has the capability to cultivate ren, 
such capability must be respected by the individual and the community, so that ‘instrumental 
concerns’ cannot ‘trouble the cultivation of [ren]’.433  As a result, neither the person nor 
community should be ‘subordinated as an instrumental means to serve the realization of the 
other. Rather, they stand as mutually implicatory ends’.434 This is also because ren ‘would seek 
consensus in a way that respected difference and did not expect uniformity’.435 All this points 
away from the contention that Confucian communitarianism supports ‘collective over 
individual’. 
Another interpretation of the Confucian community, offered by De Bary, also evinces 
a mutually beneficial harmonious relationship between individual and community. Despite the 
lack of a developed concept of community in Confucian communitarianism, there are two 
manifestations of community in Confucianism: the community compact (乡约) and the well-
field system, and both emphasise voluntarism and cooperation. De Bary describes the 
community compact as intending to ‘incorporate … voluntarism into community structures 
that might mediate between state power and family interests’ 436  and  promote voluntary 
cooperation in a community where members are mutually engaged in encouraging moral deeds, 
correcting errors and failings, and providing aid in times of distress.437 The well-field system, 
representing the ideal Confucian community, is predicated on a division between the common 
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people and the leadership class. In this system, land is divided between eight families, with the 
ninth plot in the centre belonging to the public.438 The idea is that the families would work on 
bettering the public plot of land together, and they would do so as follows, according to 
Mencius: ‘[Neighbours] share the well together in farming, befriend one another both at home 
and abroad … They live in love and harmony…’ 439  This paradigm of the community 
compact/well-field suggests a highly localised, close-knit community whose nucleus is the 
family and the immediate neighbourhood. In line with the highly interpersonal nature of the 
ideal Confucian community, in this ideal, ‘[each virtuous] member thinks of furthering the 
goals and needs of the community as a gain for oneself’.440  
The point is, the idea of community in Confucianism does not readily lend itself to the 
defender’s claim that Confucianism communitarianism endorses ‘collective over individual’, 
or the claim that it elevates the national community’s conception of the good over its members’ 
competing conceptions. This is primarily because the Confucian community seeks harmony 
between individual members, and all members as a collective. The individual is an integral 
member of the community whose interests are in line with, and not opposed to, the 
community’s. This understanding of the Confucian community comports with the Confucian 
role-bearing person discussed in Part II: if the Confucian person is the various roles that she 
plays, then there is no sharp distinction between individual and community in the way that 
‘collective over individual’ implies, or even requires. So even accepting that the Confucian 
community can be understood as the national community, a loyal interpretation of the 
Confucian community would be that members of the national community seek harmony in the 
national community by maintaining harmonious relations with each other. In contrast, the claim 
that the national community’s interest is prioritised over its individual members’ introduces an 
element of contention and subordination that is not clearly present in the Confucian 
community. As such, Confucian communitarianism does not support the defender’s claim.  
For the foregoing reasons, the defender’s claim that ‘collective over individual’ is a 
communitarian paradigm because it encapsulates the idea that the community should organise 
itself around a substantive conception of the good is erroneous. Communitarianism, properly 
understood, does not support the promotion of a community’s substantive conception of the 
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good due to the multifaceted nature of community in modern societies. But this is not to say 
that communitarianism cannot advance any conception of the good; in fact, my conceptual 
claim is that communitarianism is based on shared values—but these shared values determine 
a thin conception of the good.  
 
c. Communitarianism, Properly Understood: Promoting a Thin Theory of the Good 
My second conceptual claim about communitarianism is that, because community is 
multifaceted, communitarian politics can only promote a thin theory of the good. This thin 
theory promotes communitarianism’s aim of enabling individuals to access and participate in 
their communities in order to lead meaningful lives. It is also based on the notions of 
inclusiveness and reciprocity that are implied by the concept ‘community’. Finally, it is, by 
necessity—necessary because of the inevitable fact of the modern nation-state—engineered to 
strengthen ‘the bond of solidarity’441 between members of the national community. 
This thin theory of the good has been conceptualised as an inclusion of citizens by 
Sandel and Taylor. For Sandel, the communitarian politics of the common good is the politics 
of ‘civic virtue’, a recognition of the ‘full membership of fellow citizens wrongly excluded 
from the common life of the nation’.442 For Taylor, the bond of solidarity is the communitarian 
politics of the common good: it is the common good of a political community that citizens 
identify with ‘the republic as a common enterprise’, creating a sense of shared fate that binds 
together members of a community where ‘the sharing itself is of value’.443 Taylor calls this 
‘patriotic identification’: a ‘common identity and history, defined by a commitment to certain 
ideals’444 shared amongst citizens of a particular nation.  
The idea of a common identity and full membership is consonant with the notion of 
inclusiveness inherent in the notion of community that lies at the heart of communitarianism. 
A community is formed when a group of people who share some interest or morally relevant 
characteristics organise their lives, at least in part, towards a shared enterprise. Those who 
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possess this morally relevant characteristic are included in the community for which this 
characteristic is relevant. Conversely, those who do not possess the morally relevant 
characteristic are excluded from the community, which strengthens the inclusiveness that is 
due to those who possess the morally relevant characteristic.445 For the purpose of the nation 
qua community, then, the morally relevant characteristic is nationality, or a shared national 
identity. In this regard, the communitarian theory of the good seeks to promote the inclusion 
of all members of the national community and their equality of membership. There is also an 
added element of reciprocity, encapsulated in the ideal Confucian community, that is 
important,446 so as to curb self-interested tendencies inherent in human beings. The onus is not 
only on the community to include those individuals who possess the morally relevant 
characteristic;447 but there is also an obligation of reciprocity on individual members to set aside 
their interest for the sake of the community if they are able and willing to bear the cost incurred. 
These theories of the communitarian common good are thin in that they do not promote 
a comprehensive conception of the good. Instead, they specify the minimal standards that a 
communitarian state should put in place to realise the communitarian aim of promoting 
community and inclusiveness. This is the ‘good’ that communitarianism advocates: the 
inclusiveness that enables the communitarian self living in a modern society to immerse herself 
in the communities that are important to her. Undoubtedly, a reasonable question may arise: 
why should we be concerned with community at all? It is important to note that community’s 
normative significance lies not in community as a metaphysical entity, but in its being a source 
of value and meaning to its members. In this sense, community, and as Part II of this chapter 
has alluded to, is (partly) constitutive of our identity. As Sandel describes it, a constitutive 
conception of community is one in which its members ‘conceive their identity … as defined to 
some extent by the community of which they are a part’.448 Bell fleshes out this idea more fully 
in his account of what he calls constitutive communities, i.e. those communal attachments that 
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define our identity. I will turn to this in more detail in the next chapter. Suffice to say for now 
that the constitutive conception of community presents communitarianism in its most 
favourable light: it values both individual and community, and promotes a thin theory of the 
good that benefits community without sacrificing the individual’s interests in the way that 
‘collective over individual’ does. This thin theory is the good of inclusiveness of all members 
of the national community by upholding their equality of membership. This will be further 
elaborated on in Chapter Four.  
 
CONCLUSION 
I have subjected the principle ‘collective over individual’ to a normative critique in the light of 
‘Western’ and ‘Asian’ communitarianism. I have also made a conceptual claim that the most 
favourable interpretation of communitarianism values both individual and community, and 
promotes only a thin theory of the good. I began by challenging the contention that ‘collective 
over individual’ is an ‘Asian’ communitarian paradigm which ‘Asian’ Singapore should adopt. 
I argued that this claim cannot be sustained because, first, Singapore’s ‘Asianness’ is 
questionable; and second, ‘Asia’ and ‘Asian’ are concepts too vague to ground a normative 
claim. I also challenged the argument that ‘collective over individual’ is acceptable because it 
is how Singapore has chosen to define its own communitarianism, arguing that conceptual 
disputes cannot be defined out of existence. Hence, if ‘collective over individual’ is not a 
favourable interpretation of communitarianism, then Singapore ought not adopt it.  
I then examined the defender’s broader claim that ‘collective over individual’ is 
paradigmatic of communitarianism simpliciter and established my conceptual claim about 
communitarianism. The first strand of my claim is that, contrary to ‘collective over individual’, 
communitarianism values both individual and community. This is evident from both the 
‘Western’ communitarian critique of the liberal self and the Confucian role-bearing person. 
These conceptions of the person collectively make up the communitarian conception of the 
self: the self is a social, situated and relational self.  
The second strand of my claim is that communitarianism cannot promote a substantive 
theory of the good, but only the thin theory of the good of inclusiveness—specifically, the 
inclusion of all in the national community. It cannot promote a substantive theory of the good 
because communitarianism is premised on a pluralistic conception of community; and given 
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this, no single substantive conception of the good of a particular community can prevail over 
the others. But a communitarian state can, and should, promote the inclusion of all in the 
national community. This would enable members to participate in public life as well as the 
communities that constitute their identity. The next chapter elaborates on the first element of 
this inclusive conception: the theory of constitutive communities.   
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Chapter Three  
Constitutive Communities  
 
INTRODUCTION 
I have argued in Chapter Two that Singapore’s communitarian principle ‘collective over 
individual’ is not a necessary requirement of communitarianism, much less a paradigmatic 
communitarian principle, because it does not necessarily follow from the communitarian self 
and the communitarian politics of the common good. The most favourable interpretation of 
communitarianism, in fact, values both individual and community. Given that ‘collective over 
individual’ is incompatible with the elevated status of Singapore’s constitutional rights, and is 
not necessitated by communitarianism, we have little reason to retain Singapore’s current 
communitarian approach to rights. To redress the problem with Singapore’s communitarian 
approach to rights, we should construct an alternative communitarian approach, one that 
proceeds from the most favourable interpretation of communitarianism. In this thesis, I 
construct just this approach—the Inclusive Communitarian Approach. It consists of two 
elements: a pluralistic conception of community as constitutive communities, and the national 
community’s duty to include. 
This chapter elaborates on the first element: constitutive communities. As mentioned 
in Chapter Two,449 Sandel advances a constitutive conception of community, and Bell develops 
a full-fledged communitarian theory based on the constitutive conception.450 Following from 
the communitarian conception of the self as a social, relational and situated self, the theory 
adopts a pluralistic conception of community as the communal attachments that partly 
constitute our identity. In line with the most favourable interpretation of communitarianism, 
the theory values both community and individual by protecting the communities that are partly 
constitutive of the individual’s identity. To be constitutive of identity, these communal 
attachments should have shaped the individual’s values and outlook, such that they are integral 
to her identity and sense of self. The individual, then, has to be able to live as451 a member of 
her constitutive communities: to have access to them, to participate in them, and so on. The 
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Inclusive Communitarian Approach to rights conceptualises these communities as the 
sufficiently important interests that ground rights. Hence, constitutional rights protect 
constitutive communities from unjustified encroachment by the state and/or the majority in two 
related ways. It protects, first, the individual’s interest in accessing and participating in them, 
and being protected from the social harms caused by such membership. Second, it protects the 
communities themselves, in the variegated forms they take, from disproportionate state 
measures to restrict or prohibit their existence or activities.   
The chapter will proceed as follows. Part I explains the theory of constitutive 
communities with reference to Sandel and Bell, and provides pragmatic and normative 
justifications for adopting this theory. Pragmatically, it responds to criticisms about 
communitarians’ lack of specification of what a community is by providing just this 
specification. Normatively, it is the most appealing theory of community because, contrary to 
criticisms of community as oppressive and homogenous, it recognises and promotes social 
differences by attaching normative significance to all the communities that constitute our 
identity, not just a community. This will be shown by juxtaposing the theory against monistic 
conceptions of community.  
Part II responds to a formidable challenge to the theory: the objection from autonomy. 
The objection is that the idea that we are constituted by our communal attachment risks forcing 
autonomy out of the picture: if the self is attached and encumbered, it seems that the 
constitutive communities theory is simply a variation on the theme of ‘collective over 
individual’. Indeed, Bell’s theory ascribes wholesale normative significance to the inescapable 
features of our identity by asserting that they are always valuable to us in a strong sense. This 
claim follows from his ontology of the person that allows too little room for autonomy. I argue 
instead that Bell’s strong claim about constitutive communities requires a more substantive 
conception of autonomy so that the individual can affirm or reject the value of her constitutive 
communities, and prevent the theory from collapsing into ‘collective over individual’. Drawing 
on Kwame Anthony Appiah, I argue that the theory should be premised on the ideal 
communitarian self, the Constituted Autonomous Self, i.e. one who makes decisions about 
things of value within the boundaries set by his social world.  
Part III specifies the type of communal attachments that are constitutive and hence 
constitutionally protected. Constitutive communities have two features: the Fundamental 
Feature and the Social Harm Feature. The Fundamental Feature encompasses the ordinarily 
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unchangeable, mostly unchosen and deep-seated elements of identity to which the individual 
has made an ethical commitment. It points to the fact that membership in constitutive 
communities is a fundamental aspect of our identity because these communities provide us 
with what Charles Taylor calls the ‘framework’452 within which we make important choices. 
As such, our membership in them is intimately intertwined with our identity and sense of self. 
The Social Harm Feature identifies the social harms, such as discrimination, that arise from the 
inexorably social nature of constitutive communities. I illustrate the salience of the Social Harm 
Feature of constitutive communities with Appiah’s structure of a collective identity, and Iyiola 
Solanke’s stigma imagery453  which she uses to identify traits that anti-discrimination law 
should protect.  
Communal attachments that qualify as constitutionally protected constitutive 
communities under the Inclusive Communitarian Approach usually contain both the 
Fundamental and Social Harm Features. Some examples are communal attachments based on 
gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and sexual orientation, though these are merely 
indicative and non-exhaustive. Because of the Constituted Autonomous Self’s capacity for 
autonomy, and the social dimension of constitutive communities, the question of which 
communal attachments should count as constitutive is always in flux. In a sense, then, it is an 
empirical question that depends on the extent to which individuals claiming a communal 
attachment to be constitutive demonstrate an ethical commitment to it, and whether the 
attachment is vulnerable to social harms.  
Finally, a caveat: the constitutive communities theory only claims that our identity is 
partly constituted by our communal attachments. When I say that we are constituted by these 
attachments, it should be taken to mean partly constitutive.  
 
I. CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNITIES 
a. The Theory Explained 
The constitutive communities theory states that our identity as individuals is partly constituted 
by our social relations and communal attachments. This follows from the communitarian 
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conception of the social, situated and relational self: if we are born into, and then embedded in, 
a pre-existing social context in which we are intimately related to others, it follows that our 
identity is shaped and constituted by the social world and relations in which we are immersed. 
I am not only an individual in pursuit of a PhD; I am also a daughter, a woman, a friend, a 
Singaporean citizen, an ethnic Chinese, and so on.  
The theory of constitutive communities ascribes normative significance to the 
communal attachments that have constituted our identity. This means, briefly, that they are 
those communities ‘with which the individual self-identifies and from which the individual 
gains self-esteem’ by ‘[providing her] with certain … goods that enable her to function and 
make choices about her life’.454 Constitutive communities are thus fundamental to our self-
understanding and sense of identity. This sense of identity includes notions of self-esteem, 
dignity, personhood, self-understanding and self-confidence; essentially, it refers to the idea 
that we are someone worthy of our own and others’ respect because we know who we are and 
what we stand for. For the purpose of rights protection, the pluralistic, constitutive conception 
of community should be adopted to fully account for all the communal attachments that are 
important for our self-understanding. I will now explain the theory.  
 
i. Sandel’s Argument 
Sandel advances a constitutive conception of community in his critique of two prominent 
liberal arguments for redistributive justice: John Rawls’ common assets component of his 
difference principle in A Theory of Justice455 and Ronald Dworkin’s argument for affirmative 
action.456 Essentially, Sandel argues that Rawls and Dworkin need a stronger, constitutive 
conception of community than they explicitly acknowledge for their arguments to be 
successful. Community, for Sandel, is not only a sentiment that the ‘unencumbered self’457 
experiences every now and then, and neither is it an attachment that it chooses. Rather, 
community is a ‘constituent’ of the self’s identity, an attachment that it discovers, a description 
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of what it is as a member of its community. 458  Without this constitutive conception of 
community, Sandel argues, Rawls’ common assets cannot be redeemed without violating 
Kant’s injunction against treating an individual as a mere means to an end, and without 
disrupting the priority of the self over its ends.  
For Rawls, the moral arbitrariness of natural talent and social privilege means that the 
benefits of those naturally talented and socially privileged are the community’s common 
asset459 and should be redistributed to aid the worst-off members of society. This argument, in 
Sandel’s view, presupposes a ‘sentimental conception’460 of community in which individuals 
work towards some ‘shared final ends’ and regards cooperation as a good in itself. But this 
sentimental conception lacks the requisite robustness to support Rawls’ theory of justice that 
asserts the priority of the right over the good. The sentimental view of community compromises 
the unity of these supposedly common assets, exposing them to the danger of crumbling under 
the fragility of the sentimental conception. For the self to properly view the fruits of its labour 
as part of its community’s common assets, it would have to be constituted to some degree by 
its community so that it is not treated as a means with which the community’s worst-off 
members improve their own ends—a using of the individual which deontological liberals are 
against. It would have to view, at least partially, the well-being and success of its community 
as its own well-being and success, not some detached others to whom the self is only 
sentimentally related:461 ‘[By] my efforts I contribute to the realization of a way of life in which 
I take pride and with which my identity is bound.’462 In order to arrive at this enlarged self-
understanding, we need a constitutive conception of community.  
Sandel’s constitutive conception is also pluralistic. In his critique of Dworkin’s 
argument for affirmative action, Sandel argues that Dworkin’s argument suffers the same flaw 
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as Rawls’ common asset argument: it lacks an account of the ‘antecedent bond or tie’463 that 
would justify denying some citizens an equal opportunity to compete for university admission 
without violating deontological liberalism’s commitment against using the individual as a 
means to another’s ends. For Dworkin, affirmative action policies that favour black people for 
university admission are justified, even if they sacrifice a constitutional right not to be 
disadvantaged based on race, because such policies seek to correct historical injustices against 
black people by reducing, in the long run, ‘the degree to which American society is over-all a 
racially conscious society’. 464  Society as a whole would also benefit from having more 
representation of racial minorities in the legal and medical professions.  
However, Sandel persuasively points out that Dworkin never specifies to whom the 
individual surrenders her right to compete equally for university places. Dworkin refers 
variously to ‘the more general society’, ‘some more general concern’,465 and the nation when 
he says that universities with affirmative action policies are ‘[fulfilling] what they take to be 
their responsibilities to the nation’.466 For Sandel, however, these terms fail to determine the 
relevant subject of possession that would avoid using the individual as a means to an end. For 
one, it does not follow that, just because the individual has no moral or privileged claim to the 
assets that he accidentally possesses, the wider society automatically does, because locating 
these assets in the wider society is just as arbitrary as locating them in the individual. More 
importantly, Dworkin’s lack of a distinction between society in general and the national 
community, and hence his lack of a conception of community, is problematic for two reasons. 
First, there is simply no such thing as the wider community and the society as a whole; 
community, rather, is pluralistic:  
Each of us moves in an indefinite number of communities, some more inclusive than others, 
each making different claims on our allegiance, and there is no saying in advance which is the 
society or community whose purposes should govern the disposition of any particular set of our 
attributes and endowments.467 
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Given community’s plurality, the second problem with Dworkin’s lack of a conception 
of community is that there is no immediate reason why the individual’s assets should default 
to the national community. For this move to work, Sandel says, Dworkin needs an account of 
why the nation is the relevant subject of possession and what makes it able ‘to claim … 
allegiance to the purposes that would arise from [the common national] identity’.468 Without 
this account—indeed, without a constitutive conception of community—Dworkin’s argument 
for affirmative action collapses into an utilitarian calculus by which the entitlements of some 
are sacrificed for the greater good, hence using them as a means to an end. A constitutive 
conception of community, Sandel argues, corrects this problem: if the self is partly constituted 
by its various communal attachments, then it sees the good of these communities as its own 
good, and so it is also furthering its own ends when it makes sacrifices for its various 
communities.  
 
ii. Bell’s Theory 
These two ideas—community as constitutive and pluralistic—are the focus of Bell’s theory of 
constitutive communities. Following the communitarian rejection of the unencumbered self, 
he adopts the communitarian conception of the self as a social being embedded in a particular 
contingent world. This social world provides an unchosen moral framework that imparts to the 
individual the values of a life worth leading. Bell then asserts that, when we think of what 
matters most in our lives, the answer will likely involve ‘a commitment to the good of the 
communities out of which [our identity has] been constituted’.469 The primary purpose of 
communitarian politics is to ‘[allow] people to experience their life as bound up with the good 
of the communities which constitute their identity’.470 Bell’s use of the plural ‘communities’ is 
significant: he stresses that, in the modern world, we are encumbered by many communities, 
including the home-town, nation and family; and so it follows that the communitarian ideal 
‘must begin with a recognition of the fact that most of us identify with many communities’.471  
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But not just any community that we identify with at whatever facile level has political 
and moral salience; only those communities that have defined our identity—i.e. constitutive 
communities—do. Bell specifies three closely-connected criteria for distinguishing these 
communities from voluntary and contingent attachments. First, a community is constitutive if 
it defines our sense of who we are.472 The typical intuitive replies to the question ‘who are you?’ 
will usually be along the lines of ‘I’m Singaporean’, ‘I’m a woman’ and so on. 
Following from this, the second distinguishing feature of constitutive communities is 
that they ‘provide a largely background way of meaningful thinking, acting, and judging, a way 
of being in a world which is much deeper and more many-sided than any possible articulation 
of it’.473 This means that, while I can name a few traits that point to what being Singaporean 
means—a love for food, a native command of Singlish, a fear-of-losing-out mentality—or be 
convinced that ‘Singaporean’ describes an integral part of my identity, a complete picture of 
what it means to bear this identity eludes articulation. Contrast this with membership in a 
voluntary or contingent association—say, the Cambridge Lawn Tennis Club. It is exactly as its 
name describes: a gathering of individuals in Cambridge to play tennis. For Bell, the 
constitutive features of identity are always operating in the background, such that ‘we’re 
principally connected with [these] features … in a way which resists articulation’. 474 Our 
inability to articulate what it means to bear these constitutive features means that they are 
‘exempt from evaluation and possible rejection’.475 Bell, then, advances a strong conception of 
constitutive communities: unlike membership of a voluntary association, membership in 
constitutive communities cannot be shed. These constitutive aspects of identity, Bell argues, 
are ‘more than a descriptive fact about [oneself]’.476 Rather, one experiences a sense of shared 
fate with other members of one’s constitutive community and share a bond of solidarity with 
them that gives a special meaning to one’s life, such that one values this community in a way 
that one would not value other non-constitutive communities.477 
Bell’s third feature of a constitutive community logically follows from its deep 
embeddedness in the individual’s psyche and sense of identity: if an individual tried to shed 
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his constitutive communities, he would be ‘thrown into a state of severe disorientation’478 
leading to ‘damaged human personhood’,479 a state where a person can no longer distinguish 
the good from the bad, the meaningful from the trivial, and is unwilling to take a stand on 
things that matter. This radical conclusion follows from the premise that constitutive 
communities define our identity in a meaningful manner. Constitutive communities are, in 
Taylor’s word, ‘frameworks’ in which we make strong evaluations of meaningful questions 
about how we live our lives, what sort of life is worth living, or how to lead a fulfilling life 
according to our talents and aspirations.480 To escape our constitutive communities, then—to 
remove ourselves from these frameworks—would be to plunge ourselves into an ‘appalling 
identity crisis’,481 or ‘damaged personhood’ in Bell’s words, for we would be disoriented when 
faced with a fork in the road, forced to make decisions about fundamentally important issues. 
I will illustrate the plausibility482 of this radical claim with a literary example. In Philip 
Roth’s The Human Stain,483 Coleman Silk is a light-skinned African-American brought up in a 
black household. In his early 20s, he joins the US Navy, puts his race as white, and spends the 
rest of his life living as a white Jewish man. But his quest to be ‘free as his father had been 
unfree’484 comes at a high price: to sustain his secret, he tells his wife and children that he has 
no surviving family members when his mother and siblings are alive. In a powerful scene, Silk 
visits his mother to tell her that he is marrying a white woman who believes that he is white—
and in choosing to continue to escape his constitutive blackness, he cuts off all ties with his 
mother, ‘[murdering] her on behalf of his exhilarating notion of freedom’.485 Silk is a strong 
case for damaged personhood: to sustain a fundamental lie about who he is for the rest of his 
life is surely no easy feat. Furthermore, if we often define ourselves in relation to our familial 
ties, then we could imagine that, in choosing to relinquish his ties with his family, Silk has also 
lost a fundamental aspect of his identity.  
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Nonetheless, Bell’s strong claim is problematic. It suggests an eternal involuntariness 
of identity that ends up being as implausible as the radical voluntariness of it that 
communitarians have rejected. It traps us into the pre-determined narrative structures of our 
constitutive communities and denies that we, as individuals, write our own lives alongside our 
constitutive communities. This is the objection from autonomy which I will address in Part II, 
where I will argue that the constitutive communities theory should be premised on the 
Constituted Autonomous Self.  
To sum up the discussion so far: the theory of constitutive communities states that, in 
modern societies, our identity is constituted by the various communal attachments in which we 
are embedded. This constitution is both a description of identity and a normative definition of 
who we are as individuals. As Bell argues, one implication of the theory is that the aim of 
communitarian politics is to allow us to access and participate in our constitutive communities 
so that we can lead meaningful lives. The theory, then, soothes the tension between community 
and individual by seeing their respective goods as intimately intertwined, and directs 
communitarian politics towards promoting access to and participation in our constitutive 
communities.  
 
b. Justifying the Constitutive Conception  
Why should we adopt the constitutive conception of community when the constitutive 
communities theory is not the most obvious understanding of community? As we have seen in 
Chapter Two, community is frequently understood to be a single entity that organises itself 
around a substantive conception of the good. More casual uses of community also point to 
different understandings of the word; for instance, community is used in common parlance to 
refer to associations and groups ranging from a particular neighbourhood, to members of a 
college at university, all the way to the ‘international community’.486 What are the advantages 
of the constitutive conception?  
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i. Pragmatic Advantage: Specificity  
The first advantage of the constitutive conception is a pragmatic one. It is a robust response to 
criticisms that communitarians are often vague or unspecific about what a community is, which 
communities should be valued, and the political implications that follow. For instance, Bell’s 
expansive and specific account of constitutive communities responds to criticisms such as Ian 
Shapiro’s that communitarians should shift the debate ‘to a lower level of abstraction and seek 
to supply substantive content to the various communitarian proposals they advocate’. 487 
Elizabeth Frazer also points out the lack of conceptual analysis of the term ‘community’ in the 
communitarian literature despite the frequent references to it by political philosophers and 
theorists.488  
By defining community pluralistically as constitutive communities, the constitutive 
conception is specific and clear: a community that can ground constitutional rights and impose 
duties is one that is constitutive of its members’ identity. This element of constitution 
distinguishes constitutive communities from vague uses of the term in popular parlance; it 
might, for instance, exclude the business community and the association of tennis players. 
More will be said in Part III below about the two features of a constitutive community. Suffice 
to say for now that the constitutive conception provides a specific criterion that singles out the 
relevant communities that have the necessary importance to ground constitutional rights. The 
latter is particularly important in the context of the national community; this will be elaborated 
upon in Chapter Four.  
 
ii. Community’s Positive Connotations 
The second advantage is a normative one. The constitutive conception retains the positive 
connotations of community and discards the negative ones, and shields my Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach from some criticisms that have been directed at community. I will 
begin with the positive connotations. While it ought to be assumed that community is valuable 
and worthy of preservation within a communitarian framework, a few things should be said 
about its value. Frazer has identified several valuable positive connotations of community, 
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including ‘commitment, reciprocity, solidarity, wholeness, personalism’.489 Community, too, 
is ‘a value, or an ideal’: 490  an ‘aspiration to community [is] an aspiration to a kind of 
connectedness that transcends the mundane and concrete tangle of social relations’.491  
These positive connotations of togetherness, of solidarity, of a commonness of identity, 
buttress the normative significance of membership in these communities to the individual’s 
life. It is the sense that a particular deeply entrenched aspect of my identity—one that I 
‘discover’,492 one that I am ‘thrown into’,493 one that I ‘inherit’494—is shared with others like 
me, understood by others like me, that makes community valuable. This gives rise to a 
transcendental sense of belonging to something in the world, a sense that anchors an individual 
who would otherwise be adrift on a sea of endless possible contingent attachments, threatening 
always to sweep her this way or that, untethered to a fixity of place, of significance, of meaning, 
but for her constitutive communities.  
The significance of these constitutive communities to the individual’s identity can be 
intuitively grasped by members of the national community because all of us have our own 
constitutive communities to and from which we feel a sense of belonging. Hence, we can tap 
into such sentiments of our own when asked to respect the constitutive communities of co-
nationals to which we do not belong. Constitutive communities, and the sense of belonging that 
they evoke, are what we experience on a day-to-day basis when we interact with our family 
and friends, neighbours, fellow students, etc. This experience may, at times, be transcendental 
and intangible in Frazer’s sense; but what matters fundamentally that community is a daily 
lived experience, one that we have internalised, so that we can understand more easily why we 
should recognise others’ constitutive communities to which we do not belong. This has 
implications for the second element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, to be explained 
in Chapter Four.  
 
 
489 ibid 82. 
490 ibid 76. 
491 ibid 83. 
492 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (n 19) 150. 
493 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson trs, Blackwell 1962). 
494 MacIntyre (n 347) 255. 
125 
 
iii. Against a Monistic Theory of Community  
The third advantage of the constitutive conception is that it shields the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach from some of community’s negative implications. Iris Young, for 
instance, rejects the notion and language of community. In desiring ‘the fusion of subjects with 
one another’, community ‘denies and represses social difference’ by insisting on a forced 
commonness, including common values, between individuals and groups who may have little 
in common apart from a shared inhabitation of a particular geographical entity. 495  By 
privileging the sharing of some commonality between members, community, at best, is blind 
to extant differences between its members. At worst, it represses these differences in order to 
manufacture or manipulate a common ground on which community stakes its survival. 
Community so understood is exclusionary rather than inclusive, homogenous rather than 
diverse, and oppressive rather than empowering.  
Community is exclusionary in two ways. First, community’s emphasis on commonality 
and mutual identification inadvertently ‘validates and reinforces the fear and aversion some 
social groups exhibit towards others’.496 This is because these social groups, by possessing a 
different culture, history, and point of view, violate the pact of commonness on which 
community is founded. Second, community’s lifeforce of commonality suggests one of two 
undesirable things: either this something shared already exists, which means that the population 
is homogenous; or the commonality must be created and maintained through a system of moral 
education which compromises autonomy. 497  The homogeneity that a community seeks to 
maintain is dangerous because ‘only a modern society that ruthlessly engages in the practice 
of exclusion can be homogeneous’.498 If a community sustains itself on a commonness of 
meaning or ideology, then members of a community could plausibly cohere around ‘a common 
hatred or fear of the outsider’. 499  This either breeds xenophobia or perpetuates the 
marginalisation of unpopular minorities such as homosexuals and the disabled. On this view, 
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community does not value the multifaceted nature of individual identities; rather, it is 
exclusionary, oppressive, and champions a homogeneity that eradicates differences. 
Kymlicka is similarly suspicious of communitarians who harken back to a 
‘romanticized view of earlier communities in which legitimacy was freely given and earned, 
based on the effective pursuit of shared ends’.500 However, such communities—including 18th 
century New England town governments—were able to secure this legitimacy because a 
significant portion of society, i.e. ‘women, atheists, Indians and the propertyles’, 501  was 
excluded from membership. These communities provide a discomforting and inappropriate 
model for a communitarian politics of the common good because their historical practices and 
roles ‘were defined by … propertied, white men [] to serve the interests of propertied, white 
men’502 to the exclusion of women, black people, and lesbians, gays and bisexuals (LGBs), etc. 
As such, any strengthening of community will do little for these marginalised groups.503 Why, 
then, should we privilege the language and ideal of community if it denies the very identities 
that I am arguing should be valued?  
These criticisms of community are valid only insofar as we presuppose a monistic 
conception of community. The constitutive conception, on the other hand, rebuts these 
criticisms. An example of a monistic conception of community that validates these criticisms 
is Walzer’s political community,504 two strands of which are instructive. Walzer essentially 
argues that distributive justice is not a singular concept, but is relative to the different spheres 
of goods that a community seeks to redistribute. One such good is membership in the 
community itself, which the community can, and often does, distribute to strangers. The first 
strand of Walzer’s political community is that the criteria for distribution are shaped by ‘our 
own understanding of what membership means in our community and of what sort of a 
community we want to have’.505 A community is entitled to defend its distinct culture and 
common life against outsiders, subject to the principle of mutual aid that obliges a community 
to assist outsiders in certain extreme circumstances such as a humanitarian disaster.506 But the 
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principle of mutual aid will always be in tension with ‘the internal force of social meanings’:507 
the community’s determination of the kind of community it wants to have.  
This leads me to the second strand of Walzer’s argument that substantiates the 
criticisms of community. Social meanings, for Walzer, set the boundaries and content of 
justice. A society is just under Walzer’s framework if ‘its substantive life is lived … in a way 
faithful to the shared understandings of its members’. 508  But who, if not the community, 
determines the social meaning of a good and its shared meanings? Walzer, in fact, says that 
social meanings are determined through the political community’s decision-making process—
and it is justice that is subjugated to these social meanings, not the other way around.  
Walzer’s monistic conception of a political community substantiates the criticisms of 
community because, save for his insubstantial principle of mutual aid, there is little in it to 
prevent a community from deciding what membership means based on an ideology that 
ostracises outsiders or marginalised minorities, and so potentially leading to a dangerous 
enforced homogeneity. Walzer’s response to the problem of marginalised members and their 
unshared meanings seems to assume that membership qua citizenship in the political 
community is sufficient to count a not-like-the-majority individual as a fully integrated member 
of this community, which suggests that the community’s shared meanings will also be shared 
by the minority member. However, he fails to mitigate the exclusionary effects of his 
relativistic conception of justice as social meanings save to say that social meanings are not 
always harmonious, and sometimes provide the tools and structure for debate.509 One wonders 
how an unpopular marginalised minority group would have the means to make its voice heard, 
let alone effect tangible change, if it has been historically and systemically dominated and 
oppressed by the majority group.510 
This brief account of Walzer’s monistic conception of community shows that the 
undesirable implications of the monistic conception are good reasons to adopt the constitutive 
conception of community. It is worth emphasising that, as my thesis will show, the concept of 
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community is not inherently antithetical to granting rights to marginalised groups or 
recognising social differences; the arguments that it is presuppose a monistic conception of 
community organised around a substantive conception of the good. Young’s criticism that 
community seeks a commonness which suppresses social differences is sustainable only if we 
assume that this commonness is based on a substantive conception of the good. Likewise, HN 
Hirsh’s charge of homogeneity presupposes that community must be based on a shared 
substantive culture and way of life. Both these criticisms further assume that community 
demands, like an autocratic sovereign, that each member can only adopt this one common 
culture, this one common way of life, to the exclusion of all other cultures and ways of life. 
Viewed in this tyrannical light, of course community is unpalatable and undesirable. But the 
totalitarian implications of the monistic conception demonstrate that this conception is deeply 
opposed to the communitarian theory of the good of inclusiveness, as well as the aim of 
fostering a sense of belonging between members.  
The constitutive conception, on the other hand, rebuts these criticisms because it 
recognises and values the multifaceted nature of the communal attachments that constitute our 
identity and which inform our self-understanding. It does not seek to force individuals into 
some arbitrarily designated enlarged self-understanding based on a single community whose 
conception of the good may conflict with other communities’ conception. Rather, the 
constitutive conception promotes only a thin theory of the good, some foundational principle 
to which the larger (national) community is committed and which welcomes and values social 
differences; namely, the good of inclusiveness. The theory, then, values the many communities 
that have constituted our identity. Far from suppressing differences and diversity, the 
constitutive communities theory celebrates and promotes them—and it is arguably in this way 
that historically marginalised minorities can leverage on the positive connotations of 
community—the sense of belonging, a source of meaning—to empower themselves. 
This is not to say, of course, that community is never exclusionary under the 
constitutive communities theory, for the inclusive nature of community logically entails 
exclusion. The community’s prerogative to exclude outsiders is perhaps more pertinent in the 
context of the political community, which I call the national community; this will be taken up 
in Chapter Four. The important point for now is that the constitutive conception of community 
does not suppress extant differences in the larger community, such as the national community, 
by promoting a substantive theory of the good. Rather, it recognises that our identity is 
constituted by many overlapping concentric circles, all of which are important sources of 
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meaning to our lives. The thin theory of the good that it promotes is inclusiveness, which 
follows from the inclusive nature of community; again, this will be taken up in Chapter Four. 
To sum up the discussion so far, I have outlined the first element of the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach: constitutive communities. We should adopt the constitutive 
conception of community because it specifies what community refers to, and it retains the 
positive connotations of community while rebutting the negative ones. Above all, and in 
accordance with the most favourable interpretation of communitarianism presented in Chapter 
Two, it values both the individual and the community: it protects the communities that are 
important for the individual’s self-understanding, and values community by protecting these 
different communities. I now address an important objection to the theory: the objection from 
autonomy.  
 
II. CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNITIES AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY  
Despite the strong arguments in favour of the constitutive communities theory, there is a 
potential drawback. It may be objected that, if the theory essentially claims that individuals are 
constituted by their communal attachments, such that, following Bell, constitutive communities 
are exempt from evaluation and rejection, the theory inadvertently creates a recipe for social 
domination and oppression. Put differently, does this communitarian theory contain any 
conceptual space for individual autonomy, or does it conceive of the self as radically attached, 
without autonomy, incapable of standing apart from her constitutive attachments to reject or 
revise them? Without some provision for individual autonomy, it is hard to see how the theory 
values the individual beyond protecting the communities that have constituted her identity. 
Indeed, the theory may collapse back into ‘collective over individual’ if it cannot be shown 
how the theory carves out a space for individual autonomy, without which the individual cannot 
be said to be valued. 
 The autonomy objection is a serious one, and Bell’s strong conception of constitutive 
communities is particularly vulnerable to it. I will first outline the objection in section (a) and 
show how Bell’s theory is flawed in this way: his scant allowance for autonomy risks erasing 
individuality from his theory altogether. Section (b) explains that Bell’s strong claim is 
premised on an undesirable ontology of the person with little capacity for autonomy, and points 
out that his strong claim requires a more substantive role for autonomy than he allows. In 
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section (c), I redress the autonomy problem by outlining the ideal communitarian self on which 
the constitutive communities theory should be premised—the Constituted Autonomous Self. 
In order for constitutive communities to have value, we need to be able to affirm or reject their 
significance to our self-understanding. Simultaneously, in order for the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach to value the individual, it has to recognise our autonomy to affirm 
or reject the value of our constitutive communities to our self-understanding.  
 
a. The Objection from Autonomy  
Quite ironically, the potential Achille’s heel of the constitutive communities theory is integral 
to it: the seemingly controversial claim that we are constituted by our communal attachments. 
Seyla Benhabib criticises communitarians for conflating the significance of constitutive 
communities for identity formation with ‘a socially conventionalist and morally conformist 
attitude’.511 Richard Dagger argues that, if the individual is constituted so thoroughly by her 
communal attachments, then the danger is that she would be ‘unable to think at all critically 
about [their] practices and traditions’, with some ‘consigned to a life of community-sanctioned 
oppression and exploitation’.512 While it is not undesirable to think of one’s identity as defined, 
to some extent, by one’s communal attachments, this is no longer desirable if one’s identity is 
defined ‘almost entirely’ by these attachments, because then ‘there [would be] little room left 
for a sense of self, let alone individuality’.513 If the constitutive communities theory is unable 
to accommodate some individual autonomy, then it might valorise communities to the 
detriment of the individuals that comprise them and collapse back into ‘collective over 
individual’.  
This objection zooms in on the problem with Bell’s theory. He puts forward a strong 
conception of constitutive communities without the necessary corresponding degree of 
autonomy to support it, resulting in, first, an internal incoherence in the theory; and second, a 
vindication of the autonomy objection. One may have anticipated this objection from my 
explication of Bell’s theory in Part I, particularly from the third feature of constitutive 
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communities—that our constitutive communities cannot be shed, and that we cannot stand 
apart from them to evaluate and possibly reject them. While this claim is descriptively true, 
Bell arguably overstates the case by claiming that these descriptive constitutive elements of 
our identity will always be meaningful to us in a strong, substantive way, even when we want 
to reject them. 
To illustrate: Bell argues that if a Jew who was raised Jewish tried to ‘stop being 
Jewish’, it would likely be self-defeating because she is ‘principally connected’ with the 
constitutive nature of her Jewishness ‘in a way that resists articulation’; as such, it is ‘not 
possible’ to reject it.514 Even if the Jew does not think of herself as Jewish, the fact that being 
Jewish is constitutive of her identity means that she will always value the Jewish constitutive 
community. Valuing a community, for Bell, does not entail ‘a special obligation to endorse 
every particular belief or deed of that community’; 515  it simply means exhibiting special 
concern for this particular community, such as ‘[caring] more about Israeli repression in the 
occupied territories than about Chinese repression in Tibet’. 516  Given the constitutive 
importance of these communal attachments, escaping them would thus lead to damaged 
personhood (Bell’s third criterion of a constitutive community).  
Kymlicka objects to Bell’s strong conception by pointing out, from a feminist 
perspective, that we can sometimes be damaged by our constitutive communities as well. This 
is why it is more plausible and desirable to understand ourselves as capable of rationally 
revising the constitutive features of our identity. The ‘social construction of femininity’, 
Kymlicka says, has ‘socialized [women] to be submissive or passive, etc’, which shows that 
some constitutive attachments can ‘systematically undermine people’s sense of self-respect, 
and make them subordinate to others’.517 As such, we must be free to question and possibly 
reject our constitutive attachments. In response, Bell contends that women can reject the view 
that we are ‘biologically endowed to do dishes and change diapers’ and still feel that 
‘femininity is something deep inside [us], not open to willed rejection’.518 Being constituted by 
the community ‘women’ means, for Bell, that, even after rejecting sexist notions of femininity, 
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I still care more about the fate of women and relate to women in a way that men would not, 
and ‘still live my life as bound up with the good of the female community’.519 Trying to escape 
the inescapable constitutive features is profoundly damaging, Bell argues, because ‘it means 
losing touch with the deepest source of one’s being’.520 Bell uses Simone de Beauvoir as an 
example: even after consciously rejecting feminine notions by, for instance, rejecting marriage 
and spending most of her time in the company of men, Bell says that her writings on women 
and the elderly ‘suggest that she was drawing on caring social values deep inside her [that were] 
sustained by women in history’.521 Presumably, this means that de Beauvoir’s attempt to escape 
her female constitutive community was self-defeating because ‘feminine’ values had already 
been deeply entrenched in her.  
Both Bell’s strong conception of constitutive communities and Kymlicka’s objection 
are problematic. While Kymlicka is right to point out that we should be able to rationally revise 
the damaging aspects of our communal attachments, he misses Bell’s point about the 
constitutive nature of these attachments. In Bell’s words, they are inescapable, and so even 
when feminists rightly reject sexist notions of femininity, this does not amount to a total 
rejection of being a woman. Rather, it means engaging in a discourse with other women about 
what it means to be a woman and participating in the female constitutive community in this 
way. In this regard, Bell is right to say that these constitutive features of our identity are 
inescapable; simply in virtue of our discussing what it means to be a woman or a Jew, we are 
acknowledging the importance of these descriptive facts of our identity to our identity.  
But where Bell goes wrong, and where I depart from his theory, is to conflate 
acknowledgement with affirmation, the result of his theory’s lack of autonomy. I can 
acknowledge that being a woman is an important fact of who I am in a descriptive way, but I 
do not necessarily have to affirm its importance. I could reject sexist notions of femininity 
without consciously building my life around a particular feminist conception of the good life. 
The contention, then, is over the degree to which these constitutive elements of identity, 
inescapable in a descriptive sense, are a source of meaning and value to the individuals who 
bear them.  
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Following from the above, the second problem with Bell’s strong conception is that it 
is a simplistic and risky overstatement of the importance of constitutive communities to our 
identity and self-understanding. That we value these constitutive communities to varying 
degrees suggests that all of us have different ideas about what it means to be a member of these 
constitutive communities. Bell’s strong conception appears to neglect the fact that the meaning 
of membership in these constitutive communities is constantly contested, especially by the 
members themselves. His theory is thus simplistic for assuming that there is a universal 
conception of these various memberships; for instance, the ‘universal’ conception of a woman 
defined by ‘caring social values’. To define a woman in this way is to undermine the value of 
a female conception of the good life, one which does not conform to the ‘universal type’ of 
woman, to the woman who lives it—such as de Beauvoir. Put differently, by paying scant 
attention to competing ideas of what it means to be a woman, this simplicity overlooks the 
reality that what some women find sexist—such as marriage and the expectation of 
motherhood—others find fulfilling and vice versa.  
Bell’s strong conception is risky, then, because his simplicity neglects the extant 
diversity within a constitutive community, and the autonomy that the individual needs to 
navigate this diversity. Without this autonomy, Bell’s theory is unable to live up to its own 
promise of enabling us to access and participate in our constitutive communities to live 
meaningful lives. It neglects the possibility that one way for us to lead meaningful lives is 
sometimes a rejection of a particular idea of what it means to be a member of a particular 
community, an idea that conflicts with our own understanding of it. Indeed, Bell’s strong 
conception risks distorting constitutive communities as a source of meaning to the individual. 
Now engorged, these constitutive communities become a deluge in which the individual cannot 
stay afloat, engulfing her with its demands to conform to the beliefs and mode of behaviour 
that other members of the constitutive communities expect, which she does not endorse.  
This also suggests that Bell’s theory does not adequately account for the fact that, 
because we are constituted by many different communities, we often find ourselves having to 
negotiate the competing demands that our constitutive communities make on us. As pointed 
out in the feminist critique of autonomy, there are vast disagreements amongst feminists 
themselves about how to conceptualise autonomy in the ‘feminist way’ because women are not 
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just women; we are also black, or LGB, or Catholic.522 These other constitutive communities 
inform our experience as women in a manner that might be alien, or insensitive, to women 
from other constitutive communities.  
Similarly, and going back to Bell’s claim that it would be self-defeating for a Jew to 
stop being Jewish, there is no obvious reason why we cannot supplement a loss of meaning 
from our rejection of one constitutive community with the meaning we derive from other 
constitutive communities. While we can see how a Jew who renounces Judaism would feel a 
deep sense of loss because being Jewish was a fundamental part of her life, it is not really self-
defeating because she can stop being Jewish without being less of a person—and this is 
possible because the Jewish constitutive community is but one of her many constitutive 
communities. It may be that she was motivated to renounce Judaism because it clashed with 
another constitutive community which she has affirmed as more important, thereby balancing 
out the loss of meaning from her renunciation of Judaism. So even though it may be the case 
that she will always identify with some aspects of being Jewish, it is more plausible than Bell 
claims that she would stop thinking of herself as Jewish in an important, non-descriptive sense, 
and that it would not lead irretrievably to damaged personhood.  
Hence, if we accept Bell’s strong claim about constitutive communities without 
supplementing it with some degree of autonomy, it suggests that we ought to either conform to 
a conception of a particular identity, or always feel a special concern for our constitutive 
communities, or both. The question then arises: where does the constitutive community end 
and the self begin? Thus vindicating the objection from autonomy.  
 
b. The Constituted Self?  
The problem with Bell’s theory is that it is based on an impoverished ontology of the person 
hostile to a minimal conception of autonomy—and this ontology is irreconcilable with his 
strong conception of constitutive communities. Bell’s strong claim is intelligible only if his 
theory contains some degree of autonomy so that we can affirm or reject the value of our 
constitutive communities. Having this degree of autonomy also values the individual by 
acknowledging her capacity for making decisions about what is valuable within a particular 
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context. I will turn to the latter point in section (c). For now, I will address the issue of the lack 
of autonomy in Bell’s theory, and how it does not cohere with his strong conception of 
constitutive communities. 
In line with the communitarian tradition, Bell’s starting point is that we are ‘social 
beings, embodied agents “in the world” engaged in realizing a certain form of life’.523 Our 
actions are guided by the ‘hidden hand of the community’,524 including its social practices such 
as ways of talking, eating, walking, dressing and so on. These practices operate mostly in the 
background and are our coping skills for everyday life; our normal mode of existence is 
‘unreflectively acting in a way specified by the practices of one’s social world’.525 We only act 
as a deliberate, choosing subject when there is a disruption in our normal mode of existence; 
Bell calls this a ‘breakdown mode’.526 It can be mundane, such as trying to use chopsticks in a 
Chinese restaurant; or it can be significant, such as resolving a moral dilemma. In such 
situations, the individual, forced to struggle with the problem, formulates different solutions, 
eventually choosing one.  
Bell reveals his scepticism towards autonomy when he argues that there has been a 
disproportionate philosophical focus on this breakdown mode. We are not self-sufficient 
subjects realising an autonomously arrived-at life plan, Bell argues; we have mistakenly 
believed that we have the capacity to choose our conception of the good life and make our own 
decisions regarding things of value. We do not choose a conception of the good as much as we 
inherit ‘a framework which defines the shape of lives worth leading’527 set by our social world, 
forming the ‘authoritative moral horizons within which we determine … “what’s worth doing, 
achieving or being”’.528 Choice as a value is thus overstated, for Bell sees no reason why the 
best life is one that is chosen by the individual because there are legitimate reasons for living a 
life that is both unchosen and uncoerced by the state, such as unreflectively stumbling into an 
occupation and finding it fulfilling.  
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From this sketch of Bell’s ontology of the social being, we can see that the only 
allowance he makes for individual autonomy is the individual in breakdown mode—which 
suggests that the individual exercises autonomy only exceptionally. For the rest of the time, the 
individual acts unreflectively throughout the course of her life. She does not choose her life 
plan but stumbles into it, pushed along by the hidden hand of her constitutive communities. 
Her identity is so thoroughly constituted by her communal attachments that she cannot 
rationally affirm or reject them; instead, she is constituted by them in an unthinking, almost 
mechanical fashion, and jolted out of her stupor only when she experiences a breakdown in her 
everyday routine.  
So why would Bell’s communitarian individual value her constitutive communities and 
feel a sense of shared fate with her fellow members? Why would her constitutive communities 
matter to her other than as mere vehicles for her unthinking procession through life in a bizarre, 
Huxleyian manner? As an unreflective being, Bell’s communitarian individual’s sense of 
meaning cannot penetrate what is only skin deep; she is bereft of the self-reflective, self-
determining capacity that enables her to affirm the value of these unchosen constitutive 
communities to her self-understanding, to appreciate their significance beyond external, fixed 
facets of her identity. If the unencumbered liberal self lacks character, as Sandel argues,529 then 
Bell’s unreflective, oblivious communitarian self lacks substance and depth. This, then, 
undermines the normative force of constitutive communities. Instead of a source of meaning 
and belonging for the individual, these constitutive communities mutate into something 
pernicious, degenerating into totalitarian entities imposing their hegemony over hapless 
individuals trapped in their dominions. The objection from autonomy would then win the day: 
the individual constituted by her communal attachments is ensnared, even if unknowingly, by 
her communities, the usurpation of her individuality so complete that there is nothing left but 
a coat-hanger for her communities’ practices, traditions and values. This account of constitutive 
communities fails to value the individual and collapses into ‘collective over individual’.  
 
c. The Constituted Autonomous Self 
We need an account of a self who recognises the constitutive force of its communal 
attachments, yet retains a degree of autonomy with which to affirm or reject the value of her 
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constitutive communities. At the risk of stating the obvious, we need a midpoint between the 
unencumbered and the encumbered self—I will call this the Constituted Autonomous Self. This 
ontology of the person should be preferred to Bell’s for two reasons. First, as sub-section (ii) 
will demonstrate, it makes better sense of Bell’s strong conception of constitutive communities 
than his own ontology. Second, this account is arguably a more plausible description of our 
self-understanding than Bell’s. As will be shown shortly, we act autonomously in ordinary, 
mundane ways, and not only in an exceptional breakdown mode as Bell suggests. Since I am 
seeking to draw normative implications from my proposed account of the Constitutive 
Autonomous Self for my pluralistic conception of community as constitutive communities, 
these implications would be more persuasive if they are drawn from a more plausible 
descriptive account of autonomy.530 
 
i. A Sketch of Constituted Autonomy  
For the self to be constituted and autonomous, it needs to possess the necessary tools and 
capacities to participate in the constitution of its own identity. It needs, first, and following 
Sandel, the capacity for self-reflection to survey the claims and demands made upon it by its 
constitutive attachments. Its capacity for self-reflection allows it to place some reflective 
distance between itself and its history to negotiate the boundaries between itself and its 
encumbrances, finally arriving at a self-understanding ‘less opaque if never perfectly 
transparent’.531 Within this process of self-reflection is an element of choice which Sandel 
downplays when he contrasts reflection with choice. But this element of choice is necessary 
for the self to arrive at a more-or-less satisfactory self-understanding. And so, second: it needs 
the capacity for choice, exercised after it reflects on the various stakes made upon it by its 
constitutive attachments, rejecting the ones that go too far and affirming the ones that cohere 
with its self-understanding. Without the capacity for choice, the self, however reflective, 
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however interpretive, would be too encumbered and crumble under the weight of these 
competing claims.  
The Constituted Autonomous Self constructs its self-understanding and self-conception 
from what Appiah calls ‘a tool kit of options made available by [its] culture and society’.532 
Autonomy, after all, ‘requires a social context as an enabling, or causal, background; it cannot 
emerge except out of social relationships’. 533  This toolkit of options is the Constituted 
Autonomous Self’s constitutive communities. It reflects on these available options and chooses 
the one that best expresses its self-conception, or individuality, in Appiah’s term. Appiah uses 
a literary character, the butler Mr Stevens from Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day, to 
illustrate his point. Mr Stevens is autonomous, Appiah argues, because he chooses his own 
plan of life within the limits set by his culture and society. This plan is to be the best butler that 
he can be, and he acquires and develops skills to pursue this plan. His commitment is ‘an 
expression of [his] individuality, of who [he is]’, 534  an individuality expressed within his 
constitutive communities: his history (his father was a butler) and social context (one cannot 
be a butler in a world without the social institutions that require a butler). The objective quality 
of Mr Stevens’ choice is immaterial: it does not matter that Mr Stevens’ life plan is perhaps not 
something that ought to be chosen if he had other reasonable options, or, if it is his only option, 
he ought not to be as committed to it as he is because ‘the life of the perfect servant is not one 
of great dignity’.535 What matters, for Appiah, is that the choice to be the best butler that he can 
be is an expression of Mr Stevens’ individuality, a contextualised exercise of his autonomy.   
One might be sceptical of this account of autonomy, its expanse curtailed by the very 
thing that autonomy should fight against: the individual’s social limitations. The sceptic might 
say that Mr Stevens is not really autonomous: by defining himself almost entirely by his 
constitutive attachments—his family background, his social class, his inherited place in 
society—Mr Stevens has failed to truly choose his conception of the good life. Rather, he is, 
as Bell might say, merely ‘slipping’ into his inherited role as a butler and ‘[acting] in a largely 
unreflective manner’.536 In contrast, Coleman Silk is the one who is truly autonomous. He has 
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rejected his constitutive racial community, his family, the way of life in which he was brought 
up and chosen, freely and autonomously, to live by his self-conception as someone unshackled 
by the burdens of history, free to invent and re-invent himself, unencumbered by any 
antecedent claims of his race upon his personhood. For the sceptic, Silk epitomises what it 
means to be autonomous. Mr Stevens, on the other hand, is a cautionary tale against a reduced 
conception of autonomy: it traps the individual into his social station and prevents him from 
rising above his lot.  
The sceptic might have a point about Silk—that he illustrates what an unencumbered 
self exercising its autonomy might look like. But one wonders if he is truly autonomous in the 
sense of being radically free to choose his own identity. One wonders, and as Roth suggests, 
if Silk were not simply living as an American: ‘Was he merely being another American and, in 
the great frontier tradition, accepting the democratic invitation to throw your origins overboard 
if to do so contributes to the pursuit of happiness?’537 So Silk may have abandoned some of his 
constitutive attachments; but when it truly matters—when he believes that he has broken free 
of the particularistic chains of his history—he is as tethered as anyone else—others less 
egomaniacal, less grandiose, like Mr Stevens—to the formative anchor of one of his 
constitutive communities.  
Furthermore, one wonders if it is ever possible for any individual to completely 
‘[distance] himself from social influences and conventions, and [conduct] himself according to 
principles that he has himself ratified through critical reflection’.538 What the communitarian 
insight into the self tells us is that such a view from nowhere, as it were, is incoherent and 
empty. ‘One is a self only among other selves,’ 539  Taylor says; we require the tools and 
language for our self-understanding in a ‘common space’ 540  with those that surround us, 
including the communities that constitute us. That said, the boundaries of our constitutive 
communities are porous rather than impermeable; we may later ‘innovate’, ‘develop an original 
way of understanding [ourselves] and human life’, 541  and we may even follow in Silk’s 
footsteps and denounce certain constitutive aspects of our identity. But such autonomous 
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innovations, to paraphrase Taylor, do not sever our dependence on our constitutive 
communities; they only change the nature of our dependence by shifting it from one (Silk’s 
constitutive blackness) to another (Silk’s constitutive Americanness).542 A radical conception 
of autonomy is thus implausible.  
What matters for a meaningful and realistic conception of autonomy is not the absence 
of fetters on the individual’s choice, but the capacity for making a self-reflective choice within 
the range of options that the individual’s social framework makes available to her. But what of 
the actual choice that the individual makes? Should we agree with Appiah that it does not 
matter that the chosen life plan is perhaps one that the individual should not have chosen if she 
had other options, as long as the individual chooses and commits to it? As Appiah himself 
admits, his choice of Mr Stevens to illustrate his conception of an autonomous person is 
vulnerable to objection: Mr Stevens’ life seems like a failure because the man that he serves is 
a failure, and his dogged pursuit of his vocation cost him the love of his life.543 Hence, someone 
like James Griffin might say that, far from being autonomous, Mr Stevens has fallen prey to 
conventionality, the enemy of autonomy.544 For Griffin, we make an autonomous decision 
when we come to realise that our life goes better when we accomplish something with it,545 and 
so we choose something that is worth doing, something valuable that fulfils life and prevents 
it from being wasted.546 Value judgements of this sort, Griffin says, can be correct or incorrect, 
and so Mr Stevens has made an incorrect choice to be a butler because he eventually 
accomplishes very little with his life. Perhaps more agonisingly, and as the feminist critique of 
autonomy has highlighted, can one autonomously affirm a life that contains inherent 
inequalities? After all, being a butler exemplifies class divisions and social inequalities; he is 
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subordinated to those that he serves. Could one autonomously choose a life of subordination,547 
or are we so thoroughly socialised that we are oblivious to it?   
The problem with what Marilyn Friedman calls a substantive, as opposed to content-
neutral, conception of autonomy, 548 one that would judge Mr Stevens’ life a failure, is that it 
valorises autonomy as the ultimate value, thereby diminishing the value of anything that is not 
chosen in a radically free manner—including the range of options given to us by our 
constitutive communities. Not only is substantive autonomy inconsistent with 
communitarianism, but it is also, as Friedman argues, excessive and ‘implausibly cumbersome 
as [a reconstruction] of what people ordinarily care about’.549 It is excessive because a person 
committed to autonomy as a value is simply committed to making self-reflective choices about 
what matters to her and acting accordingly; this does not require that she eradicates all external 
influences on her choices. It is implausibly cumbersome because, if substantive autonomy 
required us to value our own substantive autonomy, this amounts to saying that ‘I valued my 
very valuing of my own [autonomous] activity’.550 If autonomy essentially requires us to make 
choices that cohere with our deepest self-understanding and wants, substantive autonomy 
demands too much by asking for unnecessary ‘metalevel self-reflections’.551 
More importantly, substantive autonomy demands that our choices be free of the 
external forces of socialisation—and this is implausible because ‘no one escapes the influence 
of socialization’.552 This fact alone ‘does not undermine humanly possible autonomy … [if the] 
autonomous behaviour … represent what someone reaffirms as deeply important to her upon 
reflective consideration’.553 If Mr Stevens’ choice to be a butler is an expression of who he is, 
and an affirmation of what is deeply important to him, then it is an autonomous choice even if 
he chose a life of subordination. To discount the autonomous quality of this choice on a 
substantive conception would be to ignore other equally important values to our lives, such as 
the satisfaction that he derives from his job, and his conviction that he is living his authentic 
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self. 554  What ought to lie at the heart of autonomy, then, and as Appiah argues, is the 
individual’s choice of life plan that best accords with her self-conception, not objective 
standards of what is a life worth living. For this, a minimum, content-neutral conception of 
autonomy would suffice: a range of options within one’s social world, a capacity for self-
reflection and choice, ‘an endowment with minimum rationality, an absence of coercion’,555 
and choices that ‘accord with deeper wants and values that the acting person has self-
reflectively reaffirmed’. 556  This is the autonomy that the Constituted Autonomous Self 
exercises within the boundaries outlined by its constitutive communities.  
 
ii. The Significance of Constitutive Communities  
The Constituted Autonomous Self’s capacity for choice allows it to affirm or reject the value 
of its constitutive communities to its self-understanding. We can now make sense of Bell’s 
strong conception of constitutive communities: for constitutive communities to matter to us 
beyond external aspects of our identity in the manner that Bell claims, we need to have affirmed 
their value to our self-understanding. Bell’s strong conception, then, requires the Constituted 
Autonomous Self. 
I will say more about what it means to affirm the value of our constitutive communities 
to our identity in Part III, section (a) below. Suffice to say, for now, that Appiah’s notion of 
‘living-as’ is instructive: we affirm their value when we live as members of our constitutive 
communities. Mr Stevens, for instance, chooses a plan of life in which he ‘lives as a butler, his 
father’s son, a man, a loyal Englishman’—and it is this ‘living-as’ that singles out our 
identity.557 In living as members of its constitutive communities, the Constituted Autonomous 
Self internalises them as a source of value that ‘structures [its] sense of [its] life’.558 Contra 
Bell’s unreflective self, the Constituted Autonomous Self can appreciate its constitutive 
communities in the manner that Bell suggests; namely, they are so important that trying to 
escape them, or to change the constitutive elements of identity, would lead to ‘damaged 
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personhood’. And the Constituted Autonomous Self is capable of doing so because it has 
affirmed the value of its constitutive communities by living as its various members. As such, 
it is cognisant of the meaning and value that its constitutive communities bring to its life.  
 Nonetheless, we should reject Bell’s strong conception of constitutive communities 
insofar as it fails to notice the important difference between acknowledgment and affirmation, 
discussed in section (a) of this Part. Because the Constituted Autonomous Self is autonomous, 
it can choose not to affirm the value of certain constitutive communities to its self-
understanding, even if the communities’ practices, values and modes of behaviour operate in 
the background, as Bell claims. This is important for two reasons. First, conflating a descriptive 
fact about identity with its normative significance to its bearer is likely to misdescribe and 
overstate the significance of some constitutive communities to their members. While Bell’s 
insight about how constitutive communities operate in the background and are so ingrained in 
us that we can never totally escape them is a plausible description of identity, it does not mean 
that all of our constitutive attachments have normative significance to us. It is as plausible that 
an ethnic Chinese would feel connected to her culture as it is that another ethnic Chinese would 
feel no such connection at all.  
As such, a second reason to reject Bell’s strong conception is that a communitarian 
theory oblivious to the importance of individuals affirming the value of their constitutive 
communities is likely to be self-defeating. Without this affirmation, constitutive communities 
are merely descriptive facts about their members: the Singaporean who does not value the 
Singaporean constitutive community is only a Singaporean in a descriptive sense, and the 
Singaporean constitutive community would not be a source of meaning to her. Even if it has 
provided her with objectively important values, these values are valuable to her only if she has 
affirmed them, for they would not be important to her if she is unaware of their significance to 
her life.  
To sum up Part II: I have addressed the autonomy objection to Bell’s theory and argued 
that, in order for Bell’s strong conception of constitutive communities to work, it needs to be 
premised on a self that is capable of some autonomy. I then argued for the Constituted 
Autonomous Self, i.e. one who exercises its capacity for self-reflection and choice within the 
boundaries of its constitutive attachments. The Constituted Autonomous Self affirms the value 
of its constitutive communities by living as a member of those that are important to its identity 
and self-understanding.   
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So far, I have said a lot about constitutive communities and used various illustrative 
examples, but I have not specified and explained the criteria with which to determine which 
communal attachments are constitutive communities. I now turn this task in the final Part III.  
 
III. CONSTITUTIVE COMMUNITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  
The purpose of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach is to protect rights within a 
communitarian framework. I am thus looking for communitarian interests that can be protected 
by constitutional rights. In this regard, my basic argument is as follows. On the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach, constitutional rights protect constitutive communities, including 
our interest in them, from unjustified encroachment by the state and/or the majority. Such 
encroachment could be a restriction or prohibition of a constitutive community’s activities or 
an outright ban on its existence.  
This basic argument presupposes that our interest in our constitutive communities—to 
participate in them, to have access to them, to exit them—is sufficiently important to impose 
duties on others to respect the various rights that arise accordingly. In order to be sufficiently 
important, a constitutive community typically has two features: the Fundamental Feature and 
the Social Harm Feature.  
 
a. The Fundamental Feature  
The Fundamental Feature of a constitutive community points to the ordinarily unchangeable, 
mostly unchosen and deep-seated elements of identity that are deeply entrenched in our self-
understanding, and which reflect a demonstrated ethical commitment. The Fundamental 
Feature is the key communitarian insight that animates the core of my Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach: for a communal attachment to be constitutive and constitutionally protected, it has 
to form an integral part of identity and provide us with a context of meaning with which we 
make sense of our lives and the world. The committed Catholic, for instance, ‘cannot conceive 
of herself without those deep-down attachments’.559 Being fundamental, these features cannot 
 
559 Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (n 351) 170. 
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be easily discarded: the Constituted Autonomous Self has affirmed their value to its identity, 
so that changing them would come at a great personal cost.  
Following from the discussion in Part II, a communal attachment contains the 
Fundamental Feature if its members have affirmed its value to their self-understanding. As 
mentioned earlier, we affirm a communal attachment as constitutive when we live as its 
members—when we have internalised it as a source of value that structures our lives. To live 
as a member is also to identify as one. Identification, as Appiah says, is ‘the process through 
which individuals shape their projects—including their plans for their own lives and their 
conceptions of the good life—by reference to … available identities’.560 Making such decisions 
involves asking whether a certain plan or conception of the good life is ‘appropriate’ for a 
woman or a gay man, for instance; and this is because the identity ‘plays a role in shaping the 
way the agent makes decisions about how to conduct a life, in the process of the construction 
of one’s identity’.561 
Note, though, that identification and affirmation do not always require that the 
individual makes a conscious, deliberate choice to affirm the value of the constitutive 
community.562 Minimally, the individual identifies as a member of a constitutive community—
say, the Swiss constitutive community—when this membership is nominally more than a 
descriptive fact of who he is; that is, this membership is important in a more than merely 
descriptive way. A Swiss who is not particularly patriotic nevertheless identifies as Swiss, and 
hence affirms the value of the Swiss constitutive community to his self-understanding, when 
he recognises that the Swiss constitutive community has, for instance, shaped his thinking 
about participatory democracy in a fundamental way.  
We can, of course, also affirm the value of our constitutive communities in a more 
substantive way. Constitutive communities provide what Taylor calls the ‘frameworks’ within 
which we make sense of our lives. ‘Frameworks’, Taylor says, are our articulation of ‘[what] 
we presuppose when we judge that a certain form of life is truly worthwhile, or place our 
dignity in a certain achievement or status, or define our moral obligations in a certain 
manner’.563  Constitutive communities thus orientate us in ‘moral space, a space in which 
 
560 Appiah (n 341) 66. (emphasis removed)  
561 ibid. 
562 I am grateful to Raffael Fasel for his feedback on this point.  
563 Taylor, Sources of the Self (n 346) 26. 
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questions arise about what is good or bad … and what is trivial and secondary’.564 My strong 
sense of duty to my parents, for instance, is moulded by my ethnic Chinese constitutive 
community that stresses filial piety as a fundamental value.  
The inextricable connection between constitutive communities and identity means that 
trying to change them—trying to change the fundamental, deeply important aspects of who we 
are as individuals—would come at a great personal cost. ‘To know who I am,’ Taylor argues,  
is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and 
identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from 
case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. 
In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.565 
If membership in our constitutive communities defines our identity, losing it would 
cause an ‘“identity crisis”, an acute form of disorientation … [lacking] a frame or horizon 
within which things can take on a stable significance, within which some life possibilities can 
be seen as good or meaningful, others as bad or trivial’.566 This is the great personal cost that 
we would incur if we tried to change the constitutive elements of identity. I would, for instance, 
cease to know who I am and how to shape my life if I were forced to become a man, or a certain 
type of woman; likewise, losing touch with my home country would be a loss of something 
that has ‘stable significance’ if my home country has been a positive source of meaning to my 
life. As such, affirming the value of our constitutive communities affirms that our membership 
in them is fundamental to our identity; and because our identity helps us navigate the world, it 
is inseparable from our sense of dignity and personhood. It follows, then, that our ability to live 
as a member of the constitutive communities that we have affirmed is integral to our identity, 
self-understanding, dignity, etc. 
My explanation of the Fundamental Feature may raise the following question: what 
type of communal attachments possess the Fundamental Feature, and to what extent does the 
Fundamental Feature require a communal attachment to be ordinarily unchosen and 
unchangeable? To put the question another way, does the Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
follow Bell’s distinction between constitutive communities and voluntary/contingent 
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attachments; that is, between ‘the proud French speaker, the committed Catholic, and the … 
homosexual’, and ‘the checkers player or the member of the Led Zeppelin Fan Club’?567 In 
light of his examples, Bell is likely to say that only communal attachments based on traits such 
as nationality, sexual orientation, religion, gender and ethnicity are constitutive communities. 
He is likely to deny that someone who has lived in many different countries but who is a 
committed salsa dancer has a constitutive salsa dancing community, or that a profession that 
we have chosen is more constitutive of identity than being English, or Catholic, or black, and 
so on.   
The spirit of Bell’s distinction is arguably sound; that is, there is something special 
about constitutive communities that elevates them above other communal attachments that are 
merely contingent or voluntary. However, Bell’s sharp distinction conflicts with Constituted 
Autonomous Self on which the Inclusive Communitarian Approach is premised. Although Bell 
is right to highlight that the types of communal attachments that tend to possess the 
Fundamental Feature are those based on what anti-discrimination law calls ‘immutable 
characteristics’ 568  and ‘constructive immutability’, 569  such as nationality, gender, sexual 
orientation, religion (including conscience) and ethnicity, the Constituted Autonomous Self has 
more leeway than Bell allows for other types of communal attachments to be fundamental to 
its identity and self-understanding. In this regard, Bell’s distinction dismisses as frivolous too 
quickly the ‘means through which contemporary selves are (re)made’ and the possibility that 
participation in a subculture can be an authentic communitarian experience, too. 570  The 
Constituted Autonomous Self, unlike Bell’s unreflecting communitarian self, possesses the 
capacity for self-reflection and choice. It is able to reflect upon its communal attachments, 
 
567 Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (n 351) 170.  
568 See generally Solanke (n 453). For a treatment of immutability in American constitutional jurisprudence, see 
Jessica A Clarke, ‘Against Immutability’ (2015) 125 Yale Law Journal 2. For the same in Canadian constitutional 
jurisprudence, see Rosalind Dixon, ‘The Supreme Court of Canada and Constitutional (Equality) Baselines’ (2013) 
50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 637. See also the UK’s Equality Act 2010.  
569 This is a term used by the Canadian Supreme Court to refer to characteristics that, strictly speaking, are not 
immutable, but which are nevertheless ‘changeable only at an unacceptable cost to personal identity’: Corbiere v 
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) [1999] 2 SCR 203 [13]. My Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
does not distinguish between these two types of characteristics. As long as an element of identity satisfies the 
Fundamental and Social Features, it will be considered constitutive.  
570  Mark Reinhardt, ‘Look Who’s Talking: Political Subjects, Political Objects, and Political Discourse in 
Contemporary Theory (Book Review)’ (1995) 23(4) Political Theory 689, 701. 
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including those that it has chosen after the original constitution of its identity, and affirm the 
ones that cohere with its self-understanding, and reject the ones that do not. Affirming its 
communal attachments in this way is also to make an ethical commitment to it; that is, to 
acknowledge that this communal attachment defines its identity fundamentally because it 
provides it with certain important values, without which it ceases to be the same person. Hence, 
the cosmopolitan salsa dancer can reject the value of his national communities to his self-
understanding, and affirm the value of the salsa dancing community as an integral element of 
his identity. The Constituted Autonomous Self ought not be coerced into aping a moral 
commitment to a constitutive community with which it does not identify, and be denied the 
dignity of living as a member of one to which it has made an ethical commitment.  
What, then, of the extent to which the Fundamental Feature requires a communal 
attachment to be ordinarily unchosen and/or unchangeable? While it is perhaps usually the case 
that the immutable and constructively immutable features of identity are constitutive, these are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions. The crux of the Fundamental Feature is our 
affirmation of the value of certain communal attachments to our self-understanding; whether 
they are unchosen and/or unchangeable does not, and should not, affect the quality of the 
affirmation. Although communal attachments based on traits such as nationality, gender, sexual 
orientation, religion and ethnicity provide the initial frameworks in which we choose our 
conception of the good, to deny the fundamental importance of the choices that the Constituted 
Autonomous Self makes within these frameworks would be to deny its very autonomy 
altogether. As argued in Part II, this is both an implausible and undesirable way to think about 
ourselves.  
On the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, then, the Constituted Autonomous Self has 
the leeway to affirm as fundamental to its identity those communal attachments that Bell would 
consider voluntary and/or contingent. These communal attachments are fundamental if the 
individual has reflected upon their value and affirmed their fundamental importance to her self-
understanding. We could say, for instance, that Mr Stevens’ choice of being a butler, and hence 
his ‘butler’ communal attachment, exhibits the Fundamental Feature because he has affirmed 
its value to his identity by committing himself to be the best butler that he can be. Likewise, a 
committed marathon runner’s communal attachment of marathon runners may also possess the 
Fundamental Feature if the runner has made an ethical commitment to running because running 
gives meaning to her life by, say, teaching her discipline and determination. It is thus plausible 
that a group of committed marathon runners would feel a greater sense of belonging with each 
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other than, say, a group of Singaporeans if the former group of individuals has affirmed the 
value of the communal attachment to their lives and the latter has not. Hence, communal 
attachments that fall outside the usual categories can contain the Fundamental Feature as well. 
If the Constituted Autonomous Self has the scope to affirm and/or reject the value of 
its ordinarily unchosen and unchangeable communal attachments, and to choose communal 
attachments that it later affirms as meaningful, this seems to pose a problem for the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach. I have said that constitutional rights protect only interests that are 
sufficiently important to justify imposing a duty on others to respect our right to those interests. 
My explanation of the Fundamental Feature of constitutive communities has shown that the 
Fundamental Feature, although containing an objective element when it points to descriptive 
facts about identity, is largely subjective, allowing the Constituted Autonomous Self to choose 
certain communal attachments—salsa dancers, butlers, marathon runners—to be fundamental 
aspects of its identity. If this is so, does it mean that any communal attachment that is affirmed 
as meaningful to the individual has the requisite importance to qualify as a constitutive 
community, and hence to be protected by rights? 
This conclusion should be resisted. A communal attachment needs to also exhibit the 
Social Harm Feature to be a constitutionally protected constitutive community. First, though, I 
will sum up what I have argued so far. The Fundamental Feature of constitutive communities 
points to the ordinarily unchangeable, usually unchosen and deep-seated features of our identity 
which we have affirmed as valuable, and to which we have made an ethical commitment. The 
usual types of communal attachments that have this feature are those based on religion, 
nationality, gender, sexual orientation and ethnicity. But because the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach is premised on the Constituted Autonomous Self, other types of communal 
attachments that the individual has affirmed as valuable can also exhibit the Fundamental 
Feature. This does not mean, however, that all of them will be constitutionally protected as 
constitutive communities; they will have to also exhibit the Social Harm Feature to attract 




b. The Social Harm Feature 
The Social Harm Feature concerns the social dimension of constitutive communities. By this I 
mean, first, the Janus-faced dialogical process by which they constitute identity; and second, 
the social harms that often arise from this process.  
 
i. The Dialogical and Janus-Faced Process of Identity Formation 
Our identity is constituted by our constitutive communities not in an inward, monological way, 
but through a dialogical process with others. Taylor contends that, through this process, we 
acquire modes of expression—words, gestures, etc—and become ‘full human agents, capable 
of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity’.571 We define a conception of 
our identity through dialogue with, and struggles against, other people’s understandings of who 
we are, and through concepts and practices presented to us by ‘religion, society, school, and 
state, mediated by family, peers, friends’.572 This dialogical process of identity formation takes 
place in specific contexts, such that individual identities are constituted within a broader 
collective.  
The collective dimension of the constitutive elements of identity shapes our 
understanding of what it means to be members of our constitutive communities. In other words, 
to engage with the collective dimension is also to engage with the ‘socially transmitted 
conceptions of how a person of that identity properly behaves’.573 On the one hand, and as we 
have seen in section (a), our constitutive communities provide us with the framework within 
which to make decisions about things of value, and we interpret the concepts and values given 
to us by our constitutive communities through dialogue with others. On the other hand, the 
Janus-faced nature of this dialogical process entails that, much as our identity is constituted by 
the values and practices that our communities transmit to us, they are equally constituted by 
socially transmitted misconceptions of membership, including how members of our 
constitutive communities ought to behave. 
 
571 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Amy Gutmann (ed), Multiculturalism (Princeton University 
Press 1994) 32. 
572 Appiah (n 341) 20. 
573 ibid 21. 
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Take my identity as a woman. It is beset by a particular history: being ‘all but absent 
from history’, being ‘the slave of any boy whose parents forced a ring upon her finger’, being 
someone who ‘could hardly read, could scarcely spell, and was the property of her husband’.574 
To the extent that this projected image of inferiority is internalised, Taylor says, it can ‘distort 
and oppress’.575 Not only should women be able to reject such sexist notions of femininity, 
which the Constituted Autonomous Self can do; but women, and similarly situated members 
of other constitutive communities, should be protected from the harms that arise from such 
socially transmitted misconceptions as well.  
 
ii. Inexorable Social Harms  
The Social Harm Feature is thus concerned with the inexorable social harms that constitutive 
communities expose to their members. These social harms are pernicious because, to build on 
the Fundamental Feature, they target constitutive elements of identity that are integral to our 
self-understanding, thereby attacking us as morally worthy individuals and undermining our 
equality of status in our larger national community.576 
 We can explore the Social Harm Feature using Appiah’s three-part structure of a 
collective identity. First, there is a social conception of members of the constitutive 
community. This social conception exists when there are some terms in public discourse that 
labels bearers of these identities by ascribing to them some criteria, such that they are 
recognised as members of the group (e.g. men, women; straights, gays).577 Appiah mandates 
that it must be generally known that this label exists, and that there be some degree of 
consensus, usually based on stereotypes, on how to identify those labelled as a member of the 
 
574 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (Penguin 2002) 45. 
575 Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ (n 571) 36. 
576 I will say more about the national community in Chapter Four. For now, it essentially refers to the political 
community contained in a nation-state.  
577 Appiah (n 341) 66–67. Note, however, that social conception is not to be confused with social recognition, 
implying some form of social acceptance of the identity. Hence, while there is probably no social recognition of 
a gay individual in countries where homosexuality is criminalised, there is nonetheless a social conception of, say, 
a gay man in India. The lack of social recognition of this identity and constitutive community is a social conception 
of it: since being LGB is unacceptable, in this society, the social conception of an LGB person is someone who is 
morally reprehensible person and undeserving of equal recognition. (I am grateful to a participant at the 7th Annual 
Yale Law School Doctoral Scholarship Conference for this point.)  
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constitutive community. A social conception thus refers to some ideas in society about how 
members of a particular constitutive community behave, what they are like, and how they may 
be spotted.  
Second, as a consequence of the dialogical process of identity formation, at least some 
of those who bear the label must have internalised the label as part of their identities. There 
must be some, for example, who have internalised the label ‘woman’, such that there exists an 
identification as a woman; that is, thinking of ourselves as a woman in a significant way that 
‘carries ethical and moral weight’.578 This includes behavioural and ethical norms; for instance, 
Singaporeans should never litter, women ought to care about gender equality, homosexuals 
ought to care about marriage equality. Identification also means locating your own life story 
within a larger narrative and fitting it into certain patterns. This may involve ‘rites of passage 
into womanhood … or a sense of national identity that fits one’s life into a larger saga’.579  
The final part, arguably the most crucial distinguishing feature, is the ‘existence of 
patterns of behaviour towards [those labelled, for instance, gays], such that [gays] are 
sometimes treated as [gays]’.580 While not always negative, the type of treatment-as that is 
immediately obvious is ‘invidious discrimination: gender, sexuality, and racial and ethnic 
identity have all been profoundly shaped … by histories of sexism, homophobia, racism, and 
ethnic hatred’.581 This sort of treatment-as is the social harm that befall us qua members of our 
constitutive communities. When all three parts are satisfied, we have a collective identity ‘that 
matters for ethical and political life’: 
That it matters for ethical life … flows from the fact that it figures in identification, in people’s 
shaping and evaluation of their own lives; that it might matter for politics flows from the fact 
that it figures in treatment by others, and that how others treat one will help determine one’s 
success and failure in living one’s life.582 
In other words, membership in constitutive communities exposes us to social harms 
that bring with them tangible consequences. Racial or gender discrimination, for instance, 
results in the tangible consequence of the woman or black person being denied a job. What is 
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also crucial about these social harms is that they are both historical and current phenomena. I 
will explain this with Solanke’s stigma imagery which she uses to identify traits that anti-
discrimination law should protect. 
 A stigma, Solanke says, ‘begins with the deliberate social creation of a “mark” and 
results in individual discrimination’.583 Ethnicity, for instance, is ‘“marked”’, and so is the 
person bearing it—the stigmatised person becomes ‘engulfed by an attribute, status or 
condition to the extent that she becomes it’,584 such that ‘[there] is no separation between the 
mark and the person’. 585  Solanke notes that ‘the purpose of the “mark” [is] to spread a 
generalised negative message about the group in society’. 586  Hence, when gay men were 
stigmatised for being HIV/AIDS sufferers, they also faced prejudice and discrimination.   
Solanke identifies five key aspects of a stigma.587 First, the created mark is based on an 
arbitrary attribute or condition of the individual, such as ethnicity or gender, that has no 
inherent meaning. Second, these marks are given a negative meaning by society. Third, this 
negative meaning is buttressed by a ‘difficult to challenge social power’. Fourth, the negative 
association with this mark is widespread in society; everyone knows, for instance, that women 
stay at home to take care of the children while men go out to work. Finally, because the stigma 
is common knowledge, ‘the stigmatised person cannot control or “wish away” the societal 
definition’.588 Consequently, a stigmatised person experiences social harms in the forms of, 
inter alia, status loss and discrimination. Since the stigma results from stigmatised membership 
in her constitutive community, these consequences are more profound and harmful because 
they result from, and target, an integral part of her identity. Other consequences of being 
stigmatised that Solanke identifies, and which she argues are reasons to attract the protection 
of anti-discrimination law, are a reduction of the individuals’ humanity, an exclusion of them 
from mainstream society, and a blocking of their access to key resources.589 
 
583 Solanke (n 453) 37. 
584 ibid 20. 
585 ibid. 
586 ibid 21. 
587 ibid 37. 
588 ibid. 
589 ibid 162–163. 
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In sum, the Social Harm Feature points to the social harms to which our membership 
in our constitutive communities exposes us. These social harms arise when we are treated as 
members of our constitutive communities in a manner that makes our lives go worse, and which 
reduce our humanity. I will now bridge the gap between communal attachments and 
constitutive communities.  
 
c. From Communal Attachments to Constitutive Communities  
How does the Social Harm Feature relate to constitutive communities? As mentioned, a 
communal attachment usually needs both the Fundamental and Social Harm Features to be 
constitutionally protected as a constitutive community, such that members’ interest in the 
communal attachment is sufficiently important to justify imposing a duty on others to respect 
their right to it. A communal attachment based on, say, ethnicity satisfies both features. Say 
that a black individual has affirmed the value of his ethnic constitutive community to his 
identity: he identifies as a black man in a more than descriptive manner, and he treats the history 
of his ethnic community an integral part of his identity, etc. The Fundamental Feature is thus 
satisfied. 
 The identity ‘black man’ satisfies the Social Harm Feature as well. It fits Appiah’s 
structure of a collective identity: there is a social conception of a black man, there are people 
who have internalised the label ‘black man’, and black men are often treated as black men. For 
instance, there is an ‘endemic’ distrust in the United Kingdom of ‘black men in hoodies’: they 
are seen as people ‘who [have not] achieved much in life’ at best, and ‘violent [thugs]’ at 
worst.590 This social conception and its associated negative meanings have been entrenched by 
a long history of racial discrimination, leading to the negative consequences that Solanke points 
out: exclusion from mainstream society, blocking of access to key resources, a reduction of the 
members’ humanity.591 Being ordinarily unchangeable, the black man cannot ‘wish away’ the 
stigma against his ethnic constitutive community. As such, the harm that the black man suffers 
 
590 David Lammy, ‘David Lammy on Why There’s Nothing Scary about a Black Man in a Hoodie’ The Guardian 
(London, 13 February 2019) <www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/13/david-lammy-on-why-theres-nothing-
scary-about-a-black-man-in-a-hoodie> accessed 3 September 2019. 
591 See e.g. Vikram Dodd, ‘Met Police “Disproportionately” Use Stop and Search Powers on Black People’ The 
Guardian (London, 26 January 2019) <www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jan/26/met-police-disproportionately-
use-stop-and-search-powers-on-black-people> accessed 28 May 2019. 
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is the harm to his very sense of self—and hence, these social harms ‘[fail] to respect fully the 
personhood of its targets’.592 
 What about the types of communal attachments that Bell considers voluntary and/or 
contingent, but which I argued do exhibit the Fundamental Feature? Unfortunately, many of 
these communal attachments do not have the Social Harm Feature, and thus would not be 
constitutionally protected. Take academics as an example. We can accept that the communal 
attachment ‘academics’ is integral to the academic’s self-understanding. However, it is 
generally less likely that the communal attachment would exhibit the Social Harm Feature even 
after constructing the best argument in its favour. Let us start with Appiah’s structure of a 
collective identity. First, the social conception of an academic is someone concerned with 
esoteric intellectual matters with poor social skills. Second, the label ‘academic’ has been 
internalised by academics, such that there are certain behavioural and ethical norms associated 
with the label. For instance, academics are expected to adhere to academic integrity which 
includes not plagiarising and representing opponents’ views in their best possible light. Third, 
academics are sometimes treated as academics: they are mocked for being socially awkward.  
 While mockery can be considered a social harm, it is not the relevant type of social 
harm: it is far-fetched to say that this harm rises to the level of harm experienced by black men. 
Further, even if the social conception of the academic satisfied Solanke’s five characteristics 
of a stigma, it also seems far-fetched to say that the academic suffers social loss or 
discrimination, a loss of humanity, an exclusion from mainstream society, etc. Indeed, 
academics as such generally do not suffer the same kind of discrimination and exclusion from 
mainstream society that black men do; on the contrary, many of them are included in society 
and enjoy reasonable respectability and social standing. The communal attachment of 
academics, then, does not have the Social Harm Feature because academics do not suffer the 
relevant type of social harm. Without the Social Harm Feature, a communal attachment is not 
sufficiently important to attract constitutional protection. This is not to deny that the attachment 
is important to the individuals who are so attached; but if they wish to claim constitutional 
protection of their communal attachment, they would need to demonstrate that their 
membership in the communal attachment has exposed them to the relevant social harm.  
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 Having said that, the Social Harm Feature is always in flux. Whether or not a communal 
attachment possesses it depends on social forces such as the society where the communal 
attachment is located, the society’s history, and so on. For instance, the academics communal 
attachment may have a better claim to the Social Harm Feature in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) where intellectuals and teachers were targeted as ‘class enemies’ during the 
Cultural Revolution, and were ‘publicly humiliated, beaten and in some cases murdered or 
driven to suicide’.593 Furthermore, it is possible that, due to the lack of academic freedom in 
the PRC, academics are treated as academics when they are silenced for criticising the state. 
These social factors, specific to the Chinese context, establish a strong arguable case that the 
Social Harm Feature is present in the communal attachment of academics in the PRC; and 
hence, the communal attachment can be a constitutionally protected constitutive community.  
 To sum up the discussion so far: I have argued that communal attachments that have 
the Fundamental Feature but not the Social Harm Feature do not rise to the level of a 
constitutive community that attracts constitutional protection. Since rights protect only 
interests that are sufficiently important to justify imposing a duty on others to respect our right 
to those interests, both the Fundamental and Social Harm Features need to be present. It is only 
when we are treated negatively as members of our constitutive communities, which we have 
affirmed as fundamental aspects of our identity, that our interest in these communities is 
important enough to be protected by constitutional rights.   
 
d. Constitutive Communities and Constitutional Rights 
How do constitutional rights protect constitutive communities? Briefly,594 rights protect both 
the existence of constitutive communities and their members’ interest in accessing and 
participating in them from unjustified encroachment by the state and/or the majority. 
Constitutive communities can either be abstract—the gay community, for instance—or 
specific, such as the women’s welfare association of my local neighbourhood. The Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach protects our ability to live as members of our constitutive 
 
593 Tom Phillips, ‘The Cultural Revolution: All You Need to Know about China’s Political Convulsion’ The 
Guardian (London, 11 May 2016) <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-
on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion> accessed 3 September 2019. 
594 A fuller account will be presented in Chapter Five, Part II, 222–245. 
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communities, including our ability to associate with fellow members, in order for us to lead 
meaningful lives.  
 Following from the Social Harm Feature, protecting constitutive communities also 
protects members’ equality of status and equal membership in their national community. Our 
constitutive communities mark out the identity traits that are integral to our self-understanding. 
Hence, full public recognition of equal citizenship requires respect for the ‘unique identities of 
each individual, regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity’, and respect for ‘activities, practices, 
and ways of viewing the world that are particularly valued by … members of disadvantaged 
groups’.595 In this light, giving political recognition to constitutive communities recognises the 
equal moral worth of individuals who live as a certain identity; and so political recognition of, 
for instance, the gay community in the form of equal rights is also a recognition of the equal 
moral worth of individuals who identify as gay.  
This is an important link to my second conceptual claim about communitarianism—
that it promotes a thin theory of the good—and to the second element of my Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach, the duty to include. Briefly, the thin theory of the good that 
communitarianism promotes is inclusiveness, and members of the national community owe 
each other a duty to include.  
 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued for a pluralistic conception of community as constitutive communities, which is 
the first element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach. This theory comports with my first 
conceptual claim that communitarianism values community and individual equally. By 
conceiving of community as the communal attachments that constitute the individual’s identity, 
the theory values the constitutive communities themselves as a source of meaning to their 
members, and values the individual by ascribing constitutional significance to the constitutive 
attachments that define her identity. Since the theory recognises the pluralistic nature of these 
attachments, it eschews advancing a monistic conception of community which would oppress 
weaker communal attachments. 
 
595 Amy Gutmann, ‘Introduction’ in Gutmann (n 571) 8. 
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 I have also argued that the theory should be predicated on the Constituted Autonomous 
Self. This means that, for our constitutive communities to be more than descriptive facts about 
ourselves, we have to affirm their significance and value to our self-understanding and choose 
to live as members of our constitutive communities. Such affirmation also means that these 
constitutive identity traits are integral aspects of who we are. I ended the chapter by identifying 
two features that elevate a communal attachment to a constitutive community: the Fundamental 
Feature and the Social Harm Feature. In this regard, our interest in our constitutive 
communities, and the communities themselves, are constitutionally protected because they are 
integral to our self-understanding and define who we are as individuals; yet, they can cause us 
intolerable social harms, too, such as discrimination and exclusion from mainstream society. 
The second element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach seeks to mitigate these social 
harms by arguing that members of the national community owe each other a duty to include; 
that is, to respect each other’s equality of membership regardless of their constitutive 




Chapter Four  
The Duty to Include  
 
INTRODUCTION  
I have argued in Chapter Three that, although constitutive communities are a source of meaning 
to our lives, they can cause us social harms as well: our membership in our various constitutive 
communities can expose us to negative treatment by others, typically motivated by attitudes of 
dislike. Such attitudes can, and have, led to clashes between constitutive communities within 
the national community, including the national community itself, whose fundamental beliefs 
are diametrically opposed. Skirmishes also arise when the national community imposes 
obligations that conflict with a constitutive community’s fundamental beliefs. When can the 
national community compel members to fulfil obligations that contradict their constitutive 
communities’ beliefs and practices? In what situations can the national community restrict the 
activities of one constitutive community to protect another? How should clashes between 
constitutive communities be resolved? In other words, what do members of the national 
community owe to each other?   
In this chapter, I argue that the national community’s members owe each other a basic 
duty to include. This duty has two grounds. First, it is generated by the correlative relationship 
between rights and duties under the interest theory of rights that the thesis presupposes.596 That 
is, our constitutive communities, and our interest in them, are sufficiently important to ground 
rights, which then generate a duty on others to respect our rights to our constitutive 
communities. These ‘others’ are members of the national community and national community 
as a whole, on whose behalf the state acts. The duty to include requires members of the national 
community to recognise fellow members’ equality of membership; that is, to include their 
constitutive communities within the national community so that they can live meaningfully as 
members of their constitutive communities. This entails recognising their right to their various 
constitutive communities.597 
The duty’s second ground, which the chapter focuses on, is a conception of the nation 
as an ethical community, and the concept of community itself. The argument consists of a few 
 
596 See Introduction, 13–15. 
597 This will be fleshed out in Chapter Five, Part II, 222–245. 
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components. First, following David Miller, 598  the nation is an ethical community where 
members owe each other special obligations; I will call this ethical conception ‘the national 
community’, which is also one of our constitutive communities. In the national community, 
members feel a special concern and loyalty for each other that is similar to the concern and 
loyalty that they feel towards those to whom they are closely and personally related, such as 
their family and friends. This feeling of special concern, or what Bernard Yack calls ‘social 
friendship’,599 explains why co-nationals often believe, and are often thought to, owe special 
obligations to each other.  
However, relations between members of the national community are unlike personal 
relationships because the national community is an impersonal, ‘imagined’600 community; as 
such, a further argument is needed to properly conceive of the nation as the national 
community. Otherwise, it could be said that co-nationals are misguided in having feelings of 
social friendship, and hence special obligations, towards each other. In Part I section (b), I 
establish the second component of the duty to include: co-nationality is sufficiently like those 
personal relationships of which social friendship and special obligations are characteristic. 
Hence, co-nationality is a type of such personal relationships, which justifies, first, the ethical 
conception of the nation; and second, special obligations between members of the national 
community. This is because members of the national community share a constitutive601 national 
identity which creates a mutual identification and recognition, and so a sense of familiarity, 
between members who are otherwise strangers to each other. This sense of familiarity 
transmutes co-nationality into the type of relationship characterised by special obligations, such 
that the relationship of co-nationality itself ought to justify these special obligations. 
Nonetheless, I provide a further basis for these special obligations: they are animated by the 
notions of identification, intrinsic in the concept of constitutive communities; and reciprocity, 
fundamental to the concept of community.  
In Part II, I will establish the duty to include: it is the baseline obligation that members 
of the national community owe to each other. The final ground of the duty, then, is the 
inherently inclusive nature of community: it includes as members those who possess the 
 
598 David Miller, On Nationality (Clarendon 1995). 
599 Bernard Yack, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community (University of Chicago Press 2012). 
600 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso 2016). 
601 As in Chapter Three, ‘constitutive’ means ‘partly constitutive’.  
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morally relevant criterion for membership, and excludes those who do not. The inclusion of 
those who fulfil the membership criterion is also an acknowledgement that the community’s 
constitutive way of life is meaningful; hence, the community should include as members all 
those who possess the morally relevant criteria for membership. In the national community, a 
shared civic national identity is the morally relevant criterion. Since members usually display 
social friendship towards each other, the duty to include enters the fray when social friendship 
reaches its limit. This typically happens in the cases of conflict mentioned earlier.  
The duty to include, then, essentially exhorts members to continue to recognise and 
respect each other’s equality of membership in the national community in cases of conflict. 
Members are required to demonstrate special concern for each other’s interest in living 
meaningfully as members of their various constitutive communities. Given the importance of 
constitutive communities to our self-understanding, members of the national community have 
a duty to include each other’s constitutive communities in the national community, so as to 
allow everyone to live meaningfully as members of the national community and their 
constitutive communities, as they themselves are able to do. The duty, of course, is not 
absolute. It ceases to apply if a constitutive community’s constitutive beliefs violate the duty 
itself, in which case the national community can justifiably ban the existence of a constitutive 
community. If a constitutive community’s peripheral beliefs and/or practices violate the duty, 
the national community can place restrictions on the community.  
Finally, the duty to include advances the second conceptual claim about 
communitarianism made in Chapter 2: communitarian politics of the good can promote only a 
thin theory of the good. In light of the theory developed so far, this thin theory is the good of 
inclusiveness. Part II concludes by considering the role of the state in promoting this good.   
 
Definitions and Assumptions 
Due to the complexity of the concepts explored in this chapter, a few words on definitions and 
assumptions are in order. Following the constitutive communities theory developed in Chapter 
3, my use of ‘nation’ presupposes civic nations in which a multitude of identities flourish within 
the borders of a state. By this I mean ‘a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in 
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patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values’,602 as opposed to ethnic 
nations that emphasise a commonality of native culture and ethnicity. 603  A civic national 
identity is ethnically and culturally neutral, and is derived from the civic national community’s 
shared history, common everyday practices and way of life, and principles of justice. Generally, 
civic nations have the following characteristics: it is tied to a particular geographical location;604 
it is inter-generational and members share a common history, however long or short;605 and co-
nationals share a common national character, public culture or cultural heritage,606 or a national 
identity, as I call it. I also assume a congruence between the civic nation and the political 
boundaries of the state in which it is situated. 
While I do not have in mind ethnic nations where the national identity is derived from 
the dominant ethnicity in the political state,607 it does not mean that the duty to include does 
not apply in these nations. Indeed, since diversity inevitably exists in modern nation-states, the 
civic nation, and the civic national identity, are normative ideals. The duty to include, in turn, 
being derived from the civic nation, should apply regardless of whether a nation is ethnic or 
civic, so long as diversity, however minimal, exists within the nation. The question then 
becomes how it should be applied. Space constraints prevent me from discussing this question 
in too much depth, though I briefly discuss an ethnic nation to illustrate the importance of a 
civic national identity.  
 The nationalist ideas that I explore in this chapter are ‘universalist’ ideas, i.e. ‘the view 
that all people ought to be partial toward their own nation and conationals’,608 as opposed to 
the view that only one’s own nation deserves special loyalty. Hence, I assume that ‘all people 
 
602 Yack (n 599) 26. 
603 Anthony D Smith, National Identity (University of Nevada Press 1991) 11–12. Advancing an ethnic national 
identity would be at odds with the constitutive communities theory, and hence the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach, both of which aim to celebrate and promote the diversity of identities in modern pluralistic societies.  
604 ibid 9; Yack (n 599) 70; Miller (n 598) 24. 
605 Yack (n 599) 68; Miller (n 598) 23. 
606 Yack (n 599) 69; Miller (n 598) 25. 
607 Examples include the PRC, Malaysia and Indonesia.  
608 Thomas Hurka, ‘The Justification of National Partiality’ in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (eds), The 
Morality of Nationalism (Oxford University Press 2014) 139. 
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are morally entitled to value their own nation, to seek to ensure its self-determining character, 
and to show partiality to its members’.609  
Finally, I use the terms ‘co-national’ and ‘members of the national community’ 
interchangeably.  
 
I. SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY  
a. The Nation as an Ethical Community: the National Community  
i. Miller’s Ethical Conception of the Nation  
The first component of the duty to include adopts Miller’s conception the nation as an ethical 
community, i.e. the national community, where members owe each other special obligations. 
Miller’s ethical conception begins with the claim that acknowledging a national identity also 
‘[acknowledges] that I owe special obligations to fellow members of my nation which I do not 
owe to other human beings’,610  and that ‘[the] duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are 
different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to human beings as such’.611 Miller 
derives these special obligations from what he calls ‘the ethics of community’612 which assume 
that ‘memberships and attachments in general have ethical significance’. 613  The ethics of 
community usually arise in immediate, intimate communities, 614  which include family, 
friendships, colleges, and so on. Membership in these communities is ethically significant, 
Miller says, because my identification as a member of these groups gives rise to my feeling a 
special loyalty towards my fellow members. This loyalty manifests itself ‘in my giving special 
weight to the interests of fellow-members’ and acknowledging ‘obligations to [them] that are 
distinct from the obligations I owe to people generally’.615  
 
609 Jeff McMahan, ‘The Limits of National Partiality’ in McKim and McMahan (n 608) 108. 
610 Miller (n 598) 50. 
611 ibid 11. 
612 ibid 66. 
613 ibid 65. 
614 I do not distinguish between personal relationships and intimate communities; hence, my use of ‘personal 
relationships’ should be taken to include intimate communities and vice versa.  
615 Miller (n 598) 65. 
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The ethics of community mandate that the loyalties and obligations between members 
are mutual and reciprocal; other members of these communities should give special weight to 
my interests, too. Failure of this mutuality, Miller says, will call into question whether the 
community to which I think I belong really is a community, or simply an association of self-
interested individuals. If I am under the impression that the Law PhD cohort at Cambridge is a 
community, then this impression would be shaken when fellow ‘members’ of the ‘community’, 
save for my group of friends, demonstrate scant interest in the events that I organise despite 
my supporting their events in the past. On the other hand, if I make special allowances for a 
member of my group of friends at Cambridge—for instance, I read Raffael’s PhD thesis in two 
days so that he can submit by his desired deadline when I am trying to finish my own—and 
Raffael reads something of mine when he has a deadline, then the mutuality that we exhibit 
cements the community nature of our friendship.  
What are the special obligations that we should acknowledge? Miller says that the 
precise content of the obligations is ‘likely to be coloured by the general ethos of the group or 
community’.616 The group’s general ethos also determines the interests that members can be 
called upon to promote—interests which are ‘interpreted in the light of the community’s 
values’.617  Miller illustrates this with Walzer’s example of medieval Jewish communities. 
Members of these communities recognised an obligation to provide for each other’s needs, 
which were ‘understood in relation to religious ideals’, such as distributing food to the poorest 
members of society, and viewing education as a need for boys but not girls.618 
The ethics of community, Miller argues, have significant motivational strengths for a 
few reasons. First, my identification with the group or community entails that ‘there need be 
no sharp conflict between fulfilling my obligations and pursuing my own goals and purposes’ 
because ‘the group’s interests are among the goals that I set myself to advance’.619 Contributing 
to the group’s welfare thus becomes ‘a form of goal-fulfilment’. 620  Second, the loose 
reciprocity of the ethics of community means that those who contribute to the community can 
expect to be benefited by fellow members at some point as well. As such, ‘the act of making a 
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contribution is not a pure loss … because he is helping to sustain a set of relationships from 
which he stands to benefit to some degree’.621 This helps to lessen the tension between the 
individual’s interests and the group’s interests ‘so that ethical behaviour becomes easier for 
imperfectly altruistic agents’.622 Finally, groups and communities usually consist of people 
‘who are already well disposed to one another in certain respects’ which makes it easier to 
establish ‘more formal systems of reciprocity’.623 This further blurs the distinction between the 
individual’s private interests and her communal obligations. 
Although Miller presents an accurate description of the ethics of community, his 
account fuses two concepts which ought to be distinguished. This is Yack’s distinction between 
justice on the one hand, and ‘social friendship’ on the other. For Yack, the partiality that we 
display towards our family, friends, and members of our communities (including the national 
community) are not obligations as such, but social friendship. They are not obligations, Yack 
argues, because friends ‘do what they can for each other, rather than what they are obliged to 
do’; and this, in turn, is because ‘they mark each other out as objects of special concern and 
loyalty’.624 This echoes what Miller calls ‘feelings of special loyalty’ that arise when one 
identifies with a group.  
In the same vein, community is ‘a group of individuals who imagine themselves 
connected to each other as objects of special concern and loyalty by something that they 
share’.625 The social friendship immanent in communal bonds is one of ‘mutual commitment’626 
and ‘a sense of mutual concern and loyalty’.627 While this echoes Miller’s requirement of 
mutuality, for Yack, members of a community display such mutuality not because they feel 
obliged to do so, but out of feelings of social friendship. Obligations, in contrast, belong in the 
realm of justice. Although both are aspects of social morality,  
[b]eliefs about justice move us to give people what they deserve, what we believe that they are 
owed given their distinctive qualities and efforts; feelings of social friendship, to do what we 
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promoting the sense that we owe them things; the latter, by promoting special concern for their 
well-being.628 
The distinction, of course, is not as sharp as it seems; we are motivated by feelings of 
social friendship and obligation when we do things for our family and friends. Nonetheless, 
the distinction is salient, especially for the duty to include, because it highlights the complex 
interplay between concern and obligation that motivates our ethical behaviour towards our 
intimates. While we are ordinarily moved to do things for our family and friends out of social 
friendship, these feelings are finite—and justice-mandated obligations fill the void opened up 
by the limits of our special concern, directing us to act as we would have ordinarily done.  
 To give a prosaic example, when my friend John asks me to read his article, I set aside 
time from my busy thesis completion schedule to read it even though I do not really want to—
and I do so out of obligation. During this busy period, my concern for my own well-being 
overrides the special concern that I would ordinarily have for his well-being. Yet, because he 
stands in a special relationship to me as a friend, and since it has been a practice between my 
group of friends at Cambridge to comment on each other’s work, I feel obliged to read his 
article—and this feeling reflects an actual obligation that exists independently of my feelings. 
I am obliged to John to read his article in a way that I am not to most others because of the type 
of mutually beneficial friendship that we have created: we support each other in our academic 
lives, and we both stand to gain from each other’s academic expertise. This obligation is thus 
constituted by two things: the special concern that we feel for each other, and the relationship 
of reciprocity and mutual benefit that we have established. Special obligations, then, step in to 
direct us to act as we ordinarily would have acted if our feelings of special concern are not 
misguided. I will return to the latter point in section (b)(ii) below. 
 To return to Miller’s ethical conception of the nation: he observes that the special 
obligations immanent in the ethics of community are often expressed towards the national 
community. This is because nationality, for many, is ‘powerful source of personal identity’629 
and often invokes strong loyalty in those that embrace a national identity. The most extreme 
example of this strong loyalty, Miller says, is some people’s willingness to die for their country. 
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629 Miller (n 598) 67. 
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Co-nationals are also likely to say that they have a special responsibility towards each other 
which justifies giving them priority when acting as individuals and in public policy decisions. 
However, and as Miller acknowledges, there are important differences between the 
national community and intimate communities. Unlike intimate communities where members 
interact with each other on a personal, face-to-face basis, the national community is an 
imagined community where members are, strictly speaking, strangers to each other. One 
important implication is that, in an intimate community, we can specify the content of our 
obligations towards fellow members because we can ascertain their needs and wants through 
our daily interactions with them. In the national community, however, we are often unable to 
specify the content of our special responsibilities towards our co-nationals because ‘we are in 
no position to grasp the demands and expectation of other members directly’.630  
Nonetheless, despite our inability to ask every member of the national community 
directly what their demands and expectations are, Miller argues that we can determine the 
content of these obligations through the national community’s public culture, ‘a set of ideas 
about the character of the community which also helps to fix responsibilities’.631 For instance, 
a communitarian society that emphasises collective goods would have a public culture that 
produces an obligation of some form of national service. This public culture, disseminated by 
the mass media, is shaped by public debate—which means it is open to interpretation, its 
content underwritten by a fluidity that responds accordingly to changes in the community. That 
the public culture can change over time shields Miller’s national community from the criticism 
that he is merely sanctifying traditional relations that have not been rationally scrutinised, 
because these national obligations that we acknowledge have been affirmed and justified with 
reasons in public debate over time.632 
Miller’s description of the ethical significance of the national community plausibly 
captures existing intuitions of what national identity means to those who claim one. However, 
two questions arise. First, if there are important differences between the national community 
and intimate communities and personal relationships, how can the ethics of community be 
applied to the national community? Second, even if the precise content of special obligations 
owed between co-nationals is determined by the national community’s public culture, can we 
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not ascertain a baseline obligation that is owed between co-nationals? As stated in the 
introduction, I will argue in Part II that this baseline obligation is the duty to include. The next 
section (b) addresses the question of how Miller’s ethics of community can be applied to the 
national community. I will argue that it is the sharing of a constitutive national identity that 
allows the ethics community to be applied to the national community, such that co-nationals’ 
feelings of special concern for each other do reflect actual special obligations owed to each 
other. First, however, it is necessary to explain why this justification is necessary.  
 
ii. The Need to Justify Special Obligations Within the National Community  
It may seem unnecessary to justify special obligations between co-nationals within my 
communitarian framework. The national community, being a type of community, can be 
assumed to generate special obligations between members because special obligations are 
integral to the concept of community. Miller, for one, seems to assume this when he applies 
the ethics of community, which usually hold in immediate, intimate communities, to the 
national community. Hence, special obligations within a community ought to be taken as a 
given within my communitarian framework, which means that these obligations within the 
national community needs no further justification, too.  
Tempting as this route is, the national community differs from other communities in an 
important way: it is a political community that imposes binding political obligations on its 
members, on whose behalf the state enacts policies that affect how the national community 
treats outsiders. Hence, the special obligations owed within a national community are 
sometimes political obligations. If these special obligations prefer members over non-members 
in, for instance, employment or wealth redistribution, then it is necessary to justify why 
membership in the national community per se entitles members to preferential treatment that 
disadvantages non-members who, some might say, are equally deserving simply by virtue of 
our shared humanity. Other types of communities, in contrast, lack a political dimension; as 
such, we can generally accept that these other communities generate special obligations without 
much more. 
The tension that I am alluding to is that between, as Miller puts it, ethical universalism 
and ethical particularism. For the ethical universalist, special obligations between co-nationals 
are an unwarranted display of bias towards a group of strangers based on an arbitrary and 
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morally irrelevant characteristic: nationality. We ought to discard the idea that we owe special 
obligations to our co-nationals, the criticism goes, because it is our common humanity that 
should determine what we owe to each other. Special obligations based on what is essentially 
an incidence of birth cannot be rationally defended, and so nationality is morally irrelevant in 
determining what we owe to each other. This is further underscored by the devastating 
consequences of wars and atrocities committed in the name of nationalism, such as the conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.   
There are two ways to read this criticism. The first is that all forms of bias in ethical 
behaviour are bad because they are based on arbitrary contingencies, such as the family and 
place we were born into, the school we went to, and so on. The extreme universalist position 
essentially objects to any form of ethical behaviour motivated by agent-relative reasons. 
However, this position is clearly problematic and deeply counter-intuitive because, followed 
to its logical conclusion, it would require us to give up our personal relationships. We display 
bias towards our family and friends and confer on them preferential treatment that we would 
not confer on acquaintances and strangers because of who they are in relation to us. If all agent-
relative reasons for ethical behaviour are objectionable, then the extreme universalist would 
either have to revise his position, or bite the bullet and declare that it is also wrong for us to 
favour our family and friends. If the ethical universalist chose the latter route, her position 
would be thoroughly unattractive because it would be intolerable for us to give up our personal 
relationships, which are fundamental human goods that enhance our lives and well-being. As 
such, agent-relative reasons for ethical action are ‘special moral reasons that arise from our 
relations with one another’633 that supplement our basic duties to one another. These special 
relationships constitute, in John Finnis’ term, basic reasons for action.634 As Jeff McMahan 
describes it,  
the moral significance of special relations … constitutes an autonomous area within the domain 
of morality, so that the existence of these relations and the forms of behaviour that are 
appropriate within them do not require justification in terms of anything else. It is part of the 
meaning or significance of these relations that they legitimize certain forms of partiality. The 
 
633 McMahan (n 609) 110. 
634 Friendship is one of the eight Finnisian basic goods, i.e. human goods that provide reasons for action in and of 
themselves, without the need for justification with reference to other goods: John Finnis, Natural Law And Natural 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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relations themselves are fundamental or foundational sources of moral reasons, including 
permissions and requirements.635 
 Our partiality towards those to whom we are intimately related is such a deeply 
ingrained component of our ethical thinking that an account of ethics that fails to take it 
seriously would fail to understand the full range of what motivates our ethical behaviour. The 
extreme universalist position, then, is untenable. 
Another problem with this reading of the criticism is that it is at odds with the 
communitarian conception of the self, developed in Chapters Two and Three. By trying to 
divorce us from our personal relationships, the criticism implicitly advances a disembodied, 
unencumbered self capable of practical reasoning without the emotional tethers of personal 
relationships. Having already shown in Chapter Two that such a conception of the self is both 
descriptively false and normatively undesirable, the universalist account of ethics that 
presupposes or depends on this conception of the self is similarly undesirable. In other words, 
given the communitarian conception of the self, our account of ethics has to be particularistic 
to some extent—namely, it has to account for our special obligations to those to whom we are 
intimately related.  
The second, more plausible, reading of the criticism is that some agent-relative reasons 
for ethical action are unacceptable—such as those based on nationality.636 This version of the 
criticism accepts that there is a realm of morality, termed ‘common-sense morality’ by some,637 
that, although impervious to rational scrutiny, is nevertheless acceptable for the reasons already 
stated. However, the criticism still objects to national partiality because of the fundamental 
differences between intimate relations and co-nationality. These differences are underscored 
by the unconvincing attempts to justify special obligations based on nationality by likening the 
national community to the family. As Thomas Hurka argues, familial relationships are ‘rich 
and intense’ because family members care deeply about each other, such that ‘[their] 
interactions have been as close as people’s typically ever are’. 638  Relations between co-
nationals, on the other hand, are nothing like familial relationships. We will likely never meet 
 
635 McMahan (n 609) 118. 
636 Race-centric reasons are another form of unacceptable agent-relative reasons. 
637  Tan Kok-Chor, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism (Cambridge 
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most of our co-nationals, let alone know who they are; hence, ‘the causal links between our 
lives are tenuous at best’.639 Moreover, the fanaticism and xenophobia that such partiality has 
produced also render national partiality objectionable. So even though it is acceptable for us to 
display partiality towards our intimates, doing the same towards our co-nationals cannot be 
justified even as a form of common-sense morality.  
 The force of the moderate reading of the criticism is why special obligations between 
co-nationals need to be justified. If giving preferential treatment to our co-nationals unfairly 
disadvantages non-nationals, then an ethical theory that allows for this without further 
justification is unattractive. In section (b)(ii) below, I will justify special obligations between 
co-nationals, and applying Miller’s ethics of community to the nation, by arguing that 
membership in the national community falls within the range of acceptable agent-relative 
reasons for ethical action. In other words, I assume that partiality towards our intimates is 
morally acceptable, and argue that partiality towards members of our national community is a 
type of such morally acceptable partiality.   
 
b. The National Community as a Quasi-Intimate Community  
A shared constitutive national identity lies at the heart of special obligations within the national 
community. It creates a sense of familiarity between co-nationals so that relations between 
them become sufficiently like personal relationships. This sense of familiarity, in turn, 
transmutes the national community into a quasi-intimate community, which explains feelings 
of social friendship between co-nationals. Since relations between co-nationals are sufficiently 
like personal relationships and intimate communities, Miller’s ethics of community can then 
be applied to the national community. Accordingly, the notions of mutuality and reciprocity 
justify special obligations within the national community.  
 The idea that sharing a nationality gives rise to special obligations is arguably implicit 
in Miller’s idea of a national identity. Miller says that the national community is ‘constituted 
by belief: nations exist when their members recognize one another as compatriots, and believe 
that they share characteristics of the relevant kind’. 640 The national community’s existence thus 
 
639 ibid 148. 
640 Miller (n 598) 22. 
172 
 
depends on ‘a shared belief that its members belong together’ and a ‘mutual recognition’641 
between co-nationals of this shared belief. Hence, a national identity requires that co-nationals 
have something in common, a set of shared characteristics; Miller calls this a ‘common public 
culture’,642 and it is this common public culture that gives rise to the sense that the people 
belong together.  
 Miller’s description of a national identity suggests that it is doing the normative work 
when he applies the ethics of community to the national community. One could say that it is 
the sense that the people of the national community belong together and their mutual 
recognition of each other as members that give rise to special obligations. However, Miller 
does not state this and assumes that the ethics of community can be applied to the national 
community in a more or less seamless fashion. As Charles Beitz notes, Miller takes an ‘indirect’ 
route to his ethical conception of the nation by distinguishing between ethical universalism and 
ethical particularism, and inviting the ‘inference … that, because [ethical particularism] is the 
more plausible position, it can be justifiable to allow duties to compatriots to trump duties to 
outsiders’.643 The inference, that is, that special obligations between compatriots is an instance 
of ethical particularism. However, without an explicit argument for why special obligations 
between co-nationals are captured by ethical particularism given the obvious differences 
between intimate relationships and co-nationality, these special obligations could be attacked 
as a ‘moral error [and] the intrusion of irrational emotional attachments into an arena that ought 
to be governed by impartial reason’.644 I will argue that they are not moral errors because of the 
significance of the shared constitutive national identity.  
 
i. A Civic Constitutive National Identity 
What does it mean to share a constitutive national identity? I use ‘national identity’ broadly to 
include a range of concepts: Miller’s public culture, Hurka’s shared cultural history,645 Bell’s 
shared national history from which moral lessons have been drawn,646 and so on. Miller’s idea 
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of a public culture is a good starting point to expound on my notion of a shared constitutive 
national identity. A public culture, for Miller, 
may be seen as a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life 
together. This will include political principles such as a belief in democracy or the rule of law, 
but it reaches more widely than this. It extends to social norms such as honesty in filling your 
tax return or queueing as a way of deciding who gets on to the bus first. It may also embrace 
certain cultural ideals, for instance religious beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of 
the national language. Its range will vary from case to case, but it will leave room for different 
private cultures within the nation. Thus, the food one chooses to eat, how one dresses, the music 
one listens to, are not normally part of the public culture that defines nationality.647 
A shared constitutive national identity encompasses matters as profound as political 
principles, and social norms as trivial as queueing for the bus, because its content is determined 
by the national community’s way of life, broadly understood. This way of life includes what 
Hurka calls ‘a shared cultural history’: ‘this is the culture they grew up in, that their [co-
nationals] share with them a history of being shaped by, participating in, and sustaining this 
culture’.648 ‘Culture’ here does not refer to a particular ethnicity, but the civic culture that has 
emerged from a civic national community. It is the amalgamation of members’ participation in 
public life as members of the national community and other constitutive communities, which 
has determined the national community’s norms and practices. In this regard, certain aspects 
of private cultures can be as constitutive of the national identity as public ones. For instance, 
an integral part of the Singaporean national identity is an obsession with food. Yet, there is not 
just a single Singaporean national dish, but several, and they come from the different ethnic 
cultures that thrive within the Singaporean national community.  
Sharing a constitutive national identity thus encompasses a range of things, from the 
profound (a commitment to the rule of law) to the trivial (an obsession with food, queueing for 
the bus), all essentially derived from the national community’s way of life. However, the values 
that constitute the national identity must not be evil or morally objectionable. As Robert George 
argues, ‘[the] integration of human beings around shared principles of injustice or other forms 
of wickedness is an undesirable integration’. 649  A national identity that asserts its own 
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superiority and denigrates other national identities would not be morally defensible. Any 
special obligations that arise would be similarly tainted by the national identity’s moral 
odiousness; hence, if Donald Trump’s racist vision for the United States were to take root such 
that the American identity became a far-right white supremacist one, special obligations 
between Americans would be tainted.650 In this regard, a shared cultural history should be one 
of ‘reciprocal benefit … where people have jointly benefited others’651 such as creating a 
national health care system to provide affordable health care to all members of the national 
community.  
Note, however, that an egalitarian and hence arguably more stable national identity 
would be one that is not substantively based on any comprehensive doctrines of the good (such 
as a religion); in other words, it would be a civic national identity. This necessarily follows 
from the constitutive communities theory defended in Chapter Three: if we are constituted by 
many communal attachments, then the national identity must be civic in order not to privilege 
some constitutive communities over others. Of course, it is sometimes difficult to divorce 
religion and ethnicity from the national identity; Greek Orthodoxy, for instance, is an integral 
part of the Greek national identity. The deep entrenchment of religious and/or ethnic influences 
on a civic national identity, however, should not be taken to mean that ‘there is a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions’, such as membership in a specific religious or ethnic 
constitutive community, for possessing a constitutive national identity ‘that everyone who 
belongs to the nation must display in equal measure’.652 Rather, a constitutive national identity 
ought to be elastic and encompass all the constitutive communities that exist in the civic 
national community. This means that members of Greek national community who do not 
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identify with the Greek Orthodox church, but identify with the Greek national community, are 
not lesser members of the Greek national community, and ought not be seen as such.  
A civic national identity is also crucial in shielding nationalist theories from criticisms 
that they are hostile to immigrants and ethnic minorities, and that they necessitate assimilation 
policies that would erase ethnic and cultural minorities. Jan-Werner Müller, for instance, is 
deeply sceptical of nationalism and favours constitutional patriotism instead. He contends that 
nationalism ‘[tends] to rely on a reified core ethnic identity’653 and is thus ‘contaminated with 
culture and ethnicity’, which breeds ‘ideals of assimilationism qua cultural conformity’.654 
Nationalistic immigration policies tend to exhibit ‘[clear] ethnic preferences … in which 
certain ethnic groups are seen as more easily “compatible” with the “national culture”’.655 
Nationalism also tends to require new immigrants to ‘[prove] membership in a national 
collective through knowledge and a demonstrated willingness to abandon one’s own way of 
life’.656 Constitutional patriotism, on the other hand, is animated by a commitment to the norms 
and values of a liberal democratic constitution.657 Hence, constitutional patriots are committed 
not to a national culture, but political principles that aid the ‘idea of citizens mutually justifying 
political rule to each other’,658 particularly the principle of fairness.  
Müller’s fears about nationalism are likely to come true only if the national identity in 
question is an ethnic or culturally homogeneous one. A civic national identity, on the other 
hand, does not necessarily require immigrants to abandon their way of life, or to belong to a 
‘compatible’ ethnic group. As already discussed, a civic national identity is not based on an 
ethnicity or religion, and does not privilege one ethnicity or religion over others; as such, it 
does not require immigrants to belong to any particular ethnic group. Further, since a national 
identity also consists of a commitment to political principles, my conception of the civic 
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national identity, because it is based on the constitutive communities theory, is necessarily 
committed to diversity and cultural pluralism.  
What about ethnic minorities within the national community? Andrew Mason has 
rejected the notion that a shared national identity is necessary to sustain a stable political 
community because fostering this identity would require assimilating minority cultures. Even 
if such assimilation is not necessarily oppressive because it is justified not by the superiority 
of the dominant culture, but by the importance of a shared national identity, it will nevertheless 
incur moral costs. Mason argues, first, that minorities who continue in their traditional ways of 
life will ‘come to feel that these are being devalued’ and so ‘suffer low self-respect or self-
esteem’.659 Second, the disappearance of valuable parts of the minority culture because they are 
incompatible with the dominant culture ‘may be a loss of something potentially enriching even 
for members of the dominant culture’.660   
However, these moral costs would arguably not be incurred if ethnic minorities are 
required to adopt a civic national identity. A civic national identity can accommodate minority 
cultures because it is constituted by cultural diversity. It would require cultural assimilation 
only if a certain way of life violates the national community’s foundational principles.661 For 
instance, if a national community is committed to the principle of equality, then a minority way 
of life that treats some members unequally will be required to abandon it. Such an abandonment 
would hardly be thought of as a moral cost; in fact, it is arguably a moral gain.  
This is not as controversial as it seems, and should not count against the civic national 
identity, for Müller’s constitutional patriotism would also lead to these outcomes. For one, the 
distinction between political values and a national culture or way of life, and his argument that 
citizenship tests and rituals should focus only on ‘political values’,662 overlook the overlaps 
between political values and national culture. In liberal democratic societies, political values 
such as fairness and mutual justification between citizens are integral components of the 
national culture and way of life. As Yack points out, even the liberal legacy of individual rights 
and political rationality is ‘a type of cultural heritage [which] imparts an inherited cultural 
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identity’ 663  that cannot be easily or readily distinguished from shared political principles. 
Hence, for Müller’s constitutional patriots to grant citizenship to someone from a patriarchal 
country with a poor record of gender equality, this person would plausibly be required to 
abandon, or at least set aside, his old ideas about the ‘proper’ roles of the sexes and recognise 
women as his equals—which is precisely the cultural assimilation that Müller says is endemic 
of nationalist theories. If even a supposedly culturally neutral way of thinking about political 
membership requires some cultural assimilation, then a civic national identity cannot be 
objected to on these grounds.  
This leads me to the final point about national identity before moving on to how a shared 
national identity justifies special obligations between members. It is that the moral significance 
of national identity should not be downplayed or dismissed because even theories like Müller’s 
arguably presuppose some notion of it. His constitutional patriotism primarily focuses on 
‘particular, preexisting political structures, not on humanity as a whole’, 664  which are 
essentially modern nation-states, or what I am calling national communities. Whatever the 
semantics, even Müller’s idea that constitutional patriots would be specifically committed to 
their political community’s constitutional culture, and not some other like-minded one, 
presupposes some prior identification with the political community qua nation-state in 
question. As Kymlicka notes, correctly, ‘What holds Americans together, despite their lack of 
common values, is the fact that they share an identity as Americans. Conversely, what keeps 
Swedes and Norwegians apart, despite the presence of shared values, is the lack of a shared 
identity.’665  
This suggests that the constitutional patriot’s commitment to her political community 
is motivated by something prior to a commitment to political principles. The constitutional 
patriot has to first identify with her political community, for instance identify as a Swede, to 
be committed to the Swedish political community and not the Norwegian one. The identity 
‘Swede’ is a national identity—and because it is a powerful source of personal identity, as 
Miller correctly states, it is arguably the national identity that provides the motivational force 
to be committed to this set of political principles instead of that. Yael Tamir notes that there 
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are ‘connections between feelings of belonging and moral obligations’,666 and it is arguably 
one’s identification with a national community, which evokes feelings of belonging to that 
community, that motivates one to fulfil the community’s obligations.  
Undoubtedly, Mason would object to my claim that Müller’s constitutional patriotism 
requires some notion of national identity to work. For Mason, it can simply be explained by 
the constitutional patriot’s sense of belonging to her polity. A person has such a sense of 
belonging, Mason argues, if ‘she identifies with most of its major institutions and some of its 
central practices, and feels at home in them [so that] she regards her flourishing as intimately 
linked to their flourishing’. 667  Mason argues, too, that Kymlicka’s characterisation of the 
American identity as a national identity is unconvincing because ‘Kymlicka says little about 
what it is for people to share an identity’.668 It is more plausible to say that ‘the most important 
factor in holding the United States together is a sense of belonging to the American polity’ 
because they ‘identify with some of the same institutions and practices, and feel at home in 
them’. Mason contrasts this to a sense of belonging together, which is required for people to 
share an identity; and the sense of belonging together, for Mason, is animated by the belief that 
‘there is some special reason why they should associate together, such as that which might be 
provided by the belief that they have a common history or distinctive culture’.669 
The constitutive nature of the national identity provides the response to Mason’s 
critique, as well as the basis for the belief that co-nationals have ‘a common history or 
distinctive culture’. It is because members are constituted by the national community’s way of 
life that they identify with the polity and with each other. This is a good segue into the next 
section; but before that, a quick summary of the discussion so far.  
I have expounded on the civic national identity on which special obligations between 
co-nationals are premised. It encompasses a range of concepts, both profound and trivial. Given 
the constitutive communities theory, the civic national identity is not based on any particular 
ethnic or cultural group; and if a national identity is based on an ethnic or cultural group for 
historical reasons, it should not require members to also belong to those ethnic or cultural 
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constitutive communities. National identities, then, should be civic, which would also shield 
national identities from criticisms that they are hostile to immigration and diversity. 
 
ii. A Sense of Familiarity: Social Friendship and Special Obligations  
What, exactly, is so salient about a shared constitutive national identity that it justifies special 
obligations between members of the national community? As alluded to previously, my 
argument has two components: the identification/social friendship component, and the 
mutuality/special obligations component.  
Sharing a constitutive national identity produces a sense of familiarity, and hence 
feelings of social friendship, between co-nationals, such that co-nationality is like personal 
relationships. In other words, it becomes a type of personal relationships and immediate 
communities constituted by special obligations, thereby allowing us to apply Miller’s ethics of 
community. How does this sense of familiarity arise? The key to the argument is the 
constitutive nature of the national community. As argued in Chapter Three, to be constituted 
by a communal attachment is to be moulded and shaped by its values, practices, way of life, 
etc. The constitutive community then becomes a fundamental feature of identity, providing a 
framework within which we make important choices; and we affirm its value when we identify 
as a member by living as such.   
What is particularly salient for the national community, and the sense of familiarity 
amongst its members, is the dialogical process of identity formation.670 In this process, we form 
our identity in dialogue with others, using the tools and concepts provided by them. Likewise, 
the national community makes available to its members the same concepts, practices, values, 
behavioural norms, etc that constitute their identities. Hence, an individual whose identity has 
been constituted by her national community, and who identifies as a member, develops an 
understanding of herself and of her fellow members. In the dialogical process of her identity 
formation, she interacts with her co-nationals in her daily life (in the neighbourhood, in school, 
at work, etc) and recognises aspects of herself in them because their identities as members of 
the national community have also been constituted by the same concepts, practices, language, 
and so on.  
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This recognition of oneself in others arguably gives rise to a sense of familiarity 
between co-nationals, which creates the impression that fellow members of the national 
community are more personally related to us than they really are. This impression of closeness 
underlies Benedict Anderson’s notion of nations as ‘imagined’ communities: ‘It is imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.’671 It is this sense of familiarity, of communion, that makes co-nationality like 
personal relationships. Friendship, for instance, is underpinned by a mutual understanding that 
stems from commonalities (interests, values, and so on) and an intimate knowledge of the other 
(her likes and dislikes, her character, etc). There is thus familiarity between friends because 
they understand each other and know important things about each other that most others do 
not. This familiarity, in turn, produces feelings of social friendship, or the drive to ‘do what we 
can for the people to whom we feel connected’,672 because we feel, and are, connected to our 
friends. 
Similarly, the fact that co-nationals have been constituted by the same national 
community gives them an intimate, albeit impersonal, knowledge of each other, which 
produces a sense of familiarity between them. Fellow members of the national community feel 
familiar to us because we recognise in them fundamental features of our identity. Hence, when 
Graham Greene’s accidental English spy in Havana, Wormold, encounters Carter, a fellow 
Englishman, Wormold finds Carter representative of ‘English midlands, English snobbery, 
English vulgarity, all the sense of kinship and security the word England implied to him’.673 
Wormold even finds security in Carter’s ‘vulgarity’: ‘You could appeal to him as you could 
appeal to an English policeman, because you knew his thoughts.’674 Hence, the constitutive 
nature of the national community creates ‘bonds of commonality tying us to [our national 
community]’675 and to each other—and it is this commonality, with which we identify, that 
evokes a sense of familiarity and recognition between co-nationals. 
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This familiarity, of course, is importantly limited to a mere sense of it, which is the 
consequence of the imagined quality of the national community. Unless we gain a deeper 
understanding of fellow members as individuals, we can only ever experience a sense, an 
approximation, of the profound familiarity that we have with our family and friends. 
Nonetheless, this sense of familiarity transmutes our relations with fellow members into quasi-
intimate relations because it arises from a deep and significant sharing: a constitutive national 
identity. This sharing signals that my co-nationals are, in an important, foundational way, ‘like 
oneself that primarily distinguish them from others’.676 As Miller says, even though people may 
have difficulties articulating what differentiates their national community from others, they 
‘may have an intuitive sense, when confronted with foreigners, of where the differences lie’.677 
Due to the national community’s profound constitutive influence on our identity, we feel as if 
we know our fellow members even though they are strangers to us. It is in this way that the 
constitutive national community becomes a quasi-intimate community: we feel a sense of 
connectedness to our fellow members, and this sense of connectedness, of familiarity, gives 
rise to social friendship. This sense of familiarity is sufficient to place co-nationality into the 
category of personal relationships characterised by special obligations, such that Miller’s ethics 
of community can be applied to the national community.  
So far, I have explained the basis of co-nationals’ social friendship towards each other: 
it is the sense of familiarity produced by sharing a constitutive national identity. This also gives 
rise to feelings of obligation, in largely the same way that I feel obliged to read John’s paper 
even when I am too busy to do so. But are the sense of familiarity and feelings of obligation 
enough to ground the special obligations that Miller argues we owe to our co-nationals? Tamir 
thinks that they are. Membership obligations, she argues, ‘are not grounded on consent, 
reciprocity, or gratitude, but rather on a feeling of belonging or connectedness’.678 Social 
friendship, in other words, is enough to give rise to special obligations; feeling obliged, on this 
account, is the same as being obliged.  
While feelings of obligation towards those we care about usually reflect an obligation, 
Tamir’s position is vulnerable to a formidable challenge. Dagger, for instance, has countered 
that ‘[t]he fact that people feel themselves to be under an obligation to their polity does not 
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mean that they are under such an obligation’.679 After all, we can be mistaken in our feelings 
of obligation: a woman may feel obliged to protect her abusive husband from the law, but she 
does not owe him any such obligation. Likewise, even though I feel obliged to John to read his 
paper, if he has done something to undermine our friendship, then I may no longer be obliged 
to do anything for him.  
We therefore need to establish special obligations within the national community on 
firmer grounds—and we can do so by applying Miller’s ethics of community to the nation. 
Recall that Miller says that the ethics of community mandate that loyalties and obligations 
between members are mutual and reciprocal. The second component of my argument, then, is 
based on the idea of reciprocity: those who contribute to the community can expect to be 
benefited by fellow members, and those who have benefited are obliged to extend the benefit 
to their fellow members.680 Not only has the national community provided us with the concepts, 
practices, language, way of life etc with which to form our identity as its members; but it is 
also the overarching political community within which our various constitutive communities 
have flourished, thereby enabling us to become the multifaceted individuals that we are. The 
national community has enabled us to form our identity, to lead meaningful lives as members 
of our various communities, through interactions with fellow members of the national 
community. It is thus a mutually beneficial community: to recall the Constituted Autonomous 
Self, our identity is formed in a dialogical process with others, and we need these others—other 
members of the national community—to flourish.  
To share a national constitutive community is to identify as a member of the national 
community; this, in turn, entails caring for fellow members’ well-being, and seeing their 
successes and failures as our own. Since we have benefited, and continue to benefit, from the 
national community’s framework, we have an obligation to ensure that our fellow members 
receive the same benefits and advantages that we have received so that they can live 
meaningfully as members of their constitutive communities. Given the fact of the modern 
nation-state and my stipulation of the civic nation, constitutive communities need the national 
community to thrive. This impacts on us as individuals because these constitutive communities 
delineate the context in which our identity is formed, and so we need the national community 
to form our identity and live meaningful lives as members of our constitutive communities. 
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Having benefited from the national community’s framework, we are obliged to sustain the 
national community as a mutually beneficial community in which members are able to live 
meaningfully as members of their constitutive communities. This is also an obligation to enable 
fellow members to live meaningfully as such.  
To whom are our special obligations owed? While I do not discount the notion that we 
owe special obligations to the national community as a whole, it seems more to meaningful to 
say that these obligations are owed to the individual members who comprise the national 
community. A community, after all, is a gathering of individuals. As Mark C. Murphy has 
argued, when we give reasons to promote some state of affairs that is good for a community, 
these reasons are derived from ‘the good of the persons whose lives that association affects’.681 
In the same vein, our obligation to sustain the national community is an obligation to fellow 
members of our national community to do so, in order that they may benefit, like we have, 
from the national community. We are thus obliged to sustain the national community in a 
particular way: as a mutually beneficial community where everyone can live meaningfully as 
members of all their constitutive communities.  
What happens when the national community is not mutually beneficial but oppressive? 
Do the repressed constitutive communities in a national community—black people in racist 
America, say—owe any obligations to the repressive national community? In such instances, 
it could be said that whatever feelings of obligations that black Americans may have are 
mistaken. More importantly, it would be incumbent on those in a better position who identify 
as members of the national community to discharge their obligations. This relates to the duty 
to include which I will discuss in Part II.  
To sum up the discussion: I have argued that the sharing of a constitutive national 
identity justifies special obligations between co-nationals. First, it gives rise to a sense of 
familiarity such that co-nationality is sufficiently like personal relationships. Second, since the 
national community is a quasi-intimate community, Miller’s ethics of community apply—and 
the notion of reciprocity justifies special obligations between members. Given that we have 
received advantages from the mutually beneficial national community with which we identify, 
we are obliged to sustain the national community so that fellow members can receive the same 
benefits as well.  
 




II. THE DUTY TO INCLUDE 
How can we derive the normative duty to include from the account of social friendship and 
special obligations? Special obligations, to reiterate, direct members to act in a manner that 
they ordinarily would towards each other but for their social friendship reaching its limit. In 
other words, special obligations inform members what they ought to do given their ordinary 
feelings of special concern towards fellow members: since members ordinarily care about the 
well-being of their fellow members, they ought to still demonstrate this concern when their 
social friendship runs out.   
What is the content of these special obligations? The examples that Miller gives include 
a duty to defend the nation and its ancestral territory, a duty to preserve the community’s culture 
and territorial integrity, and a special responsibility towards their co-nationals which would 
justify giving them priority when acting as individuals and when making public policy.682 As 
mentioned, however, the precise content of these special obligations is ultimately determined 
by the national community’s public culture, or the core features of what I call the national 
identity. Hence, if one feature of the national identity is a strong valuation of national defence, 
then an obligation might be compulsory national service for its members. 
 But is there a baseline special obligation that members in a national community owe to 
each other, one that holds true regardless of the core features of the national identity? I will 
argue that this baseline obligation is the duty to include. I call it the duty, and not obligation, to 
include because ‘duty’ more strongly connotes a sense of a responsibility that cannot be shirked 
at will, without good reasons, and thus carries greater binding force. ‘Duty’ also corresponds 
to the interest theory of rights that the thesis presupposes. How does this duty come about, and 
what does it mean to include? 
 
a. Community and Inclusiveness 
The duty to include is essentially derived from the inherently inclusive concept of community. 
A community is a group of people who associate with each other based on some commonalities, 
which are the criteria for membership. A community is thus an inclusion of individuals who 
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meet the relevant membership criteria. This inclusion is augmented by the flip side of the coin, 
exclusion: individuals who do not possess the relevant membership criteria are excluded from 
the community.  
The community’s exclusionary effect and power heighten the moral significance of its 
inclusiveness. Members of the community include only those who meet the membership 
criteria because they enjoy a shared way of life based on these criteria. This way of life is 
valuable to the community’s members because it gives meaning to their lives; and this quality 
is intensified by the fact that outsiders—those who do not fulfil the membership criteria—
cannot ordinarily grasp or understand the meaning and value of this way of life. It is because 
members value this way of life that they include as fellow members all the individuals who 
meet the membership criteria so that they can enjoy this way of life, too. To take it further, it 
is because this way of life is meaningful that the community should include as fellow members 
those who meet the membership criteria, because they ought to be able to enjoy it as well.  
 The above contains two concepts of community: community in the descriptive sense, 
and community in the normative sense. The duty to include moves from the descriptive to the 
normative. The descriptive concept, obviously, describes what it means for a group of people 
to form a community. As Mason puts it, community in the descriptive (what Mason calls 
ordinary) sense is ‘constituted by a group of people who share a range of values, a way of life, 
identify with the group and its practices and recognize each other as members of that group’.683 
The constitution of a community by a shared range of values and way of life is an inclusion of 
people who share these values and way of life, and who recognise each other as members of 
the community.  
 We can move from the descriptive to the normative conception of community by 
considering what a community whose way of life is valued by members should do. This 
community should include as members all individuals who meet the membership criteria 
because this way of life is valuable to them as well—and this is certainly true for constitutive 
communities. As discussed in Chapter Three,684  our constitutive communities are morally 
valuable because they provide the framework in which we form our identity and make choices 
about things of value. Given the moral significance of these communities to our lives, the only 
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morally relevant factor in determining who counts as a member is whether the individual meets 
the membership criteria. If she does, then she should be included as a member, and ought not 
be excluded for morally irrelevant reasons. A morally irrelevant reason to exclude someone 
who meets the membership criteria is one based on stipulations that have nothing to do with 
the criteria for membership. For instance, if the morally relevant criterion for membership in 
the X community is only that members must possess X, then someone who possesses X cannot 
be excluded because she also possesses Y. Nothing in the membership criterion—that one has 
to possess X—states that one cannot simultaneously possess Y. The possession of Y would 
only be a morally relevant reason to exclude the individual if possessing Y fundamentally 
conflicts with the X community’s foundational principles; this will be explored further below.  
 The above is the first step of the normative conception, which works at the level of 
entry: it obliges the community to admit as members those who possess the morally relevant 
criteria for membership. But the notion of including entails more than mere club entry. The 
second step spells out what it means to include—and it essentially involves a recognition of 
and respect for members’ equality of membership so as to foster their sense of belonging to the 
community in the long run, which also sustains the community as a whole. Members recognise 
each other’s equality of membership in the substantive sense by displaying social friendship 
towards them, and demonstrate special concern for fellow members’ interests by giving ‘each 
other’s interests some non-instrumental weight in their practical reasoning’.685 This also means 
that, according to Mason’s moralised concept of community,686 there must be an absence of 
systematic exploitation and injustice between members. One is only counted as an equal 
member of the community if other members give her interests due concern in their decision-
making process. Similarly, a community that exploits some members to further its own goals 
in the public sphere does not respect their equality of membership because, in virtue of the 
exploitation, these members are treated unequally as lesser members whose interests are 
unworthy of special concern. As John Baker says, relationships of exploitation ‘mock the very 
idea of community’.687 Recognising equality of membership in this way fosters members’ sense 
of belonging by taking their membership in the community seriously. Because it is taken 
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seriously, they count as integral members of the community; indeed, they belong to the 
community.   
In sum, community in the normative sense should include all who possess the 
membership criteria by, first, admitting them as members; and second, recognising and 
respecting their equality of membership so as to foster a long-term sense of belonging. One 
way to do this is to show particular concern for their interests by not sacrificing some members’ 
interests in a utilitarian calculus to advance the community’s overall interest. Community in 
the normative sense is thus an inclusion of all individuals who possess the morally relevant 
criterion for membership despite their differences. As Yack succinctly puts it, ‘communities 
are composed of individuals who focus their attention on something that bridges, rather than 
erases, their differences’.688 
As mentioned previously, however, social friendship is finite. Social friendship tends 
to reach its limits when members’ interests come into conflict, or when they simply dislike 
some other members’ interests for whatever reason. In such circumstances, members would 
have to ask, ‘What do we owe to each other given our special relationship with each other as 
members of the same community?’ Since members ordinarily exhibit mutual concern for each 
other’s interests, they owe each other an obligation of mutual concern for each other’s interests. 
More generally, given that, by virtue of their membership in the community, they ordinarily 
include each other, it follows that they owe each other a minimal duty to include when social 
friendship runs out.   
The duty to include can now be formulated as follows. Given that the community’s 
shared way of life based on the morally relevant criteria for membership is valuable to those 
who meet the criteria, the community ought to include all of them as members. The community 
should thus admit as members those who possess the morally relevant criteria for membership, 
and recognise and respect their equality of membership. This requires members to take into 
account each other’s interests when making collective decisions in a manner that is 
commensurate with these interests’ value to fellow members. Members of the community 
ought also to ensure that fellow members are not exploited or treated unjustly. This duty, 
however, is not absolute; it ceases to apply if members hold beliefs or act in a manner that 
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violates the duty itself and/or the community’s foundational principles. I now turn to the duty 
to include in the national community. 
 
b. The National Community’s Duty to Include  
To recall my justification of special obligations in the national community,689 members have 
an obligation to enable fellow members to receive the same benefits that they have received 
from the national community: the ability to live meaningfully as members of their respective 
constitutive communities. The duty to include seeks to do precisely this by, first, requiring 
members to confer membership on those who bear the constitutive national identity; and 
second, to respect each other’s equality of membership so as to foster a long-term sense of 
belonging in the national community. To respect each other’s equality of membership is to 
allow everyone the ability to live meaningfully as members of their constitutive communities.  
 How, then, should the duty be discharged? I will first provide a negative answer. 
Members of the national community should not exclude fellow members for morally irrelevant 
reasons: their membership in other constitutive communities. These reasons are morally 
irrelevant because the national identity criterion for membership does not stipulate that 
members can only, or cannot, belong to a certain constitutive community. More importantly, 
the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, because premised on the constitutive communities 
theory, does not allow for any such stipulation, and asserts that the only morally relevant 
membership criterion in the national community is the shared national identity. This protects 
members from the social harms associated with their constitutive communities by requiring 
that they cannot be excluded from the national community, and hence treated unequally, simply 
because of these various memberships.  
It may be objected that the duty to include is unnecessary because it is self-evident that 
the national community would include everyone who is a citizen or a permanent resident. It is 
also conceptually trivial because a community is obviously an inclusive gathering of 
individuals who share commonalities, as I have described. The duty to include, then, far from 
being any kind of basic obligation, is a banality that merely states the obvious. While the 
objection is right in that that the duty to include is self-evident in a descriptive sense, it does 
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not automatically translate to an ethical obligation to actively and continuously include all 
members in the national community. A sexist national community, for instance, could decree 
that women are subject to the total control of their husbands or fathers; another national 
community organised along racial lines could deny their racial minorities the right to receive 
an education, or their religious minorities the right to worship; and so on. In these instances, 
special obligations between members plausibly still exist. The sexist national community could 
still promulgate welfare redistribution policies that benefit its poorest instead of the even poorer 
in a foreign land. The women in that country, and the minorities in the racist country, could 
plausibly still be willing to defend their countries against attacks by other countries.  
These kinds of national communities, however, are the sort that undermine the idea of 
community because of their sanctioned domination and exploitation. They are also contrary to 
the Inclusive Communitarian Approach by denying the constitutive communities of some of 
its members. Furthermore, the measures enacted by these national communities are precisely 
the social harms that we face which the duty to include aims to mitigate. Since the basic ethical 
duty to include cannot be taken as a given, it has to be formulated so as to confer equality of 
membership on all that possess the morally relevant criterion for membership in the national 
community, and protect them from the social harms associated with their other constitutive 
communities. The duty exhorts members of the national community to see each other as fellow 
members who share a common commitment to the national community, and to use their shared 
national identity to bridge their differences, thereby disallowing unequal treatment of some 
members based on morally irrelevant reasons.  
 The duty, then, consists of two steps. The first, threshold step is determining who 
possesses the morally relevant criterion for membership; and the second step is the recognition 
of, and respect for, each other’s equality of membership.  
 
i. Who Bears the National Identity? 
The first step is relatively straightforward: one’s citizenship is prima facie evidence that one 
bears the national identity. Although citizenship serves an evidentiary role in my theory, it has 
been given normative significance by some authors. It has been argued, for instance, that 
citizenship has a ‘normative component which includes the acceptance of national and societal 
values’ because citizenship ‘is about participation in social life … [and in] its most developed 
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form, it is real membership of a real community’.690 Since my theory ascribes normative and 
ethical significance to the national community, however, it is a shared national identity, 
evidenced prima facie by citizenship, that gives rise to special obligations in the national 
community. That said, the question of who bears the national identity is not determined by 
citizenship alone. Individuals who identify with a national community but are not citizens, 
perhaps because they were born elsewhere but have spent most of their lives in the national 
community, certainly fulfil the membership criterion, and should be formally recognised as 
members of the national community by being granted citizenship.  
The question may arise, however, whether national identity is a subjective or objective 
criterion. That is, is national identity something that is ascribed to an individual by others based 
on her citizenship, or does she have to identify as a member of the national community? The 
answer is a mix of both. Following from the discussion in Chapter Three about the significance 
of constitutive communities to identity,691 the national identity is both objectively determined 
and subjectively affirmed or rejected, as the case may be. An individual’s national identity is 
usually apparent from external facts about her; but, to recall the Fundamental Feature of 
constitutive communities, the extent to which she identifies as a member of her national 
community is a subjective matter. That said, because the national community is one of our 
constitutive communities, it is likely that its influence on our sense of identity and self-
understanding is deeper than we think. As Miller observes, ‘the attitudes and beliefs that 
constitute nationality are very often hidden away in the deeper recesses of the mind, brought 
to full consciousness only by some dramatic event’,692 such as the national community winning 
its first gold medal at the Olympics. In such momentous events,  
even those who profess their indifference to nationality … are very likely to find that, at those 
exceptional moments when the fate of the whole nation is determined collectively, their sense 
of identity is such that they see their own well-being as closely bound up with that of the 
community.693 
 
690 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore (Routledge 
1995) 30. See also Andrew Mason, Living Together as Equals: The Demands of Citizenship (Oxford University 
Press 2012). 
691 See Chapter Three, Part III(a), 144–149. 
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Miller’s claim could be challenged for overlooking the exceptional few who genuinely 
do not feel any sense of belonging to a national community because, for instance, they have 
spent their lives in many different countries and do not identify with any of them. Imposing a 
national identity on these individuals would be inappropriate because, say, it contradicts their 
identity as a cosmopolitan. Since bearing a national identity has ethical consequences, these 
individuals may be unfairly called upon by a national community with which they do not 
identify, which claims them as members simply based on their citizenship, to contribute to and 
make sacrifices for the national community.  
 This may not be entirely unfair, however, for two reasons. First, it is doubtful whether 
anyone can feel no special concern at all for the national community or communities in which 
they grew up. At a minimum, there are likely to be certain aspects of the national community’s 
way of life, even trivial ones, that have made a lasting imprint on the individual. Hence, a 
Nigerian-Italian living in Cambridge who does not identify with any national community may 
find himself eating a plantain in the Cambridge market square and reminiscing about how it 
reminds him of his childhood in Nigeria. Of course, this is not to claim that it amounts to a 
special concern for the Nigerian national community; the point is merely that, as Miller rightly 
states, the national community’s influence on identity is arguably often hidden away at the back 
of our minds. It may be, then, that, after some triggering event, such individuals would find 
themselves feeling a stronger sense of belonging with a particular national community than 
they had hitherto acknowledged.  
 Second, even if conceding that such individuals will never identify with any national 
communities, it is still not entirely unfair for the national community whose citizenship they 
have to claim them as members. To begin with, if these individuals are not resident in the 
national community’s political territory, this imposition of the national identity and its political 
obligations—save, perhaps, for the obligation to vote—are unlikely to have any practical 
consequences. Even if some political obligations are binding, it is arguable that they are not 
unjustly imposed. Having benefited from the national community in the past, these individuals 
should reciprocate to some degree. For instance, someone who has benefited from her national 
community’s universal healthcare system ought not complain about paying taxes to her 
national community, even if she does not identify with it. That said, some obligations are more 
onerous than others; the obligation to fight in a war for the national community would clearly 
be too onerous for someone who does not identify with it.  
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 In sum, the individual’s citizenship prima facie determines whether she bears the 
national identity. In this regard, it is largely an objective question, though it is also subjective 
because citizens have to affirm the national identity as an integral part of their identities. This 
subjective aspect requires that non-citizens who identify with the national community be 
legally recognised as members by being granted citizenship.  
 
ii. Equality of Membership 
How should members of the national community recognise and respect each other’s equality 
of membership? Essentially, this entails displaying special concern—that is, social 
friendship—for each other’s interest in their constitutive communities by not sacrificing them 
in a utilitarian calculus to advance the community’s overall interests, and enabling all members 
to live as members of their various constitutive communities—including the national 
community. Simply put, the duty to include aims to enable the national community’s members 
to live meaningfully as members of all their constitutive communities. The duty is thus directed 
at two aspects of members’ identities: as members of the national community, and as members 
of other constitutive communities.  
How can members of the national community recognise each other’s equality of 
membership? They ought to accept each other’s constitutive communities even if some profess 
beliefs that are diametrically opposed to their own. Acceptance can be demonstrated in two 
ways. First, members should not ordinarily have to choose between living as a member of the 
national community and as members of other constitutive communities because these 
memberships, ceteris paribus, are equally valuable. For instance, members of a religious 
constitutive community should not be forced to choose between two valuable constitutive 
communities if the national community imposes obligations that conflict with their beliefs. 
Second, members of the national community ought not be refrained from living as members of 
their other constitutive communities simply because some other members object to their 
identity or beliefs. The LGB community, for example, ought not be restricted merely because 
some religious communities object to their sexual orientation.  
These potential conflicts between constitutive communities (including the national 
community) are the problems faced by pluralistic societies alluded to at the start of this chapter; 
they are also instances when social friendship reaches its limit. The duty to include then steps 
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in to resolve these conflicts. Unlike a strand of liberal nationalist thought that solves conflicts 
between the national community and ‘communities below the level of the state … in favour of 
the former’,694 the duty to include requires that members of the national community be slow to 
impose their will on the constitutive communities under fire. The duty exhorts members to 
display special concern for their fellow members by appreciating the importance of their 
constitutive communities to their lives. This trades on the fact members have their own valued 
constitutive communities, and thus can appreciate the value of these constitutive communities 
to their fellow members, and accept a reasonable compromise in cases of conflict.  
For example, a national community that imposes political obligations that conflict with 
a religious community’s beliefs ought to accommodate these religious members by providing 
an alternative way for them to fulfil their obligations without violating their religious beliefs. 
Likewise, the religious community opposed to homosexuality has to accept that the LGB 
community, being fundamentally important to their fellow members, has as strong a right to an 
equal existence in the national community as the religious community. The duty to include is 
then discharged because accepting these positions demonstrates respect for fellow members’ 
equality of membership. They take members’ interest in their constitutive communities 
seriously by allowing them, as far as possible, to live meaningfully as members of their 
constitutive communities, instead of sacrificing them to serve a collective interest, or to 
sacrifice one (e.g. the LGB community) to please another (e.g. the religious community). This 
also recognises that, ceteris paribus, all constitutive communities are equally valuable and thus 
have the space to thrive within the national community.   
However, the duty to include is not absolute. The national community’s members owe 
no such duty to a constitutive community whose constitutive beliefs violate the duty to include, 
in which case the national community can justifiably ban its existence. A white supremacist 
community, for instance, is constituted by the belief that the white race is superior to all other 
races, and denigrates other races as inferior to promote this belief. This belief is deeply violative 
of the duty to include because it excludes some members for morally irrelevant reasons and 
denies their equal moral worth. Hence, the duty to include ceases to apply to the white 
supremacist community: its violation of the duty is a morally relevant reason to exclude it from 
the national community. Consequently, the national community would be justified in banning 
the community altogether. The same argument applies to a constitutive community that is 
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constituted by homophobia, or some other ideology that is rooted in a belief that denies the 
equal moral worth of some members. Hence, a religious community constituted only by the 
belief that LGB members are inferior to non-LGB members can also be banned.  
What happens when the beliefs and/or activities that seem to violate the duty to include 
are more nuanced than my account so far? This is especially pertinent when it comes to the 
tension between religious communities and LGB communities. Many religious communities 
hold the view that homosexuality is a sin, and religious leaders often preach exactly that to 
their congregation. But what if these religious communities do not call for LGBs to be driven 
out of the national community, but instead, tell its members to treat LGBs with compassion 
even if they consider homosexuality a sin? In such cases, to hold that these religious 
communities violate the duty to include, such that the national community can justifiably ban 
them, would be too hasty because it would fail to notice that, unlike the white supremacist or 
homophobic communities, these religious communities are not constituted by the duty-
violating belief. Put another way, the belief that homosexuality is an abomination is not the 
raison d'être of the religious communities’ existence, as it is constituted by other beliefs as 
well: the existence of a god, the god’s goodness, love for your neighbours, and so on. The white 
supremacist/homophobic communities, on the other hand, are constituted by the duty-violating 
beliefs. The very definition of these communities is a denigration of other members of the 
national community.  
A distinction must be drawn, then, between a violation of the duty to include arising 
from the raison d'être of the constitutive community, and a violation that forms part of a wider 
set of beliefs. The national community can ban the existence of the former constitutive 
community; and if this distinction is sound, what ought to be done about the religious 
community that preaches compassion towards LGBs?695 While these communities ought not 
be banned because their raison d'être does not violate the duty to include, their activities can 
justifiably be restricted. The national community can, for instance, require the religious 
constitutive community to confine its preaching to its private place of worship, and its leaders 
barred from speaking publicly against homosexuality. The national community would have to 
justify, first, the restrictions to the religious community; and second, the fact that the religious 
community can continue to preach that homosexuality is a sin to the LGB community. Such 
justifications should appeal to the special significance of membership in the national 
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community and the feelings of social friendship that ordinarily exist in the national community. 
The justification could be something like this: even though some aspects of your fellow 
members’ constitutive communities are fundamentally opposed to yours, you should 
nevertheless give them some latitude to carry out the objectionable activities. Since they are 
fellow members of your national community, you should show them special concern by 
appreciating that these objectionable activities are fundamental to their identities and accept 
that a compromise is necessary so that you can both live meaningfully as members of your 
constitutive communities. This is what respect for each other’s equality of membership 
requires.  
 This solution may strike some as unsatisfactory. The very idea that the justification 
appeals to membership in the national community and the social friendship between members 
seems self-defeating because the conflict was brought about by the failure of social friendship 
in the first place. Why would appealing to social friendship that is already spent be successful 
in a situation where both groups are incurring a loss? That is, the religious community is told 
to restrict its activities, and the homosexual one is told to accept that the religious community 
can continue to preach in private that its constitutive community is sinful.  
 Admittedly, the solution is imperfect. Nonetheless, the social friendship that ordinarily 
exists in the national community, and its resulting ethical significance, must be the fulcrum of 
resolutions to these conflicts. This is because, as explained earlier, nationality is a powerful 
source of identity, which makes the national identity a potent motivator for ethical behaviour. 
In cases where social friendship has failed, the duty to include steps in to direct members to 
take the right ethical action; but it does not mean that social friendship has failed entirely. In 
the process of discharging the duty to include towards each other, members could be reminded 
that the opposing constitutive community is composed of fellow members of the national 
community, a fact that is easy to overlook in the heat of controversy. Reminding them of their 
shared national identity could revitalise their feelings of social friendship and motivate them to 
accept the compromise. In any event, this imperfect solution is arguably more plausible than 
each side trying to convince the other of the truth of their positions, which, given the deep-
seated nature of the clashing constitutive communities, is unlikely to be successful.  
 I have argued that the duty to include requires members of the national community to 
recognise and respect each other’s equality of membership by displaying special concern for 
each other’s interest in their constitutive communities. In cases where conflicts arise between 
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constitutive communities (including the national community) and social friendship reaches its 
limit, the duty steps in and directs members to the appropriate ethical action. The duty does so 
by requiring members of the national community to appreciate that their fellow members’ 
constitutive communities are important sources of meaning to their lives, and to demonstrate 
special concern for them by accommodating those that clash with their own. Where there are 
compromises, the losses incurred on both sides should be mutually justified by reminding them 
of the social friendship within the national community.  
 
c. A Thin Theory of the Communitarian Politics of the Good  
The duty to include relates back to the second conceptual claim about communitarianism that 
I made in Chapter 2: communitarianism promotes only a thin theory of the good of 
inclusiveness. How can the communitarian state promote this good? I will consider this 
question in relation to 1) members of the national community; and, very briefly, 2) the state’s 
treatment of non-members. 
 
i. Members of the National Community  
The good of inclusiveness ultimately aims to enable everyone to live meaningfully as members 
of their various constitutive communities within the national community. As already argued, 
this requires the national community to confer equality of membership on all its members, and 
to recognise and respect this equality of membership. The good of inclusiveness, then, is a 
recognition of the ‘full membership of fellow citizens wrongly excluded from the common 
life’ 696  of the national community. Hence, to achieve equality of membership, the 
communitarian state should first confer equal citizenship on all who fulfil the national identity 
criterion for membership. De jure equality of citizenship, however, does not always guarantee 
de facto equality. Equality of membership is undermined when certain constitutive 
communities are singled out for criminalisation, for instance, based on the prejudices of the 
majority in the national community. The role of the communitarian state in promoting the good 
of inclusiveness is to ensure that equality of membership is not unduly undermined by a 
tyrannical majority trying to exclude unpopular constitutive communities for morally irrelevant 
 
696 Sandel, Public Philosophy (n 359) 153–154. 
197 
 
reasons. This can be done by repealing laws that target unpopular constitutive communities, or 
by enacting laws to protect them.  
Legal recognition of membership equality is but the first step towards promoting the 
good of inclusiveness. Its substantive promotion involves assisting members of the national 
community to discharge their duty to include by putting in place the necessary measures to 
facilitate an understanding of what it means to recognise and respect each other’s equality of 
membership. Given that the national community is constituted by its members’ shared national 
identity, the communitarian state can adopt nation-building measures that promote this national 
identity. It can, first, mould public education to inculcate in students the importance of the duty 
to include by emphasising that, despite differences, every member of the national community 
is an equal member. This can be done by teaching students about the national community’s 
shared history: its formation as a community with its unique identity, constituted by its 
members’ diverse and oft-conflicting constitutive communities which it has accepted and 
accommodated. Historical instances of mutual aid and concern, when members of different 
constitutive communities came together to help each other in times of need, are especially 
salient in illustrating the plausibility and importance of commonality in plurality, of forging a 
common national identity that encompasses members’ different identities.  
The second measure that the communitarian state can take in its nation-building efforts 
is to mould public education in a way that nurtures students’ respect for, and acceptance of, 
each other’s constitutive communities. This means that the state should adopt educational 
policies that actively promote the equal status of all constitutive communities, especially 
historically marginalised ones. For instance, Bell’s suggestion that legislation be enacted to 
‘[promote] schoolbooks which portray homosexuals in a positive light’697 would help to reverse 
historical and socially entrenched prejudices against LGBs. This would also ameliorate the 
conflict, discussed earlier, between the religious and LGB communities. The hope is that public 
education in the manner that Bell has suggested will, over time, lead to a greater acceptance of 
historically marginalised minorities.   
In a similar vein, syllabi for humanities subjects such as literature and philosophy can 
also be designed in a way that promotes the contribution of historically marginalised 
constitutive communities, and which portray them in a less stereotypical and more holistic 
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light. For instance, canonical literary texts, selected and reinforced by a specific class of 
individuals, should be interspersed with works by women and non-white authors so that 
students are exposed to a diverse range of views and experiences. Classics that are (rightly) 
judged racist, sexist, homophobic, etc by today’s standards should be taught alongside works 
that counter the viewpoints expressed in those classic texts. This is to enable students to gain a 
deeper understanding of the experiences and struggles of fellow members of the national 
community. All in all, public education should be moulded in a way that ‘[equips] students to 
become good citizens, capable of contributing meaningfully to public deliberations and 
pursuits’.698 The chief pursuit is, of course, the good of inclusiveness.  
Moving away from education, the third thing that the communitarian state can do in its 
nation-building efforts is to refrain from interfering with the national community’s 
determination of its identity, stepping in only when the duty to include is violated. The national 
identity is a deeply social phenomenon; its content is shaped and re-shaped by its members 
based on, among other things, their daily practices, their interactions with each other, and their 
ideas about what the national identity is. As such, the communitarian state has to respect the 
right to freedom of speech and expression, including freedom of the press. As Miller says, the 
national community’s ‘public culture is to some extent a product of political debate, and 
depends for its dissemination upon mass media’.699 The same applies to the national identity: 
its content is, to some extent, a product of public debate, which requires that members have the 
freedom to express their views on what the national identity is. The details of the debate, as 
well as its outcome, are then transmitted by an independent media. The communitarian state, 
then, ought to promote public debate about what the national identity is, what it means to bear 
it, and so on, particularly when it detects social fault lines, such as animosity towards an 
unpopular minority constitutive community. In such instances, the communitarian state should 
initiate official dialogue between opposing camps about the contentious issues so that members 
of the national community can be reminded of each other’s equal membership and social 
friendship. 
The fourth consideration for the communitarian state in its nation-building efforts is 
that it ought not impose a top-down conception of the national identity. In other words, the 
communitarian state should avoid the temptation of defining the national identity and foisting 
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it on the national community through, for instance, education. Such top-down imposition of a 
state-defined national identity is particularly objectionable when the national identity valorises 
the majority constitutive community or communities at the expense of other constitutive 
communities. When promoting the national identity, the communitarian state must always keep 
in mind that the national identity is pluralistic and multifaceted through and through; that it 
encompasses all the constitutive communities within the national community by embodying 
none of them. The national identity that the state promotes must be one that is true to members’ 
self-understanding, and which enables all of them to flourish in the national community as 
members of all their constitutive communities. To do otherwise would be to co-opt the national 
identity to serve statist interests, which would be illegitimate under the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach.   
These are but some ideas about how the communitarian state can promote the good of 
inclusiveness within my framework of civil-political rights. There may be socio-economic 
measures that the state ought to take to promote inclusiveness, such as a fair redistribution of 
wealth that enables the poorest segments of the national community to have access to the same 
resources as other members. Such considerations, however, are beyond the scope of the thesis, 
and so I will leave them aside.  
 
ii. Treatment of Non-Members 
Before concluding this chapter, it is necessary to comment, albeit too briefly, on how the 
communitarian state should treat non-members. As argued previously, our special obligations 
to our co-nationals does not exhaust all our ethical obligations. Hence, the duty to include does 
not allow us to violate our general ethical obligations to non-members. 
How should the communitarian state deal with this issue? To begin with what the 
communitarian state can do, the tension between special and general obligations arguably does 
not arise when the state denies non-members the right to vote, and when it adopts policies that 
favours members for employment. Arguably, too, the communitarian state can place reasonable 
restrictions on non-members’ right to freedom of expression on issues that exclusively concern 
the national community, especially if non-members are trying to stir up inter-community 
tension. The assumption here is that non-members do not have a stake in the national 
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community and its way of life, and so their right to expression on issues that concern the 
national community is comparatively less important.  
What, then, of the measures that the communitarian state cannot adopt against non-
members within its territory? The general principle is that the laws and policies that the 
communitarian state adopts to promote the good of inclusiveness cannot discriminate against, 
or disadvantage, non-members in a way that conflicts with our obligations to human beings as 
such. Undoubtedly, the question of what exactly these obligations are is a protracted one, and 
it would be vastly beyond the scope of the thesis to discuss it in depth. At the risk of over-
simplification, then, our general ethical obligations to human beings are determined by how 
we ought to treat them as moral beings; to invoke Kant, as if they were ends in themselves. 
This, in turn, requires us to respect and protect the basic interests that they have as moral beings, 
such as life, bodily integrity, the avoidance of physical pain, and so on. For instance, we treat 
someone as an end in herself when we prohibit the use of torture because we recognise that 
torture is a ‘consequentialist [trade-off] of one person’s welfare or liberty for the sake of others 
[which fails] “to take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals”’.700 In this light, 
the policies and laws that the communitarian state adopts to promote the good of inclusiveness 
cannot violate these basic interests and the rights that protect them.701 For instance, it would be 
illegitimate for the communitarian state to violate non-members’ right to life by imposing the 
death penalty on non-members but not members.   
Ultimately, however, where exactly the communitarian state ought to draw the line 
when promoting the good of inclusiveness can only be determined based on specific situations 
with which the state is confronted. Nonetheless, the general guiding principle is that, in 
promoting its national community’s good of inclusiveness, the communitarian state must 
ensure that it does not treat non-members within its territory in a manner that undermines them 
as subjects of our moral consideration. This would also enable members of the national 
community to discharge their obligations to each other without violating their general ethical 
obligations to human beings as such.  
 
700 Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House (Oxford University Press 
2010) 15.  
701 It should go without saying that, as a general matter, the communitarian state cannot enact laws or adopt 






This chapter has established the second element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach to 
rights: the duty to include. I began by arguing, following Miller, that the nation should be 
conceived of as the national community, i.e. an ethical community where members owe each 
other special obligations. Following Yack, I drew a distinction between two concepts: social 
friendship and special obligations. I argued that we are ordinarily motivated by social 
friendship in our ethical behaviour towards those to whom we are intimately related; but we 
act out of obligation towards them when social friendship reaches its limits. Hence, special 
obligations should be understood as filling the gap when social friendship runs out.  
I then addressed the question of how special obligations flowing from nationality can 
be justified given the important differences between the national community and intimate 
communities. I assumed that particular obligations to friends, family and so on are morally 
acceptable, and provided an argument for why special obligations between co-nationals can be 
classified as a type of particular obligations. I argued that it is the sharing of a constitutive 
national identity which gives rise to a sense of familiarity between members, such that the 
national community is a quasi-intimate community, and our relations with our fellow members 
sufficiently like our intimate relations. From this, I applied Miller’s ethics of community to the 
national community; specifically, the principle of reciprocity. I argued that, because we have 
benefited from the framework established by the national community within which we have 
thrived in our constitutive communities, we are obliged to our co-nationals to sustain the 
national community so that they, too, may live meaningfully as members of their constitutive 
communities.  
 I went on to argue that the duty to include is a basic obligation that we owe to fellow 
members of the national community. I derived the duty from the inherently inclusive concept 
of community. In the national community, the duty to include applies as long as individuals 
meet the morally relevant criterion for membership, i.e. a shared national identity. The duty 
requires that members recognise and respect each other’s equality of membership, which 
entails demonstrating special concern for members’ ability to live meaningfully as members of 
their constitutive communities within the national community. I concluded the chapter by 
reiterating that communitarian politics can promote only a thin theory of the good, i.e. 
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inclusiveness; then suggested a few ways in which the communitarian state can, and cannot, 
promote this good.  
 I have now established the two core elements of the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach. It re-conceptualises the important interests that constitutional rights protect as our 
constitutive communities and our interest in them. Hence, when conflicts arise, members 
should discharge their duty to include and continue to demonstrate special concern for the 
importance of fellow members’ constitutive communities by not unduly restricting or 
prohibiting the existence and/or activities of the contested constitutive communities, so that 
every member of the national community can live meaningfully as members of their various 
constitutive communities.  
 In the final chapter, I revisit Singapore and apply the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach to the cases discussed in Chapter 1. It will be shown that, the Inclusive 








This chapter refocuses on Singapore and does two things: it demonstrates the relevance of the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach to Singapore and applies it to the cases discussed in 
Chapter One. As shown in Chapter One, Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ 
communitarian approach to rights has led to a disjunction between the elevated status of rights 
and their scant protection in practice. This suggests that Singapore’s ‘collective over 
individual’ approach is problematic—and so in Chapter Two, I showed that ‘collective over 
individual’ could not survive a normative critique in light of both ‘Asian’ and ‘Western’ 
communitarianism; as such, Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ communitarianism should 
be abandoned. In Chapters Three and Four, I developed the two core elements of the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach, designed to protect rights within a communitarian framework. In 
this chapter, then, I will show that the Inclusive Communitarian Approach will lead to a 
successful outcome in the cases discussed in Chapter One.  
 I precede the reinterpretation exercise by establishing, in Part I, how the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach is relevant to Singapore. Although the Approach has general 
applicability, demonstrating its relevance to Singapore would ameliorate, if not remove, the 
sting of potential criticisms that it is irrelevant because it does not take into account Singapore’s 
unique context. I will show that applying the Inclusive Communitarian Approach would not be 
foisting an alien theory to Singapore because the two elements of the Approach are already 
present, albeit minimally, in Singapore’s communitarianism. The constitutive communities 
theory is implicit in Singapore’s definition of community, and the duty to include’s emphasis 
on the nation can be found in some of Singapore’s constitutional rights cases.  
Most of all, the normative core of the duty to include—that members of the national 
community should recognise each other’s equality of membership—is arguably the essence of 
one of Singapore’s foundational principles: multiracialism. I will argue that Singapore’s 
multiracialism, even though couched in terms of racial equality, has at its core the ideal of 
equality simpliciter. As such, the duty to include bolsters Singapore’s existing philosophical 
commitments. This will be followed, in Part II, by the application of the Inclusive 
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Communitarian Approach to the cases discussed in Chapter One. I will demonstrate how an 
emphasis on the values that the Approach advances will produce a successful outcome in the 
cases. 
 
I. THE INCLUSIVE COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH AND SINGAPORE 
I make three claims in this Part to establish the relevance of the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach to Singapore. First, I will show that Singapore’s definition of community contains a 
trace of the constitutive conception of community developed in Chapter Three. Second, I will 
show that the emphasis on the nation is evident in some of Singapore’s constitutional rights 
case law. Third, I will argue that the normative core of the duty to include—essentially equality 
of membership—underpins one of Singapore’s foundational principles: multiracialism. I will 
show how multiracialism qua racial equality is premised on equality simpliciter, and argue that 
it should be extended as such; hence, the duty to include is consistent with Singapore’s 
multiracialism.  
 
a. Singapore’s Definition of Community  
To demonstrate how the first element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, constitutive 
communities, already exists in Singapore’s communitarianism, we have to recall the White 
Paper on Shared Values, 702  discussed in the Introduction. 703  In fleshing out Singapore’s 
communitarianism, the White Paper makes a few references to community. Community is 
explicitly mentioned in the first and third values: ‘nation before community and society above 
self’, and ‘regard and community support for the individual’. What does the White Paper mean 
by community?  
Its definition of community can be gleaned from its elaboration of the third value, 
community support for the individual. The White Paper’s idea of community support refers 
specifically to the various ways in which the different racial groups can help its members. 
 
702 White Paper (n 37).  
703 See Introduction, 8–11.  
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There are four official racial groups in Singapore: Chinese, Malays, Indians and Others.704 The 
White Paper suggests that the different racial groups can help its members in the following 
ways. The Chinese community can draw inspiration from the Chinese clan associations’ strong 
sense of social responsibility during the colonial period when they helped the newly arrived 
ethnic Chinese establish themselves.705 The Malays’ tradition of gotong royong (mutual help) 
and their ‘kampung (village) spirit are examples of the Malay community’s way of undertaking 
projects for the general good’.706 The Indians are organised in ‘sub-ethnic’ groups, and the 
Singapore Indian Development Association ‘has been formed to provide comprehensive social 
services to all Indian groups’.707 Such ‘community support’ for individuals, the White Paper 
concluded, ‘will keep Singapore a humane society … [and] avoid the dependent mentality and 
severe problems of a welfare state’.708  
As conceptualised by the White Paper, community support refers specifically to how 
each racial group can help its members; it does not refer to how other types of community, 
such as religious groups, schools, and even the nation, can support the individual. Its narrow 
definition of community is also evident from the meaning of community in the first value, 
‘nation before community’. The White Paper states that this value seeks to ensure that the 
‘parochial concerns’ of the racial communities do not come before the nation’s interests as a 
whole.709 There is thus a conceptual bifurcation of the racial group and the nation; to this end, 
the White Paper’s designation of the former as a community but not the latter once again points 
to a narrow definition of community—one that excludes the nation.  
Nonetheless, it is arguable that the White Paper adopts a constitutive understanding of 
community, albeit a very narrow one. By defining it as the Singaporean’s racial group, its 
definition is minimally constitutive because it refers to one of the suggested type of constitutive 
 
704 For an example of how the population is classified, see e.g. Singapore Department of Statistics, ‘M810671 – 
Singapore Citizens By Age Group, Ethnic Group And Sex, End June, Annual’ 
<www.tablebuilder.singstat.gov.sg/publicfacing/createDataTable.action?refId=15689> accessed 3 September 
2019. 
705 White Paper (n 37) [35]. 
706 ibid [36]. 
707 ibid [37].  
708 ibid [38]. 
709 ibid [21].  
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communities set out in Chapter Three: ethnicity.710 It can be said that the White Paper’s race-
based definition of community recognises the importance of the ethnic community to the 
individual’s self-understanding. It calls upon the ethnic constitutive community to provide 
assistance to its members that are specific to the ethnic constitutive community’s customs and 
traditions, such as the Malays’ tradition of gotong royong. In this limited sense, the White 
Paper’s definition of community as the racial group is minimally constitutive because it marks 
out one important communal attachment that has constituted our identity: ethnicity. Hence, the 
first element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach is already present in Singapore’s 
communitarianism.  
Nonetheless, Singapore should adopt the Inclusive Communitarian Approach because 
the White Paper’s minimally constitutive definition of community fails to capture the plurality 
of all our constitutive attachments. Given the importance of all our constitutive communities 
to our self-understanding, a constitutive conception of community is both necessarily and ought 
to be pluralistic. Since the White Paper already recognises one form of constitutive community, 
the spirit of this recognition, and its minimally constitutive definition of community, should be 
expanded to include all our constitutive communities. This is because, first, if it seeks to 
emphasise the importance of community in supporting its members, then its neglect of other, 
non-ethnic sources of support overlooks many potential sources of support. Churches, for 
instance, can be a potent avenue for support for less well-off individuals. Second, it should not 
be assumed that any single constitutive community is meaningfully constitutive for everyone. 
As argued in Chapter Three, the Constituted Autonomous Self is able to stand at some distance 
from its constitutive communities and critically affirm or reject them. Singaporeans, then, 
ought not be compelled into community support based on a constitutive community that they 
may not have affirmed.  
Third, and most importantly, the White Paper’s narrow definition of community as the 
racial group, particularly its exclusion of the nation from this definition, is inappropriate for 
multiracial Singapore. Its narrow definition of community suggests that there is a special bond 
between members of the same racial group simply by virtue of their shared ethnicity, which 
motivates them to support the less privileged members of their racial group. However, ethnicity 
arguably should not do so much normative work in multiracial Singapore. By suggesting that 
a special bond exists only between members of the same race, the White Paper is implicitly, 
 
710 I use race and ethnicity interchangeably.  
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and perhaps inadvertently, undermining the national community as a potent source of bonding 
and mutual assistance between members. Similarly, the suggestion that only the racial group is 
a community implies, dangerously, that only race invokes feelings of social friendship that 
inspires community support for the individual, while other communal attachments, including 
nationality, do not. The risk here is that, by defining community as the racial group only, it 
undermines an inter-racial—indeed, Singaporean—sense of community that is arguably crucial 
in multiracial Singapore.  
Furthermore, it inappropriately divides the national community into four discrete 
enclaves711 when the focus ought to be on what is shared: national identity. This ought to be 
the logical inference of Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ communitarianism and the first 
value, ‘nation before community and society above self’: we can only accept that we should 
place the interests of the collective—that is, the nation—above our own if we see our own good 
as intimately bound up with the collective’s good. But we are unable to adopt this point of view 
and the burdens that it imposes on us if our experience with Singaporeans from other racial 
groups is less meaningful because it is not a communal experience. The trouble, then, is that 
we focus too much on what separates us—our different ethnicities—instead of what unites us: 
our shared national identity.  
In sum, because the first element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach is in line 
with the White Paper’s minimally constitutive definition of community, the Approach is 
relevant to Singapore. Hence, Singapore ought to adopt the Approach and expand the spirit of 
its definition of community—the importance of the ethnic constitutive community to our self-
understanding, and the potency of the constitutive communities to offer support to its 
members—to all constitutive communities. This is particularly important in recognising the 
significance of the constitutive national community, and the shared national identity, as the 
force that brings together Singaporeans in multiracial Singapore.  
 
 
711 As Chua notes, the government’s ‘regrouping and discursive homogenization’ of the diversity that existed 
within the four racial categories—the ethnic Chinese consisted of many dialect groups; the Indians spoke different 
languages; and the Malay group also had linguistic differences—is ‘an enforced erasure of differences, so as to 
facilitate the ease of government and administration’: Chua, ‘Communitarianism without Competitive Politics in 




b. Significance of the Nation in the Constitutional Case Law 
It may be recalled that the analysis of the Singapore judiciary’s communitarian approach to 
rights conducted in Chapter One revealed an occasionally nationalistic bent in the decisions. In 
this regard, the second element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, the national 
community’s duty to include, coheres with the courts’ emphasis on the nation’s importance. In 
these cases, the courts referred, variously, to the nation, the national interest, national unity, 
and so on in justifying why a claimed constitutional right was not violated. These references, 
however, are shaped by Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ communitarianism; as such, 
they fail to appreciate the full normative force of the national community as argued in Chapter 
Four. This can be redressed by adopting the Inclusive Communitarian Approach.  
 Colin Chan v PP712 involved a number of constitutional challenges made by a group of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses alleging that the ban on their congregation and religious materials violated 
the Article 15 right to religious freedom. The Court of Appeal (CA) rejected their claim and 
asserted that the paramount mandate of the Singapore Constitution was the ‘sovereignty, 
integrity and unity’713 of Singapore. As such, any exercise of an individual right, such as the 
Witnesses’ right to religious freedom, that threatens to undermine this unity cannot be 
supported. In the related Colin Chan v MITA,714 the CA also rejected their claim and stated that 
‘[a] refusal to do National Service which is required by law is disruptive of the national ethos 
and is unquestionably a matter in “the public interest”’.715  
Similarly, in Peter Williams Nappalli,716 a case in which a Jehovah’s Witness trainee 
teacher was dismissed for refusing to carry out the Ministry of Education’s (MOE) directive 
that all teachers must participate in the pledge and anthem ceremony, the High Court (HC) 
cited the MOE’s objective of ‘preserving the sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore’ as 
an additional reason for holding that his dismissal did not violate Nappalli’s Article 15 right. 
This is because ‘Singapore’s success depends on, among other things, the unity of its multi-
racial and multi-cultural population’.717  When the case went on appeal in Nappalli Peter 
 
712 Colin Chan v PP (n 84).  
713 ibid [64] (emphasis added).  
714 Colin Chan v MITA (CA) (n 103).  
715 ibid [36]. 
716 Peter Williams Nappalli (n 125). 
717 ibid [46]. 
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Williams, the CA rejected Nappalli’s Article 15 violation claim again, and declared that ‘Article 
15 as a whole demonstrates that the paramount concern of the Constitution is a statement of 
citizen’s rights framed in a wider social context of maintaining unity as one nation’.718 
This nationalistic flavour of the courts’ reasoning is also present in two District Court 
(DC) cases. In Benjamin Koh,719 two individuals were convicted under the Sedition Act (SA)720 
for posting offensive anti-Malay remarks on an Internet forum. In convicting them of the 
offence, the District Court asserted, ‘Each individual living [in Singapore] irrespective of his 
racial origin owes it to himself and to the country to see that nothing is said or done which 
might … plunge the country into racial strife and violence.’721 These comments were echoed 
by the DC in Ong Kian Cheong,722 a case where a Christian couple was prosecuted under the 
Sedition Act for distributing evangelical tracts that partly denigrated other religions—including 
Islam—to Muslims. The DC asserted that, ‘[as] citizens of Singapore’,723 the couple had the 
responsibility to ensure that the evangelical tracts do not have a tendency to ‘cause social unrest 
thereby jeopardizing racial and religious harmony’724 before distributing them. Recall that the 
SA considers such a tendency to be an existential attack on Singapore. Viewed in this light, the 
DC’s comments in Ong Kian Cheong is nationalistic in wanting to preserve the country’s racial 
and religious harmony.  
Finally, the nationalistic element of the courts’ communitarian reasoning can be found 
in Chee Siok Chin.725 The applicants were barred from carrying out a four-person peaceful 
political protest because they ran afoul of regulations relating to public protests. They alleged 
that the regulations violated their Article 14 right to freedom of expression. In rejecting their 
allegations, the HC emphasised the importance of safeguarding the integrity of public 
governance in Singapore. It stated, ‘To spuriously cast doubt on that would be to improperly 
undermine both a hard-won national dignity and a reputable international identity.’726 
 
718 Nappalli Peter Williams (n 122) [26].  
719 Benjamin Koh (n 190).  
720 Sedition Act (n 187). 
721 Benjamin Koh (n 190) [8]. 
722 Ong Kian Cheong (n 192).  
723 ibid [82]. 
724 ibid [31]. 
725 Chee Siok Chin (n 207).  
726 ibid [49] (emphasis added).  
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These excerpts show that the nation and related concepts played an important role in 
the courts’ communitarian constitutional rights adjudication, and so the importance that the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach ascribes to the national community is relevant to 
Singapore. But due to the courts’ ‘collective over individual’ communitarian adjudication, the 
nation is merely a collective, not a community. As we have seen in Chapter Four, the normative 
conception of community requires members to show special concern for each other’s interests 
by, minimally, not sacrificing these interests in a utilitarian calculus that advances the 
community’s overall interest. 727  This utilitarian calculus is precisely the force that drives 
‘collective over individual’. By prioritising the collective interest over the individual from the 
outset, this approach cannot properly account for the individual’s interests that the collective 
sacrifices for its overall good. As shown in Chapter One, the courts’ constitutional rights 
adjudication does not evince any special concern for the claimants’ constitutionally protected 
interests. Resultingly, the nationalistic element of the courts’ communitarian reasoning protects 
the nation as a collective, not a community.  
Nonetheless, we can cast the courts’ nationalistic sentiments in a more positive light by 
asking: what is the underlying spirit of these sentiments? Is there a normative reason to 
emphasise the importance of the nation? The reason is that, in diverse, multiracial Singapore, 
the nation, and the identity that it creates, are what hold Singaporeans together. It is a site of 
commonality at which Singaporeans—be they Chinese, Indian, Malay or other—converge, 
interact with each other, and live harmoniously with each other. The ideal of national unity is 
a helpful fiction that inspires us to overlook our surface differences and focus on what is 
common: national identity, also a fundamental feature of personal identity. The sharing, then, 
is deep and meaningful enough to provide the motivation for us to look past our differences. 
Since a stable and peaceful nation is beneficial for all, in the sense that lives would be disrupted 
if the nation were in a state of strife, it is important to emphasise national unity and harmonious 
relations between the races when dealing with constitutional issues that threaten to undermine 
them.  
The ideal of national unity, however, ought not be pursued as an end in itself, with no 
regard to those that it tramples upon along the way. This, unfortunately, appears to be the 
approach that the courts have taken. By sacrificing the interests of some at the altar of national 
unity and the nation, the courts sully not only the ideal of unity—for how can unity, defined as 
 
727 See Chapter Four, Part II(a), 185–187. 
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‘the state of being joined together or in agreement’,728 exist if some members are severed from 
the whole in disagreement?—but the very concept of community itself. Instead, the fiction of 
national unity should be geared towards an equality of membership of all in the nation, for it 
is only when there is such equality that it can be said that Singaporeans are united. Equality of 
membership is undermined and denied when some members’ interests are sacrificed in the 
aforementioned utilitarian calculus. Hence, in the Colin Chan cases, the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were denied equality of membership because their interest in their religious constitutive 
community was not given due consideration; this will be explained further in Part II below. In 
Benjamin Koh and Ong Kian Cheong, the accused persons were given deterrent sentences upon 
conviction. It is thus arguable, though admittedly less so, that equality of membership is 
undermined when some members, even if they have contravened the duty to include and the 
national community’s foundational principles (in this case, multiracialism) are used as a means 
to send a message to the national community about the severe consequences of undermining 
racial and religious harmony. As argued in Chapter Four, equality of membership requires that 
every member’s interests be given ‘some non-instrumental weight’729  in the community’s 
practical reasoning.730 
To properly harness the national community’s normative force, Singapore should adopt 
the Inclusive Communitarian Approach. This is especially so given that the duty to include 
aims to foster a sense of belonging by recognising and upholding the equality of membership 
of all members of the national community. Accordingly, then, the second element of the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach already exists in the courts’ communitarian approach to 
rights, and so the Approach is relevant to Singapore.  
 
c. Singapore’s National Community and Multiracialism  
In this section, I will argue that the normative core of the duty to include, equality of 
membership, is the underlying philosophical commitment of one of Singapore’s foundational 
principles: multiracialism. I will begin by briefly explaining why multiracialism is a 
 
728  Cambridge Dictionary, ‘Unity’ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/unity> accessed 3 
September 2019.  
729 Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging (n 659) 27. 
730 See Chapter Four, Part II(a), 185–187. 
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foundational principle of the Singaporean national community, and thus, a foundational feature 
of the Singaporean national identity. I will then argue why multiracialism qua racial equality731 
has at its core the ideal of equality simpliciter, such that the duty to include is consistent with 
multiracialism; further, multiracialism should be extended to equality simpliciter. Accordingly, 
the Inclusive Communitarian Approach is wholly relevant to Singapore.  
 
i. Multiracialism as the Foundational Principle of the Singaporean National Community 
It is widely acknowledged that multiracialism is a foundational founding myth of the 
Singaporean nation 732  and ‘a central element in … Singapore’s “national culture”’. 733 
Multiracialism essentially confers equal status on all Singaporeans regardless of race. Before 
explaining how multiracialism forms the foundation of the Singaporean national community, 
it is worth pointing out that multiracialism is as much an ideology as it is policy.734 That is, not 
only has the state made a philosophical commitment to it, but it is also a conscious policy 
adopted by the state to serve various ends. One such end is the ‘depoliticization of ethnicity’,735 
or what Chua terms a ‘[mechanism] of the government’s instrument of social control’.736 By 
instituting formal equality between the four racial groups in Singapore, the argument goes, no 
one racial group can attempt to promote its own language to the detriment of others. If any 
group or individual tries to do so, the state, as a neutral party between the four groups, is able 
to ‘police inter-racial boundaries’737 and impose sanctions. This theoretical possibility has 
certainly borne out in practice, as we have seen in the Benjamin Koh case.  
 Regardless of the ways in which the state has operationalised the multiracialism ideal, 
taken purely as ideology, it is a powerful one with a normative commitment worthy of respect. 
 
731 Although frequently expressed as multiracialism, in Singapore, race and religion are often treated as going 
hand-in-hand. Hence, multiracialism/racial equality should be understood to include religious equality.  
732 E.g. Michael D Barr and Zlatko Skrbiš, Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-Building 
Project (NIAS Press 2008); Hill and Fee (n 690) 4. 
733 Hill and Fee (n 690) 14. 
734 ibid 95. 
735 ibid 99. 
736 Chua Beng Huat, ‘Culture, Multiracialism, and National Identity in Singapore’ in Chen Kuan-Hsing (ed), 




It is the foundational principle of the Singaporean national community because the question of 
racial equality was chief amongst the many reasons Singapore split with Malaysia in 1965.738 
Although a Malay-majority country, Malaysia had (and still has) its own minority Chinese and 
Indian (among others) populations, whereas Singapore was (and still is) a Chinese-majority 
state with minority Malay and Indian (among others) populations. Michael Hill and Fee Lian 
Kwen claim that Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia ‘was essentially over the [Singapore 
government’s] intransigent stand on multiracialism’:739 the Singapore government advocated 
for multiracialism, a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’, 740  whereas the federal government in Kuala 
Lumpur insisted on a Malays-first policy to recognise the Malay population as Malaysia’s 
indigenous people.  
The two governments’ ideological split remains to this day. Multiracialism is 
constitutionally entrenched in Singapore; Article 12(2) of the Constitution prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of race. 741  This points to the fundamental importance of 
multiracialism and ‘indicates the type of community the Constitution is designed to sustain, 
reflecting the goal of nurturing the ethos and practice of ethno-religious pluralism’. 742 
Likewise, pro-Malay affirmative action is constitutionally entrenched in Malaysia: the ‘special 
position of the Malays’ is safeguarded in Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution by way of 
quotas reserved for Malays in public service, scholarships, universities and similar educational 
institutions, and licences for trade or business.743 Such affirmative action is at odds with the 
 
738  For a brief overview of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, see National Library Board, ‘Singapore 
Separates from Malaysia and Becomes Independent’ (History SG: An Online Resource Guide) 
<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/dc1efe7a-8159-40b2-9244-cdb078755013> accessed 3 September 
2019.  
739 Hill and Fee (n 690) 93. 
740 ‘Malaysian’, the nationality, should not be confused with ‘Malay’, the race. ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ refers to a 
Malaysia for all Malaysians regardless of race.  
741 Article 12(2) states: ‘Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination 
against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law or in the 
appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in the administration of any law relating to 
the acquisition, holding, or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, 
profession, vocation or employment.’ 
742 Thio, A Treatise on Singapore Constitutional Law (n 16) 693. 
743 Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Article 153(2). In contrast, Singapore’s Article 152, which also safeguards 
the Malays’ special position, only states in general terms that ‘[the] Government shall exercise its functions in 
such manner as to recognize the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, and 
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ideal of multiracialism on which the Singaporean nation is founded and which constitutes an 
integral part of the Singaporean national identity. In his address to the newly independent 
Singapore on 9 August 1965, founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew declared, ‘We are going 
to be a multi-racial nation in Singapore. We will set an example. This is not a Malay nation; 
this is not a Chinese nation; this is not an Indian nation. Everyone will have his place, equal: 
language, culture, religion.’744 In other words, Lee proclaimed a ‘Singaporean Singapore’. 
Multiracialism is thus an integral part of the state’s nation-building efforts. It is a central 
feature of the National Pledge, recited in schools every morning until the age of 18: ‘We, the 
citizens of Singapore pledge ourselves as one united people regardless of race, language or 
religion.’ Schools observe Racial Harmony Day on 21 July to commemorate the race riots that 
took place on the same day in 1964, and to ‘teach students the importance of maintaining racial 
and religious harmony in Singapore’s multicultural and multi-ethnic society’.745 Further, the 
red on the Singapore flag symbolises ‘universal brotherhood and equality of man’, while one 
of the five stars on the flag depicts Singapore’s ideal of equality.746 Multiracialism is also 
reflected in the fifth shared value of the White Paper, racial and religious harmony. 
Multiracialism has been augmented, at least in theory, by Singapore’s other foundational 
principle: meritocracy. Meritocracy ‘facilitates social mobility purely on the basis of hard work 
and achievement’,747 hence promoting the idea that success in Singapore is based on individual 
merit—which, as an ideal, is colour-blind. Combined with meritocracy, Hill and Fee argue that 
the ‘essence of multiracialism was the ability of all to advance, in whatever field, on the basis 
not of ascriptive criteria such as race, family, or sex, but rather solely on the basis of 
achievement, merit, and hard work’.748 
 
accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote 
their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language’. 
744 Quoted in Lee Hsien Loong, ‘National Day Message 2015’ (Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, 8 August 2015) 
<www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/national-day-message-2015> accessed 3 September 2019. 
745  Pei Ying Loh and Jamie Han, ‘Racial Harmony Day’ (Singapore Infopedia) 
<http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_965_2004-12-31.html> accessed 3 September 2019. 
746  National Heritage Board, ‘National Flag’ <www.nhb.gov.sg/what-we-do/our-work/community-
engagement/education/resources/national-symbols/national-flag> accessed 3 September 2019. 
747 Lily Kong and Brenda SA Yeoh, The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore (Syracuse University Press 2003) 
36. 




ii. The Limits of Singapore’s Multiracialism 
Laudable as Singapore’s multiracialism is for its commitment to racial equality, it nevertheless 
has its limits. Its biggest flaw is its intimate relationship with race consciousness, such that it 
has entrenched Singaporeans’ racial identity rather than diminished it. Due to the peculiar way 
in which the state has implemented its conception of multiracialism as formal equality between 
the four racial groups,749 Hill and Fee argue that multiracialism has led to a ‘hyphenated’ 
national identity that is ‘simultaneously ethnic and national’.750 In other words, multiracialism 
is not conceived as a colour-blind ideal; one’s race is as integral to the national identity as one’s 
Singaporeanness. While this is not a problem in itself, as we need to be able to live 
meaningfully as members of our various constitutive communities (of which race is one) to 
flourish, it is arguably a problem for the notion of equality that underpins Singapore’s 
multiracialism, and for fostering a sense of belonging to the national community. I will 
illustrate with two examples.  
One obvious flaw of the emphasis on race in Singapore’s multiracialism is that it 
undermines the ability of the national community to demonstrate social friendship to each other 
qua members of the national community, and provide assistance to less well-off members. 
Singapore’s current model of colour-conscious multiracialism, as explained in section (a) 
above, delegates social assistance to the racial groups themselves, which faces the problem of 
racialising social issues. Chua cites drug addiction as an instructive example. Drug addicts are 
statistically over-represented by the Malay population, and because of Singapore’s racial self-
help scheme, the Malay community is asked to assist in solving this problem. But Chua points 
out that drug addiction is ‘overwhelmingly a problem among lesser-educated and lower-income 
individuals’.751 Reducing it to a Malay problem, which the Malay self-help groups should 
solve, not only denies the Malay population the funds that they would otherwise have if 
 
749  An example is the Ethnic Integration Policy that imposes racial quotas for public housing. This was 
implemented in 1989 to tackle the formation of racial enclaves in certain parts of Singapore, which was seen to 
impede social and racial cohesion. Given that 80% of the population lives in public housing, this is a significant 
tool of social engineering. See National Library Board, ‘Ethnic Integration Policy Is Implemented’ (History SG: 
An Online Resource Guide) <http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/d8fea656-d86e-4658-9509-
974225951607> accessed 3 September 2019. 
750 Hill and Fee (n 690) 107. 
751 Chua, ‘Culture, Multiracialism, and National Identity in Singapore’ (n 736) 171. 
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community support were centrally administered, but also creates the unfair perception that the 
Malays are low-achieving, lazy drug addicts. This risks undermining the ideal of equality in 
terms of, first, an unequal administration of funds; and second, an unequal perception of all 
Singaporeans’ membership in the national community, if Malays are seen as less-than-equal 
members due to the prejudice against them. Furthermore, it denies the national community the 
opportunity to display social friendship to each other and work together to solve the social 
problem regardless of race, thereby overlooking a potentially potent nation-building effort.  
Another problem with Singapore’s hyphenated national identity is that, due to the high 
visibility of Chinese Singaporeans, there is a tendency to equate being Singaporean with being 
Chinese Singaporean. The recent discourse on ‘Chinese privilege’ 752  highlights the latent 
inequalities between races in Singapore society.  It is a privilege of the majority Chinese, the 
argument goes, to never have to justify one’s nationality to fellow Singaporeans, to never 
having one’s name, appearance or accent made fun of in school, to automatically satisfy job 
advertisements that ask for Mandarin speakers, to not being excluded from a group 
conversation conducted in Mandarin. To the privileged Chinese Singaporean, there is no racism 
in Singapore until some racial minorities are brave enough to speak out; and even then, a non-
Chinese Singaporean who tries to talk about race risks being accused of over-sensitivity by 
Chinese Singaporeans—because the Chinese Singaporean has never had to think about the 
colour of her skin within the confines of her tiny island.753  
We could combat the implicit assumption that Singaporean is synonymous with 
Chinese Singaporean by either dropping the hyphen in the Singaporean national identity, or 
increasing the number of hyphens. The state’s emphasis on racial identity has not led to racial 
 
752 E.g. Samantha De Silva, ‘Outside The Margins: Chinese Privilege in Singapore’ (Five Stars And a Moon, 23 
September 2014) <www.fivestarsandamoon.com/2014/09/outside-the-margins-chinese-privilege-in-singapore> 
accessed 3 September 2019; Cher Tan, ‘What Privilege Looks Like in Singapore’ (Vice, 7 January 2017) 
<www.vice.com/en_id/article/gvqa59/what-privilege-looks-like-in-singapore> accessed 3 September 2019; and 
Yuen Sin and Ng Wai Mun, ‘Being Chinese in Multiracial Singapore: A Framework to Check One’s Ignorance’ 
The Straits Times (Singapore, 15 February 2018) <www.straitstimes.com/opinion/being-chinese-in-multi-racial-
spore> accessed 3 September 2019. 
753 The social privilege enjoyed by the majority ethnic group in a society is, of course, not unique to Singapore. 
Indeed, the term ‘Chinese privilege’ was adapted from the ubiquitous discussion of white privilege in ‘Western’ 
societies and media. See e.g. Peggy McIntosh, ‘White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack’ Peace and 
Freedom (August 1989). 
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barriers being lowered in society, which means that the multiracial ideal remains exactly that: 
an ideal. To get us closer to the ideal, we ought to emphasise what is common (the national 
identity) and not what is divisive (the racial identity). However, this does not entail, nor should 
it entail, dropping the hyphen altogether. My commitment to a pluralistic constitutive 
conception of community requires that members of the national community are able to live as 
members of all their various constitutive communities—which, in turn, entails increasing the 
number of hyphens attached to the national identity to include all our constitutive communities. 
We are not just Chinese Singaporeans; we are also a woman who is a Chinese Singaporean, a 
gay man who is a Malay Singaporean, a Christian who is a male Indian Singaporean, and so 
on. Equality of membership would be a more realisable ideal in a national community where 
members interact with each other as members of all their constitutive communities. 
That said, it would likely be objected that my suggestion that Singapore’s 
multiracialism really has at its core the equality ideal misconstrues Singapore’s multiracialism. 
Indeed, by removing the emphasis on race, one could no longer call it multiracialism. This 
would be unacceptable, the objection goes, because it misunderstands the inception and role of 
multiracialism in Singapore’s history, and because it is essentially imposing a new political 
philosophy on a society that has consciously adopted one specific to its circumstances; that is, 
multiracialism for multiracial Singapore.  
I will address these objections in the next sub-section, where I also argue why 
multiracialism is fundamentally animated by the ideal of equality. For now, I will conclude this 
sub-section by noting that, despite the flaws of Singapore’s multiracialism, it is nevertheless a 
foundational principle of the national community and a fundamental feature of the national 
identity. It is fundamental because any other alternative that is not premised on the notion of 
equality between races is untenable. The notion of a Chinese-first Singapore fundamentally 
conflicts with deeply-ingrained notions of a Singaporean society where all races are formally 
equal. To change this fundamental term of the social contract in any way, then, would radically 
transform the meaning of ‘Singaporean’ to the point of distortion. To live in Singapore is to 
live in a multiracial society; and to be Singaporean is to be a member of this multiracial national 
community where everyone is an equal member regardless of race. If there were a positive 
outcome of the state’s top-down implementation of multiracialism, it would be that any other 
alternate conception of Singapore as anything other than a multiracial state in which all races 




iii. The Duty to Include, Equality and the Singaporean National Community   
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the normative core of the duty to include is equality of 
membership within the national community so long as an individual possesses the morally 
relevant criterion for membership: national identity. The notion of equality is clearly present 
in, and arguably forms the normative core of, Singapore’s multiracialism. As such, the duty to 
include, and the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, are relevant to Singapore. To establish 
an even stronger case for its relevance, though, I will argue in this section that Singapore’s 
multiracialism is underpinned by the notion of equality and thus should be extended to equality 
simpliciter.  
 How is multiracialism qua racial equality essentially premised on the notion of equality 
when multiracialism seems to adopt a narrow definition of it as racial equality only? I will 
begin my argument with multiracialism’s normative claim. It is that Singaporeans are equal 
regardless of race, and ought to be treated as such, thus calling upon Singaporeans to recognise 
members of other races as their equals. Race, then, is irrelevant in determining whether a 
Singaporean has this equality of status—and this suggests that the only thing that establishes 
her equality of status is her identity as a Singaporean. In other words, if one bears the 
Singaporean national identity, then one is a member of the Singaporean national community 
within which everyone will be treated equally regardless of race. The notion of equality thus 
underpins the multiracialism ideal.  
While this is a laudable ideal, there does not appear to be any normative reason why 
race alone ought to be discounted when conferring equality of membership on all who bear the 
national identity. At the heart of racial equality is the notion that only one criterion, the 
Singaporean national identity, qualifies an individual for equal treatment. This suggests that, 
so long as one meets the national identity criterion, one cannot be denied equal treatment on 
some other basis that is similar to race, but not race per se. Put another way, if we cannot treat 
a Singaporean unequally based on race, it suggests that other race-like factors are also 
prohibited grounds of unequal treatment. What are these other factors? 
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To get a grip on what they are, and how they are similar to race, we can refer to the 
prohibited grounds of discrimination contained in Article 12(2).754 Article 12(2) states that 
‘discrimination against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of religion, race, descent or 
place of birth’ is prohibited. The significance of these traits is that they are either immutable 
(race, descent, place of birth) or constructively immutable (religion). Immutable characteristics 
are those that cannot be changed, while constructively immutable ones are changeable only at 
an unacceptable personal cost. 755  Other immutable and/or constructively immutable 
characteristics, then, include gender, sexual orientation, nationality and conscience.  
We can further underscore this point by recalling the Fundamental and Social Harm 
Features of constitutive communities discussed in Chapter Three.756 The Fundamental Feature 
points out that these traits are integral to identity and inseparable from our self-understanding, 
and mark out our deepest moral commitments without which we would cease to be this 
particular individual. Since they are immutable and/or constructively immutable, trying to 
change these features of identity would come at a great personal cost. The Social Harm Feature, 
in turn, identifies the social harms, such as discrimination, to which these traits frequently 
expose us. Given the Fundamental Feature, it is unjust for us to be at the receiving end of these 
social harms from which we cannot escape because these traits cannot be changed, or are 
changeable only at a great personal cost. 
Since factors like gender, sexual orientation, conscience and nationality are either 
immutable or constructively immutable in the same way that race and religion are, there is 
arguably no morally relevant difference between these traits that would justify treating a 
Singaporean unequally based on, say, gender. From this, we can say that these ‘other factors’ 
that should be as irrelevant as race in determining Singaporeans’ equality of status are our 
membership in our constitutive communities: gender, for instance, or sexual orientation, or 
conscience, and so on. These constitutive features fall into the same categories as those 
protected by Article 12(2) and hence Singapore’s multiracialism; as such, there is no morally 
relevant difference between them. If we cannot treat a Singaporean unequally on the basis of 
race, we also cannot treat a Singaporean unequally on the basis of her membership in her other 
constitutive communities. If it is claimed that we can treat a Singaporean unequally on these 
 
754 I am grateful to John Adenitire for this suggestion.  
755 See Chapter Three, Part III(a), 147–148, especially footnote 569.   
756 See Chapter Three, Part III, 144–154. 
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other grounds, a further argument is needed because, from a normative perspective, there is no 
morally relevant difference between race and gender or religion or sexual orientation that 
would justify unequal treatment on these latter grounds, but not race.  
Singapore’s multiracialism is thus underpinned by the notion of equality, and should be 
extended to equality simpliciter. This is also because the Singaporean national community has 
designated national identity as the sole criterion for membership in the national community. If 
unequal treatment based on gender or sexual orientation were permitted, it would arguably 
contaminate the multiracialism ideal. It would permit us to see fellow Singaporeans as less than 
equal because they are women or gay, when the point of racial equality is to treat other 
Singaporeans equally and with respect simply because they are Singaporeans. The best way to 
achieve the aim of multiracialism—essentially, equality amongst Singaporeans—is therefore 
to extend it to equality simpliciter.  
There are, however, some non-normative counters to my argument, and I have already 
alluded to one of them in the previous sub-section. A critic would say that my argument 
fundamentally misconceives Singapore’s multiracialism which came about also as a 
geopolitical necessity. Since Singapore is a Chinese-majority country nestled within the Malay 
archipelago, with Malaysia to the north and Indonesia to the south, any overt, official favouring 
of the Chinese ‘would have generated great difficulties with these trading partners’.757 As such, 
Singapore had to institute formal equality between the races. A less cynical reading of the 
politics of multiracialism has been put forward by Hill and Fen. They argue that, during the 
period of Singapore’s self-governance in 1959 leading up to merger with Malaysia in 1963, 
when the ruling People’s Action Party was trying to consolidate its influence and stabilise 
society, multiracialism served to  
[send] a clear signal to both Malays and Chinese that ethnic chauvinism would not be tolerated. 
On the other hand, it could be viewed as a reassurance for the Chinese and the other ethnic 
communities, who feared Malay domination after merger, that their interests would be 
safeguarded.758 
 
757  Stephan Ortmann, ‘Singapore: The Politics of Inventing National Identity’ (2009) 4 Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs 23, 30. 
758 Hill and Fee (n 690) 98. 
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Since race was the only point of contention in Singapore’s early history, which can also 
be seen from the 1964 race riots, race is thus a special issue in Singapore in a manner that other 
race-like factors are not. As such, my argument could be said to fundamentally misunderstand 
the politics of Singapore’s multiracialism. 
 However, the attractiveness of Singapore’s philosophical commitment to racial equality 
ought not be undermined by the geopolitical reasons for its coming into being. The mere fact 
that Singapore’s multiracialism was proclaimed also because of certain exogenous factors is 
not a logical impediment to recognising that it is underpinned by equality, and that it should be 
extended to equality simpliciter. The normative core of Singapore’s multiracialism is 
commendable for its own sake regardless of why it was instituted; and the goodness of its 
underlying principle ought not be restrained by non-normative reasons for its proclamation. It 
would be so restrained if the geopolitical reasons for instituting multiracialism were to become 
a bar to a more inclusive interpretation of its underlying principle—equality.  
Alternatively, this objection to my argument suggests that we ought to allow geopolitics 
to dictate our normative commitments. This leads to the unacceptable claim that, if Singapore 
were situated in the middle of, say, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, it would be acceptable for 
multiracial Singapore to adopt a pro-Chinese policy since it would be necessitated by 
Singapore’s geopolitical realities. This would lead to a normative gap where some members of 
the national community are denied equal status based on what should be a morally irrelevant 
factor: race. As such, even if Singapore’s multiracialism ideal was partly motivated by its 
geopolitical situation, how we choose to interpret its underlying ideal of equality should not be 
similarly constrained.  
The second non-normative objection to my argument is that it is precluded by a plain 
reading of Article 12(2). If I rely on it to support my claim that multiracialism is Singapore’s 
foundational principle and that it should be extended to equality simpliciter, then this claim is 
defeated by the fact that Article 12(2), and the rest of the Constitution, do not prohibit any other 
forms of discrimination, or guarantee equality other than racial equality. Article 12(2), to recap, 
states that ‘there shall be no discrimination against citizens of Singapore on the ground only of 
religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law’, etc. Since there is no mention of gender or 
sexual orientation in Article 12(2), my argument is constitutionally baseless.  
This plain reading objection, however, misses the point of the normative argument that 
I am making. The normative argument seeks to identify the essence of the multiracialism ideal, 
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and of Article 12(2), in solidifying the Singaporean national community and the basic 
obligation that we owe to each other: that we should treat each other as equals regardless of 
race, language or religion. The essence of ‘regardless of race, language or religion’, as I have 
argued, is that we are equal regardless of these immutable and/or constructively immutable 
characteristics. As such, to deny equality on the basis of other immutable and/or constructively 
immutable characteristics without a morally relevant reason would be inconsistent with the 
multiracialism ideal. Contrary to the plain reading objection, my normative claim is 
constitutionally grounded.  
To sum up the discussion so far: I began by arguing that Singapore’s definition of 
community as set out in the White Paper already is a minimally constitutive understanding of 
community. By defining community as the Singaporean’s racial group, it captures one type of 
constitutive community; as such, the first element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
is already present in Singapore’s communitarianism. I then argued that the importance of the 
nation is reflected in some of Singapore’s constitutional rights cases, and so the second element 
of the Approach is present in Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights. Finally, 
Singapore’s commitment to multiracialism qua racial equality is underpinned by the equality 
ideal and should be extended to equality simpliciter. From a normative perspective, since there 
is no morally relevant difference between race/ethnicity and constitutive communities such as 
religion, gender and sexual orientation, there is no good reason to privilege race and religion 
only as prohibited grounds of unequal treatment. In this light, the duty to include, whose 
normative core is equality of membership, is relevant and applicable to Singapore. For these 
reasons, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach is wholly relevant to Singapore.  
 
II. A REINTERPRETATION OF SINGAPORE’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
CASE LAW  
This Part applies the Inclusive Communitarian Approach to the cases discussed in Chapter 
One. It will be shown that the Approach would vindicate the rights claims in the cases. The 
cases are divided into two clusters: where there is an infringement into a constitutive 
community, and where there is not.  
 A caveat is necessary. Given the thesis’ limited scope, the reinterpretation highlights 
only the values the Inclusive Communitarian Approach protects, and how these values differ 
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from the values that the Singapore courts advanced. The Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
begins from the position that, contrary to Singapore’s approach which pits rights against 
community interests, rights are valuable to community interests because they further values 
and interests that promote our constitutive communities and unity within the national 
community. The reinterpretation of the cases will focus on the following communitarian 
values: our interest in living meaningfully as members of our constitutive communities; our 
constitutive communities themselves; and unity in the national community.  
 
a. First cluster: encroachment into a constitutive community   
The inquiry under the first cluster has the following structure. The first question is: do the 
members of the constitutive community alleging a legislative and/or executive impingement 
into their constitutive community fulfil the national community’s membership criterion? If so, 
then the next question is whether this community’s constitutive beliefs/practices violate the 
basic duty of any national community: the duty to include.759 If the answer is yes, then it is not 
entitled to constitutional protection. If the answer is no, then it is prima facie constitutionally 
protected.  
 A few things need to be said about the prima facie constitutional protection, and how it 
relates to the Inclusive Communitarian Approach. This maps on directly to the duty to include. 
Since these individuals are members of the national community, and their constitutive 
beliefs/practices do not violate the duty to include, the national community’s duty to include 
applies. This is discharged, in the first instance, by affording the constitutive community prima 
facie constitutional protection in recognition of their equality of membership in the national 
community.760 A failure to extend prima facie constitutional protection—i.e. a denial that the 
constitutive community has any rights claim at all—is a failure to recognise their equality of 
membership because it fails to exhibit special concern for their interest in their constitutive 
community. This is how the Inclusive Communitarian Approach sees constitutional rights as 
valuable to the national community, not just the individual: protecting the individual’s interest 
in her constitutive community, and hence protecting the community itself, also maintains the 
national community’s unity by respecting its members’ equality of membership. In this sense, 
 
759 See Chapter Four, Part II, 184–200.  
760 The constitutional protection is only prima facie at this stage because of the various constitutional limits.  
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then, it is plausible to think of the clash in some of the cases as between competing communal 
interests, and not between the collective and the individual.  
 This brings us to the next stage of the inquiry: does the constitutive community’s 
beliefs/practices fall within the constitutional limits? In assessing this question, the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach emphasises the constitutive community’s profound value to its 
members. This stage of the inquiry maps on to the first element of the Approach: the importance 
of constitutive communities to our lives. Generally, the Approach requires that restrictions into 
a constitutive community should be commensurate with its fundamental importance to its 
members. What this means will depend on the individual cases.  
What about when the membership question is answered negatively? As argued in 
Chapter Four, our special obligations to members of the national community do not exhaust all 
our ethical obligations. We would need to ask whether censuring a constitutive community 
whose members are not part of the national community would violate our general obligations 
to humans as such. Since I have already suggested in Chapter Four that these obligations 
generally require us to treat these non-members as ends in themselves by respecting and 
protecting their basic interests,761 and since this issue does not arise in the Chapter One cases, 
I will not dwell on it. 
 
i. Freedom of Religion, National Security and National Unity 
The Inclusive Communitarian Approach would vindicate the Jehovah’s Witnesses various 
Article 15 freedom of religion claims.762 To briefly recapitulate the facts: in the Colin Chan 
cases, Article 15 challenges were mounted against three executive orders, one of which 
effectively banned the Singapore Congregation of the JWs (SCJW), while the other two were 
blanket bans on publications by the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society and the International 
Bible Student’s Association. I will refer to these three bans as ‘the blanket bans’. In the 
Nappalli cases, a Jehovah’s Witness teacher who refused to take part in the daily pledge and 
anthem ceremony, which he claimed was contrary to his religious beliefs, sued the Institute of 
Technical Education (ITE) for wrongful dismissal. The blanket bans encroached into the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious constitutive community by denying them access to, and 
 
761 See Chapter Four, Part II(c)(ii), 199–200.  
762 See Chapter One, Part I, 25–35.  
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participation in, their religious community, which also undermines their ability to live 
meaningfully as Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
 Since the Jehovah’s Witnesses are Singaporeans, they are members of the national 
community. Based on the facts established in the cases, their beliefs and practices do not violate 
the duty to include: nothing in the judgments suggested that they exalt themselves at the 
expense of other religions or seek to establish a Jehovah’s Witnesses state. Hence, the national 
community’s duty to include applies, which means that the national community must recognise 
their equality of membership, thereby entitling their religious constitutive community to prima 
facie Article 15(1)763 protection.  
The more crucial question is whether their Article 15(1) right can be justifiably limited 
by the Article 15(4) public order exception.764 Recall that the courts, in rejecting the Article 
15(1) claim, accepted the government’s position that the Witnesses’ objection to military 
service was a national security issue, which prevented the courts from interrogating whether 
the objection to national service actually threatened national security and public order. The 
courts accepted the government’s determination that the very existence of a group like the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses that ‘preached … that military service was forbidden was contrary to 
public peace, welfare and good order’.765 As such, the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Article 15(1) right 
was held to be limited by the public order exception in Article 15(4), and the blanket bans were 
justified.   
In contrast, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach would fully account for the value 
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religious community to its members and respect their equality of 
membership in the national community. The Approach would thus require that any restriction 
adopted should encroach as little as possible into the religious constitutive community. In this 
light, the blanket bans are unconstitutional because they are overly restrictive and impose a 
burden disproportionate to the perceived threat to public order. Recall that it was stated in Colin 
Chan v PP that ‘there had never been a suggestion that the Jehovah’s Witnesses were not 
otherwise law-abiding citizens. The contention that they were respectable citizens was not in 
 
763 Article 15(1) reads: ‘Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and to propagate it.’ 
764 Article 15(4) reads: ‘This Article does not authorise any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, 
public health or morality.’ 
765 Colin Chan v PP (n 84) [68]. 
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dispute either’.766 If the only problem that the Jehovah’s Witnesses pose is their religious 
objection to military service, banning the entire congregation and all their religious materials 
is disproportionate in two ways. First, as the CA accepted in Colin Chan v MITA, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses not liable for national service (i.e. women and senior citizens) are also affected by 
the blanket bans even though their objection to military service does not directly affect the 
smooth operation of national service.767 The blanket bans therefore impose a disproportionate 
burden on Jehovah’s Witnesses not liable for national service. Simultaneously, this 
disproportionality shows that the blanket bans are overly restrictive for burdening this group 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses. As such, the blanket bans fail to properly appreciate the value of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious constitutive community to their lives.  
Similarly, the blanket bans cannot be salvaged by restricting them to only male 
Jehovah’s Witnesses because they would still be disproportionate for the second reason. The 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious beliefs encompass more than just an objection to military 
service. Hence, a blanket ban on the entire congregation and their religious materials is 
disproportionate for also outlawing aspects of the religion that do not threaten national security. 
The blanket bans completely deny the Jehovah’s Witnesses the right to have access to and 
participate in their religious constitutive community because of one aspect of their religious 
beliefs. To be sure, it is a fundamental aspect, both to the adherents and to Singapore’s national 
service regime. However, the courts’ respective weightage of the importance of this objection 
to the adherents and to Singapore skews too heavily in the latter’s favour. It is noteworthy that 
the CA in Colin Chan v MITA was ‘prepared to accept that there could well be other less 
restrictive methods which the Minister could conceivably adopt’, 768  which implicitly 
acknowledges that the blanket bans were not the least restrictive methods to adopt. Perhaps 
more egregiously, the blanket bans were justified as a form of administrative efficiency. In 
Colin Chan v MITA, the HC stated that ‘[any] order other than a total blanket order would have 
been impossible to monitor administratively’.769 Similarly, in Liong Kok Keng, the HC justified 
the blanket bans by asserting that  
 
766 ibid [37]. 
767 Colin Chan v MITA (CA) (n 103) [47]. 
768 ibid [45]. 
769 Colin Chan v MITA (HC) (n 99) [32]. 
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any order other than a total blanket order would be administratively inconvenient. It would be 
absurd to expect every published material to be vetted. Hence a total blanket order was the only 
possible administrative solution.770 
Given the fundamental importance of their religious community to their lives, the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach considers administrative efficiency an inadequate reason 
to completely deny the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ right to access and participate in their religious 
community. The blanket bans are thus overly restrictive and unconstitutional.771 
In contrast, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach protects three interests: the 
Witnesses’ interest in their religious community, the religious community itself, and the 
national community’s unity and other interests. It would recognise that the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
have a right to conscientious objection based on their religious beliefs because it is important 
for them to live meaningfully as Jehovah’s Witnesses. This protects their interest in their 
religious community. Simultaneously, the religious community itself is protected because, by 
allowing conscientious objection, the religious community is also allowed to legally exist 
which preserves it as an entity.  
How does recognising a right to conscientious objection protect the unity of the national 
community and its interest in safeguarding its national service regime? To begin with, the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach would adopt an interpretation of what threatens public 
order, and when it is threatened, that is commensurate with the value of the religious 
community to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ lives, and safeguards Singapore’s national service 
regime at the same time. The Approach would first suggest that it might be an exaggeration to 
claim that the objection to military service of a very minor portion of Singapore’s population772 
constitutes a threat to public order, especially given the lack of evidence that they intend to 
abolish the national service regime altogether. That said, it is possible that, due to their 
evangelical nature, the Jehovah’s Witnesses might convert enough of Singapore’s population 
to fundamentally undermine Singapore’s national service regime. In such a scenario, the 
 
770 Liong Kok Keng (n 109) [27]. 
771 It is noteworthy that Seventh Day Adventists, who also object to military service, are not banned. In this light, 
the blanket bans on the Jehovah’s Witnesses seem even more disproportionate.  
772 There are no official statistics from Singapore. However, a US Department of State report on religious freedom 
in Singapore states that the Witnesses constitute less than 1% of the population: ‘2017 Report on International 
Religious Freedom: Singapore’ (United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor 2018) 2.  
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Witnesses’ right to propagate their beliefs may be restricted, but they would still be allowed to 
freely practise and profess their beliefs.  
More importantly, even if there were a substantial number of male Jehovah’s Witnesses 
objecting to military service, it still does not justify the blanket bans because, as already stated, 
the blanket bans do not sufficiently account for the value of the religious community to the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. In contrast, carving out an exemption for conscientious objectors from 
military service and offering civilian service as an alternative would safeguard the national 
community’s unity and interest in maintaining national service. It protects national unity by 
not forcing an artificial choice between the religious and national communities for the 
Jehovah’s Witness: they can discharge their obligations to both communities in a harmonious 
way instead of ‘choosing’ to be sent to military detention (which is the current practice for 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who refuse to undertake military service) because of their religious 
beliefs. It signals to them that, despite differences in beliefs, they are still integral members of 
the national community, and their equality of membership is respected by allowing them to 
live meaningfully as members of both the religious and national communities. Forcing them to 
‘choose’ to be sent to military detention punishes them for their religious beliefs, which 
arguably undermines their equality of membership and hence national unity.  
The exemption policy that the Inclusive Communitarian Approach advocates preserves 
Singapore’s national service regime in another way. Although Singapore’s regime focuses on 
military self-defence, national service can serve an equally compelling interest of nation-
building by ‘[strengthening] the moral bonds holding the nation together’.773 The exemption 
policy would contribute to this aspect of national service because it respects and upholds the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ equality of membership, and includes them in the nation-building project 
despite their fundamentally different religious beliefs.  
There may be scepticism regarding whether the compromise preserves Singapore’s 
national service regime. It may be said that allowing for some conscientious objection would 
lead Singapore down a slippery slope of spurious or false conscientious objections. As the 
current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said in Parliament in 1990, conscientious objection is 
not recognised in Singapore because ‘the whole system of universal National Service will come 
 
773 Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (n 351) 141. 
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unstuck [as many] other people will ask: why should I also not decide to have conscientious 
objections and therefore exempt myself from National Service?’774 
The slippery slope argument, however, can be countered. The Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach would preserve members’ religious (or some other ethical beliefs that 
conscientiously object to military service) communities and Singapore’s national service 
regime by requiring a high level of commitment to the relevant belief before an exemption is 
granted. The claimant would have to demonstrate, for instance, that the belief is deeply and 
sincerely held; and the courts would test and certify, as it were, the veracity of these beliefs. 
The slippery slope argument, then, is not a good reason to deny conscientious exemptions to 
those members of the national community whose religious community is a fundamental aspect 
of their identity. Indeed, to allow the slippery slope argument to triumph over these members’ 
interest in their religious (or ethical) constitutive community would be to deny their equality 
of membership, for the outcome of the slippery slope argument—the blanket bans, for 
instance—is not the least restrictive measure that the state could have adopted to achieve its 
aims.775  
What about the teacher, Nappalli Peter Williams? Recall that his wrongful dismissal 
claim was rejected by the courts because, inter alia, he had entered his employment contract 
voluntarily with the knowledge that he had to participate in the pledge and anthem ceremony. 
This ceremony takes place every morning in schools; teachers and students are required to sing 
the National Anthem while the Singapore flag is raised, and place their right fist over their 
heart to recite the National Pledge. Nappalli refused to participate in the ceremony because, in 
his view, it amounted to an act of worship. Since his objection to the ceremony stems from his 
religious beliefs, his dismissal impinges upon his membership in his religious constitutive 
community.  
How would the case be decided under the Inclusive Communitarian Approach? 
Contrary to the CA’s assertion in Nappalli Peter Williams that ‘there was no valid religious 
 
774 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 23 February 1990, vol 54, col 1181.   
775 For pacifists who object to war as such, the nation-building and community-focused aspect of civilian service 
could be emphasised. In any event, pacifism is not opposed national service per se; it is opposed to war and 
violence. Pacifists, then, could contribute to non-military aspects of national self-defence. See Andrew Fiala, 
‘Pacifism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/pacifism> accessed 3 September 2019. 
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belief protected by the Constitution’,776 the duty to include would apply: because Nappalli is a 
member of the national community and his religious beliefs and practices do not violate the 
duty to include, his interest in his religious community—especially his ability to live 
meaningfully as a member by not taking part in the pledge and anthem ceremony—is prima 
facie protected under Article 15(1). The question, then, is whether his dismissal is a 
proportionate measure to resolve the issue.  
The Inclusive Communitarian Approach would give due weight to Nappalli’s ability to 
live meaningfully as a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious community, and his 
equality of membership in the national community. The competing interests in this case are, 
on the one hand, Nappalli’s objection to the ceremony because it interfered with his ability to 
live meaningfully as a Jehovah’s Witness; and on the other hand, the MOE’s interest in 
inculcating a sense of national unity in schools, which, as stated in Chapter Four, 777  is a 
legitimate interest for a communitarian state to pursue. The question, then, is this: does 
Nappalli’s dismissal serve the interest of promoting national unity?  
The Inclusive Communitarian Approach would conclude that it does not, and hence, 
violates Article 15(1). Part of national unity is the national community’s duty to include each 
other as members, which involves a recognition of each other’s equality of membership. This, 
in turn, requires an appreciation of the value of each other’s constitutive communities to their 
lives. Dismissing Nappalli for wanting to live meaningfully as a member of his religious 
community by objecting to the pledge and anthem ceremony, as his religious community 
requires, fails to demonstrate this appreciation.  
On the other hand, the national community’s interest in promoting national unity would 
be served by vindicating Nappalli’s Article 15(1) claim under the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach. It interprets national unity as the national community’s acceptance of each other’s 
constitutive communities. As such, the MOE’s legitimate interest in promoting national unity 
would be served by educating students on religious diversity in the national community, and 
the importance of conscientious objections to some members of the national community. In 
this connection, rather than dismissing Nappalli for not taking part in the pledge and anthem 
ceremony, he could be required to explain his reasons for objecting to it. This would help 
 
776 Nappalli Peter Williams (n 122) 29. 
777 See Chapter Four, Part II(c)(i), 197–198. 
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students develop an understanding of those amongst them who do not conform to the norm, 
which is important in a pluralistic national community whose constitutive national identity 
encompasses a range of things, as argued in Chapter Four.778 This is arguably the true spirit of 
the National Pledge that exhorts Singaporeans to ‘pledge ourselves as one united people, 
regardless of race, language or religion’.  
It may be objected that this solution is utopic at best. The ITE and the MOE would 
presumably not want Nappalli to explain his reasons because they would consider it detrimental 
to national unity. It would allow ‘subversive’ views to be promulgated, subversive because 
contrary to an important nation-building tool (i.e. the pledge and anthem ceremony), thereby 
undermining national unity. To be sure, the question of what benefits or harms national unity 
is a value judgement. In this sense, then, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach values unity 
in diversity, and deems national unity meaningful only if members of the national community 
are able to live meaningfully as members of their various constitutive communities. In the same 
vein, inoculating students to the extant diversity of the national community would affect an 
artificial ‘unity’ that is unlikely to withstand fault lines that are inevitable because of this 
diversity. Thus, instead of forcing everyone to conform to a particular mode of nation-building 
or face the consequences (such as dismissal from a job), the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach considers national unity better served when there is an appreciation and 
understanding of the different constitutive communities within the national community and 
their value commitments. For these reasons, Nappalli’s claim would be vindicated under the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach. 
 
ii. Sexual Orientation and Public Morality 
Section 377A of the Penal Code, which criminalises sex between men only, was held in Lim 
Meng Suang779 not to have violated the Article 12(1) right to equality. This is because it 
satisfies the ‘reasonable classification’ test: 377A prescribes an intelligible differentia of men 
who have sex with other men, which is rationally connected to its purpose of criminalising sex 
between men.780  
 
778 See Chapter Four, Part I(b)(i), pages 172–175. 
779 Lim Meng Suang (n 6). 
780 See Chapter One, Part II, 38–39. I leave out the Article 9 analysis due to space constraints.   
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 The Inclusive Communitarian Approach would hold that 377A violates Article 12. The 
duty to include would apply to extend prima facie Article 12 protection to the gay community 
because the applicants in Lim Meng Suang are members of the national community, and their 
beliefs and practices do not violate the duty to include. The next question is whether there are 
any good reasons to defeat the duty to include—and this would necessitate that 377A serves a 
legitimate purpose. This is necessary because a law, such as 377A, that treats some of the 
national community’s members unequally qua members of a particular constitutive community 
must serve a legitimate purpose in order to respect these members’ equality of membership. 
For 377A, the question is whether the conservative national community can criminalise the 
intimate manifestation of a fundamental aspect of its gay members’ identity for two reasons. 
First, because it holds the view that homosexuality is immoral (the Immorality Reason). 
Second, because it thinks that homosexuality disrupts family lineage since gay men do not 
biologically procreate and so cannot carry on the family name (the Family Lineage Reason).  
 Under the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, these are not good reasons to defeat the 
national community’s duty to include, especially when weighed against the importance of the 
gay constitutive community to its members. The guiding principles are the notion of equality 
of membership inherent in the duty to include, and that the criterion for membership in the 
national community is national identity only, prima facie evidenced by citizenship. First, the 
Immorality Reason is neither here nor there because this view is contested at best, and mistaken 
at worst.781 Regarding the former, there is no consensus on whether homosexuality is immoral; 
indeed, the fierce divide in Singapore between the two opposing camps on the 377A issue 
demonstrates that there is significant support for the view that homosexuality is not immoral. 
Since the moral status of homosexuality is undetermined at best, it is irrelevant to membership 
in the national community; that is, it cannot be a basis to undermine gay men’s equality of 
membership. Membership in the national community requires only that one bears the 
Singaporean national identity (‘Singaporean Singapore’); it does not require that one must not 
be gay. Since homosexuality is not indisputably immoral, the Immorality Reason is irrelevant.  
 The Family Lineage Reason is also irrelevant. Again, membership in the national 
community requires only that one be Singaporean; it does not require that the male should be 
 
781 I have argued elsewhere that the best philosophical case for this view is mistaken, and that homosexuality is 
morally permissible. See Chang Ya Lan, ‘The Communitarian Case for Decriminalising Male Homosexuality for 
Singapore’s Common Good’ (2019) 20 Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 90. 
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able to carry on the family name. Furthermore, this reason is strongly peculiar to the Chinese 
community in Singapore,782 which makes it even less legitimate that non-Chinese gay men are 
denied the ability to live meaningfully as members of their constitutive community based on a 
cultural tradition to which they do not belong. 377A thus does not have a legitimate purpose 
and violates the right to equality.  
Unlike Singapore’s communitarian approach that retains 377A to preserve a certain 
heterosexual conception of the good, the Inclusive Communitarian approach would repeal it 
and vindicate gay men’s right to equality to protect three communitarian values: first, gay 
men’s ability to live meaningfully as gay men; second, the gay community’s existence and its 
members’ ability to legally form sub-groups; and third, the unity of the national community. 
That a 377A repeal would protect the first two values is pretty straightforward. First, it would 
allow gay men to live legally and meaningfully as gay men, which they are currently unable to 
do despite Parliament’s non-enforcement policy. As the ECtHR noted in Dudgeon, the ‘very 
existence’ of a legislation such as 377A ‘continuously and directly affects’ gay men’s private 
lives:  
[Either they respect] the law and [refrain] from engaging – even in private with consenting male 
partners – in prohibited sexual acts to which [they are] disposed by reason of [their] homosexual 
tendencies, or [they commit] such acts and thereby [become] liable to criminal prosecution.783  
Having this Hobson’s choice at the back of their minds arguably impedes gay men from 
living meaningfully as gay men. As the CA noted in Tan Eng Hong,784 377A, even if not 
proactively enforced, reduces gay men to ‘unapprehended [sic] felons in the privacy of their 
homes’.785 This is likely to induce a sense that they are less-than-equal members of the national 
community because of a fundamental aspect of who they are. A 377A repeal, in contrast, would 
remove the legal impediment to their living meaningfully as gay men. This would protect the 
gay constitutive community because it would remove the legal basis on which to deny LGB 
 
782 See Lim Meng Suang (n 160) [128]: ‘…the Chinese portion of Singapore society was still largely traditional, 
with parents looking forward to their children marrying and producing offspring … to carry on the family name…’ 
783 Dudgeon (n 7) [41]. 
784 Tan Eng Hong (n 1). 
785 ibid [184]. 
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groups legal registration under the Societies Act, 786  and allow the formation of sub-
communities based on the LGB constitutive community as registered groups and societies. 
But how would a 377A repeal protect the national community’s unity? From one 
perspective, it would promote gay men’s sense of belonging to the national community, thereby 
strengthening unity in this way, because a repeal would allow gay men ‘access to structures 
that enable them to express their identity’.787 As Bell argues, a society that fails to provide these 
structures will mostly ‘have a high percentage of frustrated and alienated homosexuals’.788 To 
prevent the undesirable outcome of alienation, accepting the gay community by repealing 377A 
would foster gay men’s sense of belonging to the national community, which is also a part of 
the duty to include as expounded in Chapter Four.789 This fits better with Parliament’s position 
that homosexuals are ‘our kith and kin’790 than its current non-proactive enforcement of 377A.  
It may be objected that repealing 377A would divide, rather than unite, the national 
community, because it would alienate those that oppose homosexuality, particularly the 
religious camp. Yvonne Lee, for instance, has argued that repealing 377A would lead to a 
‘persecution … [of] those who hold contrary religious or moral viewpoints’ as well as a 
‘[chilling of] the free speech rights of others, in the name of pro-homosexual state enforced 
orthodoxy’.791 Instead of alienating LGBs, the objection goes, a 377A repeal would alienate 
those that oppose homosexuality, and so it is unlikely that a 377A repeal would lead to the 
unity that the Inclusive Communitarian Approach claims to protect. 
There are two responses to this objection. First, Lee’s objection arguably overstates the 
practical implications of a 377A repeal. The only type of anti-homosexuality speech that the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach would prohibit is speech that violates the duty to include, 
such as religious preaching that undermines LGBs’ equality of membership in the national 
community. Statements such as ‘we must not allow any activist or gay-affirming group … to 
interfere with our national interests, defy our shared values and push their permissive credo on 
 
786  Michael Hor, ‘377A – To Prevent What Harm?’ (The Online Citizen, 10 October 2007) 
<www.theonlinecitizen.com/2007/10/10/377a-to-prevent-what-harm/> accessed 3 September 2019. 
787 Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (n 351) 169. 
788 ibid 47. 
789 See Chapter Four, Part II(a), 186–187.  
790 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, 23 October 2007, vol 83, col 2398.  
791 Lee (n 25) 383. 
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our conservative society’ 792  thus violate the duty to include. This statement, issued by a 
controversial pastor in Singapore, violates the duty because it unilaterally redefines the terms 
of membership in the national community. Since the only morally relevant criterion for 
membership is that one is Singaporean, whether or not a constitutive community has a 
‘permissive credo’ is irrelevant to its members’ equality of membership. Furthermore, the 
contention that affording equal rights to the gay community is against Singapore’s national 
interests also violates the duty to include because it suggests that gay members of the national 
community do not deserve equal rights, thereby diminishing their equality of membership. In 
short, religious conservatives expecting a carte blanche to speak out against homosexuality and 
LGBs in a pluralistic national community where members owe each other the duty to include 
would find themselves disappointed. In contrast, a preacher who tells his congregation that 
homosexuality is a sin according to the Bible, but they should still be respected as equal 
members of the national community would not run afoul of the duty to include. The rule of 
thumb, then, is that statements against homosexuality must be calibrated to respect LGBs’ 
equality of membership in order to be accommodated by the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach.  
The second response to the objection focuses on the ideal of equality of membership 
that underpins the duty to include, and which a 377A repeal seeks to achieve. First, though, it 
is important to reiterate the point of the duty to include. The duty directs the national 
community’s members to the ethical action that they would have taken if their social friendship 
had not reached its limit. This ethical action, as explained in Chapter Four,793 is the obligation 
to accept fellow members’ constitutive communities as a source of meaning to their lives. This 
entails, minimally, acceptance as formal status; and more substantively, that members opposed 
to homosexuality accept the gay constitutive community as a source of meaning to their fellow 
members’ lives, given that there are no legitimate reasons to retain 377A.  
Only a 377A repeal can achieve equality of membership in this way. A repeal would 
remove a symbol of exclusion that denies some members’ equality of membership based on a 
morally irrelevant factor: sexual orientation. A repeal would thus safeguard unity in the 
 
792 Kirsten Han, ‘Lawrence Khong: “Pink Dot “Vandalises” Singapore with Their Propaganda’’ (The Online 
Citizen, 15 June 2015) <www.theonlinecitizen.com/2015/06/15/lawrence-khong-pink-dot-vandalises-singapore-
with-their-propaganda/> accessed 3 September 2019. 
793 See Chapter Four, Part II(b)(ii), 192–196. 
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national community, even if tenuously at first, by equalising the status of gay men without 
denying equality of membership to other members of the national community. In contrast, 
retaining 377A, which undermines gay men’s equality of membership for reasons already 
stated, will always be a fault line within the national community. Hence, a 377A repeal, by 
conferring equality of membership on gay men, brings the national community closer to unity 
than retaining 377A. Since the Inclusive Communitarian Approach seeks to allow everyone in 
the national community to live meaningfully as members of their constitutive communities, 
any measure that frustrates this meaningful living-as would not be permitted. This solution 
between clashing constitutive communities strives for unity in the long run by safeguarding the 
equality of membership of all in the national community. For these reasons, the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach would hold that 377A violates the right to equality. I now move on 
to the second cluster of cases.  
 
b. Second cluster: no encroachment into a constitutive community 
The inquiry under the second cluster of cases is as follows. The first question is whether the 
individual challenging the constitutionality of a legislation and/or executive order censuring 
her action is a member of the national community. If she is, and her action violates the duty to 
include, then she is not entitled to constitutional protection. If she is a member, and her action 
does not violate the duty to include, then she is prima facie constitutionally protected. In the 
latter scenario, the question is how to strike a balance between the individual right and the 
community’s interests protected either by the constitutional limits, or by the purpose of the 
impugned legislation.  
 In calibrating the balance between competing interests, the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach is guided by the notion of equality of membership inherent in the duty to include. 
This notion is fundamental to the Approach because it is derived from the very concept of 
community itself.794 It requires members of the national community to display special concern 
for each other’s interests; one implication of this is that members’ interests should not be 
sacrificed in a utilitarian calculus to advance the community’s overall interests. In this regard, 
the Inclusive Communitarian Approach emphasises the importance of not treating the 
individual as a means to an end, which would undermine the individual’s equality of 
 
794 See Chapter Four, Part II(a), 184–188. 
237 
 
membership. In instances where the only appropriate balance has a utilitarian element (e.g. 
deterrent sentences for certain types of crimes), there must be only minimal interference with 
the individual’s equality of membership.  
If the individual is not a member of the national community, then we need to ask 
whether the national community’s treatment of her violates our general ethical obligations 
towards human beings as such. If it does not, then the individual is not entitled to constitutional 
protection; but if it does, then the individual is prima facie protected, and the question then 
becomes how to strike a balance that upholds these general ethical obligations.   
 
i. Multiracialism and Sedition  
How would the Inclusive Communitarian Approach handle the Sedition Act (SA) and the two 
prosecutions that were brought under it? Let us first analyse the actions of the accused in 
Benjamin Koh and Ong Kian Cheong. To briefly recap the facts:795 in Benjamin Koh,796 two 
individuals were charged and convicted under the Act for posting anti-Malay remarks online; 
and in Ong Kian Cheong,797 an evangelist Christian couple was charged and convicted under 
the SA for distributing evangelist tracts that promoted Christianity partly by insulting other 
religions, including Islam and Catholicism. These actions were held to be seditious because 
they ‘promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the 
population of Singapore’.798 
 The Inclusive Communitarian Approach would first determine that, because the 
individuals are Singaporeans, they are members of the national community. As members of the 
national community, they owe their fellow members the duty to include. In Benjamin Koh, the 
anti-Muslim and anti-Malay remarks—mocking the Malay community’s customs, for 
instance 799 —violated the duty because the remarks undermined the Malay and Muslim 
communities’ equality of membership in the national community. In Ong Kian Cheong, there 
is an arguable prima facie case that the evangelical tracts also violated the duty because the 
 
795 See Chapter One, Part III(a), 44–48. 
796 Benjamin Koh (n 190).  
797 Ong Kian Cheong (n 192).  
798 Sedition Act (n 187), section 3(1)(e). 
799 See Chapter One, Part III(a), 45.  
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tracts denigrated other religions, including Islam, which were deliberately sent to Malays, who 
are generally also Muslims. However, since the purpose of the tracts was not to denigrate these 
other religions per se, whether or not the couple in Ong Kian Cheong can be held liable under 
the SA depends on their intention; this will be discussed later. Hence, on its face, the two cases 
properly fall under the SA.  
 This conclusion may seem unsatisfactory to those who oppose the rather draconian SA; 
in particular, the fact that the mere promotion of feelings of ill-will and hostility is enough to 
be a seditious tendency. As analysed in Chapter One,800 this is a much lower standard than anti-
hate speech legislation such as the UK’s Public Order Act which requires ‘threatening, abusive 
or insulting words’ intended to ‘stir up racial hatred’.801 However, equating the promotion of 
feelings of hostility between different races with sedition, i.e. an existential attack on the state, 
is consistent with the Inclusive Communitarian Approach if we reconceptualised the state as 
the national community. Indeed, the Approach would expand the definition of sedition to 
include such promotion between all constitutive communities. Under the Approach, an attack 
against a constitutionally protected constitutive community is an existential attack against the 
national community as a whole. This is because the Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
considers these constitutive communities integral parts of the national community whole—and 
so not only does an attack on a constitutive community unjustifiably undermines its integral 
nature, but it is also an attack on the national community itself. Hence, the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach would expand the Sedition Act’s definition of a seditious tendency 
as one that promotes ill-will and hostility between the different constitutive communities in the 
Singaporean national community.  
Furthermore, because the Inclusive Communitarian Approach protects every member’s 
equality of membership, it would require a seditious intention before someone can be held 
liable under the SA. The Inclusive Communitarian Approach, then, would amend the SA and 
change ‘seditious tendency’ in section 3 to ‘seditious intention’,802 and it would do so for two 
 
800 See Chapter One, Part III(a), 44–45.  
801 UK POA Section 18(1)(a). Although there are offences under the POA that set a lower threshold, such as 
section 5(1)(a)’s ‘threatening or abusive words or behaviour … within the hearing or sight of a person likely to 
be caused harassment’, I am comparing the respective threshold set in regulating race relations, not disturbances 
to public order per se.  
802 The provision currently reads: ‘A seditious tendency is a tendency … to promote feelings of ill-will and 
hostility between different races or classes of the population of Singapore.’  
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reasons. First, intention is necessary to constrain the broad reach of the SA’s low threshold. 
Without the intention to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility, the SA would capture speech 
that seems seditious, but which has other intention; for instance, social commentary, satire, and 
artistic expression. Capturing speech without a seditious intention, where the seditious effect 
is incidental, does not further the aim of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach to safeguard 
equality of membership because the speech is intended to do something other than to deny the 
equal membership of some in the national community. Punishing such speech under the Act 
would cast too wide a net. 
Second, the point of legislating against speech that attacks constitutive communities is 
not to protect feelings from offence; it is to safeguard equality of membership, or what Jeremy 
Waldron calls dignity: ‘a person’s basic entitlement to be regarded … as someone whose 
membership of a minority group does not disqualify him or her from ordinary social 
interaction’.803 Hence, even though the unintentionally seditious act or speech may still offend 
the targeted individual and/or group, it would not be punished by the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach. The producer of such speech does not intend to deny the targeted individual and/or 
group’s equal membership in the national community, but seeks to do something else; for 
instance, artistic expression and social commentary, as was the case with Salman Rushdie’s 
The Satanic Verses. Without the intention to deny or undermine some members’ equality of 
membership, the speaker would not be deemed to have violated the duty to include. In cases 
where the speaker’s motive is mixed—satire or artistic expression with a seditious intention, 
for instance—then the speaker would have violated the duty to include. In short, so long as a 
seditious intention is present, the duty to include would be violated. As such, the evangelical 
couple in Ong Kian Cheong arguably did not violate the duty because, based on the facts, their 
intention was to promote Christianity, not to denigrate other religions; hence, they would not 
be liable under the amended Sedition Act. In contrast, individuals like the accused in Benjamin 
Koh who mock a particular racial and/or religious community intend to undermine the equal 
membership of the religious community and its members, thus violating the duty to include 
and being guilty of a seditious offence. 
Finally, because the SA sets a low threshold, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
would adjust the punishment accordingly. The SA prescribes a maximum fine of S$5,000 
and/or a maximum jail term of 3 years for first-time offenders, and a maximum jail term of 5 
 
803 Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (n 189) 105.  
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years for subsequent offenders. Even though individuals who commit a seditious offence would 
have violated the duty to include and are thus not entitled to constitutional protection, so long 
as they remain members of the national community, they possess a residual equality of 
membership. Hence, the punishment for such individuals must account for the importance of 
this residual equality; and in Singapore’s context, also of racial and religious equality which is 
a central tenet as explained earlier. A deterrent sentence would be justified as it accounts for 
the severity of the offence and the seriousness with which the national community treats 
flagrant attempts to undermine some members’ equality of membership. However, a deterrent 
sentence should be at the lower end of the scale to account for the offenders’ residual equality 
of membership depending on the severity of their actions. The Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach would also prescribe community service (e.g. the Chinese offenders in Benjamin 
Koh helping out at a Malay community centre) and some form of classes on the importance of 
the duty to include as ‘punishment’. This would help to rehabilitate the offenders and hopefully 
correct their misconceptions about their fellow members.  
 
ii. Political Protest and Public Order 
Although the political protest case, Chee Siok Chin,804 appears hard to vindicate because of the 
wording of Article 14, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach could plausibly vindicate the 
claim by emphasising the values that it advances. To recap the case,805 the applicants held a 
peaceful four-person political protest outside the Central Provident Fund (CPF) Building 
against rumours of corruption in the CPF and demanded more public accountability. They wore 
t-shirts bearing slogans such as ‘Be Transparent Now’ and stood in a row along the walkway 
leading to the CPF Building. Subsequently, the police ordered them to disperse because their 
protest constituted a public nuisance under the now-repealed Miscellaneous Offences (Public 
Order and Nuisance) Act (MOA). The applicants alleged that their Article 14(1) right to 
freedom of speech and assembly had been violated.  
 As Singaporeans, the applicants are members of the national community. Since they 
protested against the rumoured corruption in public institutions, the protest does not violate the 
duty to include, and is thus prima facie protected under Article 14. However, Article 14(2) 
 
804 Chee Siok Chin (n 207).  
805 See Chapter One, Part III(b), 48–53. 
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confers a broad constitutional leeway to Parliament to enact ‘necessary or expedient’ laws that 
restrict free speech, assembly and association in the interest of public order. The low threshold 
of expedience—the Cambridge Dictionary, for instance, defines it as ‘helpful or useful in a 
particular situation, but sometimes not morally acceptable’806—is an initial stumbling block to 
the Inclusive Communitarian Approach’s possible vindication of the applicants’ claim. 
Expedience does not impose a normative standard, such as non-arbitrariness, that Parliament 
has to meet for a restriction on Article 14(1) to be constitutional. Rather, its broadness appears 
to sanction just about anything—including, at least prima facie, defining a peaceful assembly 
as no more than four persons. It seems, then, that the Approach has come up against the 
broadness of the constitutional text itself. 
 While this is one plausible way to reinterpret the case, there is an alternative 
reinterpretation that reads down the ‘necessary or expedient’ limitation in light of the values 
that the Inclusive Communitarian Approach advances.807  In this context, the value is the 
national community as a source of meaning to its members. Political protest can preserve this 
value if it highlights instances where the government is acting against the national community’s 
interests, or when the national community itself has failed to discharge its duty to include 
towards a particular constitutive community.808 In such situations, protesting against the state’s 
alleged impropriety and the national community’s failure can strengthen the bond between 
members of the national community: by generating a vivid sense of shared fate, that everyone 
has a stake in the national community’s future. Thus, if the impugned protest advances the 
national community’s interests, then ‘expedient’ ought to be read out of ‘necessary or 
expedient’, such that the question becomes whether the restriction on the protest is necessary 
instead.  
 In Chee Siok Chin, the MOA’s regulatory framework disallowing political protests of 
five or more persons without a police permit was upheld by the High Court as falling within 
the ‘necessary or expedient’ limit. Given the value of political protest to the national 
community, however, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach would read down the ‘necessary 
or expedient’ limit and contend that, given the importance of political protest, restrictions on 
 
806 Cambridge Dictionary, ‘Expedient’ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/expedient> accessed 
3 September 2019. 
807 I am grateful to Dr Kirsty Hughes for this suggestion.  
808 An example is mass protests in India for women’s rights after egregious incidents of rape.  
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the rights to speech and assembly have to be necessary, not merely expedient. Further, the 
Approach would question whether it is necessary to require protests of more than just five 
persons to be licenced by the police. All things remaining equal, it seems unlikely that a group 
of five, even twenty, peaceful protesters would disrupt public order. This is not to say, of 
course, that political protests can take place unregulated; it is only to say that setting the limit 
at five persons is arguably an overly broad restriction on the right to protest, given its value to 
the national community.809 The Inclusive Communitarian Approach would thus decide that the 
MOA does not fall within Article 14(2).  
 
iii. The Death Penalty and Drug Trafficking 
The relevant provisions challenged in the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA) death penalty cases are 
unconstitutional under the Inclusive Communitarian Approach. This may seem a surprising 
conclusion since no constitutive community is involved: the drug traffickers are not claiming 
an infringement into a constitutive community of drug traffickers, and their censured activity—
drug trafficking—does not violate the duty to include. For some cases, however, there is a 
constitutive community involved: the national community. The reinterpretation, then, relies 
heavily on the duty to include.   
To briefly summarise the salient issues,810 section 33B(2) of the MDA provides that 
anyone who traffics, inter alia, more than 15g of heroin (the 15g Differentia) will be sentenced 
to death unless he proves, on a balance of probabilities, that he is a drug courier or mentally 
impaired; and if he successfully proves that he is a drug courier, he has to have received a 
certificate of substantive assistance from the Public Prosecutor. If these conditions are satisfied, 
he will be sentenced to life imprisonment in lieu of the death penalty and a certain number of 
strokes of the cane. These provisions were variously challenged for violating Article 9(1), the 
right to life and liberty, and Article 12(1), the right to equality.  
 
809 Note that, under Singapore’s Public Order Act (Cap 257A, 2012 rev ed) which replaced the MOA, a procession 
is a public procession and subject to the POA’s regulatory framework if it ‘[comprises] 2 or more persons gathered 
at a place of assembly to move from that place substantially as a body of persons’ to demonstrate support for or 
opposition to a cause, etc: section 2(1). The current law is thus more restrictive than the previous one.  
810 See Chapter One, Part IV, 53–66. 
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The primary issue is whether the 15g Differentia, as upheld in Nguyen Tuong Van811 
and which attracts the death penalty,812 can be sustained under the Inclusive Communitarian 
Approach. There are two different answers to this question, depending on how the first 
question—whether the offender is a member of the Singaporean national community—is 
answered. I will first briefly address the situation where the offender is not a member of the 
national community. The offender’s non-membership does not permit the national community 
to impose the death penalty on him, as it would violate the national community’s general ethical 
obligations. As suggested in Chapter Four,813 these obligations require us to treat humans as 
subjects of our moral considerations, and we do so by upholding their basic interests. One such 
basic interest is the interest in life. As such, discounting offenders from constitutional 
protection simply because they are not members of the national community would violate our 
general ethical obligations, which means that they are entitled to prima facie constitutional 
protection.  
What about the issue of whether the 15g Differentia violates Articles 9(1) and 12(1) for 
both the member and non-member scenarios? Since drug trafficking does not violate the duty 
to include as it does not denigrate any constitutive communities’ equal membership in the 
national community, the question is how the balance between the competing interests should 
be struck, bearing in mind the individual’s interest in life and equality of membership, and the 
national community’s interest in combating drug trafficking and preventing drug abuse. To 
state the conclusion first: under the Inclusive Communitarian Approach, both the 15g 
Differentia and the death penalty for drug trafficking per se are not ‘law’ for the purpose of 
Article 9(1), which requires life and liberty to be taken away in accordance with ‘law’.  
Why is the 15g Differentia not ‘law’? It is not law in a substantive sense because it fails 
to strike a proper balance between the competing interests in both the member and non-member 
scenarios. This is because the 15g Differentia is only ‘broadly proportionate’814 to the MDA’s 
social object, and because, as the CA admitted in Yong Vui Kong, the 15g Differentia is not the 
best means of achieving the MDA’s objective.815 Imposing the ultimate punishment of death 
 
811 Nguyen Tuong Van (n 249). 
812 See Chapter One, Part IV(a)(ii), 57–60. 
813 See Chapter Four, Part II(c)(ii), 199–200. 
814 Yong Vui Kong (n 238) [112]. 
815 ibid [113]. 
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based on a statutory threshold that is not the best possible means to combat drug trafficking 
does not accord due weight to the non-member’s interest in life, and the member’s interest in 
life and equality of membership. If the death penalty for drug trafficking can be justified at all, 
the statutory threshold that would attract it must be the best way to achieve the statutory 
objective. Otherwise, it suggests that there is a better way to achieve the objective, but the 
individual’s interest in life is not important enough to put this measure in place. This signals 
disrespect for the non-member as a moral being by disrespecting his interest in life and violates 
the national community’s general ethical obligations; hence, the 15g Differentia is not ‘law’. 
For the member of the national community, the 15g Differentia is not ‘law’ also because 
it disrespects her equality of membership in the national community. By imposing the death 
penalty on a member based on a statutory threshold that is not the best means of furthering the 
MDA’s objective, and by imposing the death penalty at all, the national community ends up 
sacrificing her with such finality that calls into question its very character. As analysed in 
Chapter Four,816 a community is a group of people who display feelings of special concern 
towards each other and recognise each other as members. Hence, a community that sacrifices 
some of its members in a categorical manner by way of the death penalty feels no special 
concern for these members and so fails to respect their equality of membership. The national 
community, then, violates its duty to include even convicted drug traffickers as fellow members 
by, first, not ensuring that the statutory threshold is the best possible means of achieving the 
MDA’s purpose; and second, using them to send a warning about the serious consequences of 
drug trafficking by imposing the deterrent death penalty on them.  
One might say that the national community no longer owes these individuals the duty 
to include because they are convicted drug traffickers; they are guilty of a crime that the 
national community has deemed serious enough to be punishable by death. But even granting 
that the national community’s duty to include is defeated by the crime of drug trafficking, it 
does not follow that the death penalty is justified. The national community can exclude these 
members by, for instance, imprisoning them for a number of years. More importantly, there is 
a residual duty to include that still applies; the duty is defeated only to the extent that is 
necessary to correct the effects of its members’ wrongdoing because these individuals are still 
members. Hence, there is a residual duty in this case to include even convicted drug 
traffickers—and this essentially means that their membership in the national community should 
 
816 See Chapter Four, Part II(a), 184–188. 
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be respected by not sacrificing them, by way of the deterrent death penalty, in the national 
community’s fight against drug trafficking. For these reasons, the death penalty for drug 
trafficking cannot be upheld under the Inclusive Communitarian Approach.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter, I have argued for the relevance of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach 
to Singapore and applied it to the cases discussed in Chapter One, which has resulted in a 
vindication of the rights claimed in the cases. I began by arguing that the Approach is relevant 
to Singapore because its two elements, constitutive communities and the duty to include, are 
already minimally present in, first, Singapore’s definition of community; and second, the 
courts’ emphasis on the importance of the nation in some cases. More importantly, the 
normative core of the duty, equality of membership, is arguably also the normative core of 
Singapore’s foundational multiracialism. In this connection, I have argued that Singapore’s 
multiracialism is essentially underpinned by the ideal of equality, and should be extended to 
equality simpliciter, because there is no morally relevant difference between racial and other 
forms of unequal treatment. As such, the duty to include is consistent with Singapore’s 
multiracialism.  
 My reinterpretation of the cases has shown that Singaporeans’ constitutional rights can 
be vindicated within a communitarian framework that protects fundamental communitarian 
values: our ability to live meaningfully as members of our constitutive communities, our 
constitutive communities themselves, and unity within the national community resulting from 
recognising and respecting every member’s equality of membership. The Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach therefore bridges the gap, cleaved by Singapore’s ‘collective over 
individual’ approach, between the elevated status of the rights and their non-application in 
practice. What the reinterpretation exercise also shows is that constitutional rights and 
communitarianism do not make odd bedfellows. Constitutional rights can be vindicated by a 
non-liberal, communitarian reasoning process; and so a rejection of liberalism and its various 
individual-centric approaches to rights does not entail a correlative rejection of rights. On the 
contrary, communitarianism is compatible with constitutional rights when rights are 
reconceptualised as protecting the constitutive communities that are a source of meaning and 
autonomy to their individual members.  
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If we are serious about constitutional supremacy and communitarianism, then 
Singapore’s ‘collective over individual’ approach should be abandoned for the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach. By placing constitutive communities as the primary subject of 
constitutional protection, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach succeeds in shifting the focus 
of rights protection from individual to community without sacrificing, as Singapore’s approach 
has done, the supremacy of the Constitution and the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental 






This thesis introduced Singapore’s communitarian approach to constitutional rights with Lim 
Meng Suang v Attorney-General, the failed constitutional challenge to section 377A of the 
Penal Code. Although this decision flows against the currents of LGBT rights liberalisation in 
many countries, including Taiwan, the first country in Asia to legalise same-sex union, it is 
entirely consonant with Singapore’s communitarian approach to rights. It is an approach that 
pits the collective interest against individual rights in a zero-sum game, one from which the 
collective interest has always emerged victorious. 
This is the logical outcome of Singapore’s communitarianism that a priori valorises the 
collective interest over individual rights. In this thesis, I have shown how Singapore’s 
collective over individual’ approach to rights is problematic for producing a disjunction 
between the elevated status of constitutional rights and their non-application in practice. Instead 
of prescribing an ill-fitting liberal solution, however, I have argued that the problem with 
Singapore’s approach is not its communitarian commitment per se; the problem, rather, is that 
it is premised on a particular ‘collective over individual’ conception of communitarianism. By 
attaching overwhelming weight to a collective interest pitted against an individual right, the 
latter inevitably faces a Herculean uphill battle for a vindication that has never happened in 
Singapore’s fifty-four years as an independent nation. This arguably casts a shadow on the 
constitutional status of Singapore’s fundamental rights. 
 Instead of accepting that communitarianism is synonymous with ‘collective over 
individual’, I subjected the latter to a normative critique in light of both ‘Western’ and 
‘Asian’—that is, Confucian—communitarianism, a critique which ‘collective over individual’ 
failed to survive. In the course of the critique, I made two conceptual claims about 
communitarianism: first, it values both individual and community equally; and second, 
communitarianism advances only a thin theory of the good. These two claims follow from the 
communitarian conception of the self as a situated and relational self, and the communitarian 
politics of the common good. Essentially, given the multifarious communal attachments to 
which the self is related, the good that communitarianism promotes must account for all these 
various valued attachments—and it is the good of inclusiveness.  
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 Since the normative critique shows that ‘collective over individual’ is not a necessary 
feature of communitarianism, we have good reasons to theorise about an alternative 
communitarian approach to rights that Singapore could adopt. I developed just this alternative 
communitarian approach, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach. Its two elements follow 
from my two conceptual claims about communitarianism. The first element is a pluralistic 
constitutive conception of community as all the communal attachments that partly constitute 
our identity, such that rights protect both our interest in our constitutive communities, and the 
constitutive communities themselves, from unjustified encroachment from the state and/or the 
majority. I identified two features of a constitutive community: the Fundamental Feature and 
the Social Harm Feature. A communal attachment possesses the fundamental feature when it 
is an ordinarily unchangeable and unchosen, and deep-seated aspect of identity to which the 
individual has made an ethical commitment, and cannot conceive of herself without it. In order 
for such communal attachments to be protected as constitutive communities, however, the 
Social Harm Feature needs to be present, too: members of these communities are exposed to 
social harms, particularly discrimination, simply as members of these constitutive 
communities. When the two features are present, a communal attachment becomes a 
constitutive community in which our interest is sufficiently important to justify imposing a 
duty on others to respect our right to it.  
The second element of the Inclusive Communitarian Approach is the baseline special 
obligation that is owed between members of the national community: the duty to include. This 
duty is derived from a conception of the nation as an ethical community in which members 
owe each other special obligations, and the inherently inclusive nature of the concept of 
community itself. Given the importance of our constitutive communities to our self-
understanding, members of the national community owe each other a duty to include every 
member’s constitutive communities within its folds, so that every member can live 
meaningfully as members of all their constitutive communities. The duty to include is 
discharged by recognising and respecting every member’s equality of membership so long as 
they possess the morally relevant membership criterion: national identity. Members of the 
national community demonstrate respect for fellow members’ equal membership by displaying 
special concern for their interest in their constitutive communities. Hence, the national 
community should not sacrifice some members’ constitutive communities in a utilitarian 
calculus to serve the collective interest; and in the event of clashes between constitutive 
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communities, the duty to include is discharged by reaching a compromise that both sides can 
accept.  
I ended the thesis by applying the Inclusive Communitarian Approach to Singapore. I 
demonstrated its relevance to Singapore by showing how its two elements are already present 
in Singapore’s communitarianism. I then applied the Approach to the cases discussed in the 
thesis and showed that it led to a successful outcome in the cases analysed in Chapter One. I 
focused my reinterpretation exercise on the communitarian values that the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach aims to protect: our interest in our constitutive communities, the 
constitutive communities themselves, and unity in the national community. On the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach, then, constitutional rights protect not just individual interests, but 
community interests as well. The successful outcome of the cases that the Approach produces 
thus proves my initial hypothesis that Singapore’s peculiar ‘collective over individual’ 
approach to rights is the reason that all of the constitutional rights challenges brought to date 
have failed. Accordingly, Singapore should abandon its approach, and adopt the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach, so that the elevated status of rights can be upheld.  
Those readers whom I have managed to convince of the theoretical plausibility of the 
Inclusive Communitarian Approach may nevertheless have a nagging doubt: given Chapter 
One’s narrative of a conservative judiciary that has a long history, entrenched by stare decisis, 
of adhering strictly to its self-circumscribed role in the separation of powers, it seems unlikely 
that the Inclusive Communitarian Approach would be adopted. It would require an almost 
revolutionary reconfiguration of the judiciary’s constitutional interpretation and an overhaul of 
its constitutional case law—a possibility as remote as snow in tropical Singapore.  
Admittedly, the Inclusive Communitarian Approach that I have outlined in this thesis 
is only the first step in what would likely be a long process of change in conservative Singapore. 
Whether the Approach would be taken up by the relevant actors—the judges in their 
constitutional rights reasoning, the political leadership in their policy-making—depends on a 
variety of factors, chief among them being the types of personalities involved, and their 
willingness to not just think outside the box, but replace the existing toolbox. My pessimistic 
disposition prevents me from any kind of prediction that the Approach will persuade the 
relevant actors; save to express a tenuous hope that, at some point, the Inclusive 
Communitarian Approach would at least enter the conversation about rights in Singapore, be 
it in public debates or between constitutional scholars. 
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Be that as it may, and regardless of its practical consequences, I hope to have 
successfully shown that the unsuccessful outcome of Singapore’s constitutional rights 
challenges is not an inevitable consequence of a communitarian approach to rights. If there 
were to be one lasting impression that I hope for this thesis to make, it is that constitutional 
rights can be protected within a communitarian framework, and that protecting rights is not 
only the business of liberalism; communitarianism can undertake the task with robustness as 
well.  
For Singaporean readers in particular, I hope to have convinced them that we should 
not be resigned to the assumption that the Singapore judiciary’s non-vindication of our 
constitutional rights so far is the price that we have to pay for Singapore’s communitarian 
exceptionalism; that our rights are the prize that we have to give up for Singapore to stake its 
own unique communitarian identity in drawing and defining the contours of its place in the 
modern world. Amidst the conservative forces chipping away at our diversity by screeching at 
the government to ban anything that it disagrees with,817 I hope that my theory provides a 
plausible, if not convincing, counter-argument to those who would use communitarianism as 
an excuse for the unequal treatment of the LGB, religious, transgender, political, and so on 
members of our national community. To naysayers who might accuse my theory of being too 
radical for conservative Singapore, I hope that they would realise that there is nothing radical 
about treating fellow Singaporeans as equals; that, indeed, it is the basic expectation and 
entitlement of what we have pledged to each other: as one united people, regardless of race, 
language or religion—or any other constitutive community.  
  
 
817 See the recent cancelled concert of Swedish death metal group Watain after some religious conservatives’ 
outrage: ‘Watain Concert Cancelled Based on Christian Community’s Reaction after Initial Approval’ Channel 
News Asia (Singapore, 1 April 2019) <www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/watain-concert-cancelled-
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